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ABSTRACT
INSTITUTIONALIZING SOLAR THERMAL TECHNOLOGIES IN THE HOMEBUILDING INDUSTRY
Barbara S. Parker
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on March 12, 1980 in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of City
Planning.
Each year, nearly 20 percent of the national energy budget is used for
home space and water heating. Solar thermal technologies could meet a large
fraction of these needs and thereby help to mitigate the current U.S. energy
dilemna. But they are far from the point of widespread diffusion in the
homebuilding industry.
Drawing on the theoretical literature on innovation, this thesis aims to
broaden the traditional perspective on innovation acceptance, and to suggest
additional means for facilitating acceptance of the technology. Central to
the analysis is the view that innovations are not likely to be accepted on the
basis of their intrinsic characteristics alone. Rather, innovation acceptance
is a more complex process, set in the context of a larger "institutional"
environment. How an innovation is seen is partly a function of the "process"
in which it is encountered in terms of the existing institutional environment.
To investigate this proposition and identify the forces contributing to
innovation acceptance, the thesis examines three cases in which solar thermal
was used in housing. (All are projects in the HUD Solar Heating and Cooling
Demonstration Program, a program which provides grants to homebuilders to
encourage use of the technology). Three different developer types are
presented: the speculative builder, the housing cooperative, and the
non-profit developer.
The study concludes that institutional forces significantly effect the
rate and extent of acceptance of solar thermal technologies. All three
builders were induced to use solar thermal not only because of the
availability of HUD funding, but also, because the technology was introduced
and associated with a range of facilitating institutional forces. This
included a variety of supporting institutional entities, i.e., individuals
and/or groups, who, because of their "institutionalized," roles and functions
were able to "mediate" the uncertainties of the technology and generally
"legitimate" its use. Similar mediating and legitimating effects were
achieved by introducing solar thermal in supportive institutional contexts,
i.e., contexts in keeping with the builders' institutional routines.
On the basis of these and related forces common to the solar thermal
acceptance process, the thesis makes recommendations for the design.of future
programs aiming to facilitate acceptance of solar thermal technologies in the
homebuilding industry. Though the thesis focuses exclusively on solar thermal
technologies, it is believed that the conclusions have validity for the
introduction of other new energy technologies in the homebuilding industry,
and innovation in the homebuilding industry in general.
Thesis Supervisor Richard D. Tabors
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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6INTRODUCTION
In the face of continuing political and economic unrest in the
oil-exporting countries of the Middle East, rising energy prices and
spiraling inflation, coupled with concerns about the environmental
consequences of coal and nuclear powered plants, alternative energy
sources like solar energy are being looked upon from a wholly new
perspective. Currently, the solar energy field is itself marked by
turbulence and uncertainty, with attitudes differing widely as to the
potentials of different solar approaches and systems. Nevertheless, it
is clear that solar energy has become a serious alternative energy source
for the long-term future. As one recent study notes, the issue is now a
matter of "how much solar energy, what kind--and when." [1]
A particularly compelling case can be made for the use of solar
thermal technologies in buildings, specifically in the residential
sector. Of all solar technologies, those small-scale technologies for
space and hot water heating are the most technically advanced and easily
adapted. And buildings play a significant role in energy consumption;
each year, home energy use accounts for roughly 20 percent of the
national energy budget. Judgements differ as to the precise contribution
solar thermal can make. But whether a solar thermal system can supply
only 50 percent of the energy used in the home, as projected in the most
conservative forecasts, or 100 percent, as suggested in the most
1Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, eds., Energy Future: Report of theEnergy Project at the Harvard Business School, New York: Random HouSe,
1979 . p. 183.
7optimistic, the potentials for mitigating the current U.S. energy dilemma
are, by all means, considerable.
This thesis aims to explore new means for facilitating more rapid
acceptance and widespread use of solar thermal technologies in the
homebuilding industry. For as compelling as the case may appear, solar
thermal is far fram the stage of widespread diffusion in the industry.
Since the time of the oil embargo, the idea of solar thermal has gained
in appeal, and use of the technology has increased. But solar thermal is
not yet considered a serious alternative by actors in the mainstay of the
homebuilding industry, the homebuilder, in particular.
Many different explanations have been offered to account for this
predicament, as might be expected in a field so new and dynamic. Most
analyses, however, conceptualize the problem in terms of a "mismatch" or
incanpatibility between the intrinsic characteristics of the technology,
in its present state of development, and major industry dispositions and
routines. Solar thermal, for example, involves a high capital cost,
while industry members are characteristically "first cost sensitive."
Solar thermal is at odds with industry design and aesthetic standards: a
solar house looks and "feels" different from the traditional home
characteristically sought by the homebuyer. Further, solar thermal
currently involves many uncertainties, uncertainties regarding key
activities in the housing production process (e.g., product procurement,
distribution, installation and service) in addition to basic
technological uncertainties. Members of the homebuilding industry,
however, are characteristically conservative, and often avoid things
perceived to be uncertain and/or risky.
8In turn, on the basis of these related instances of "mismatch," a
host of policies and programs have been proposed to facilitate more rapid
acceptance of the technology. This includes a variety of financial
incentives, e.g., federal and state loans, grants, and tax abatements;
programs to upgrade solar thermal systems and components in technological
areas; programs to develop product standards, warranties, performance
criteria, procedures for product certification and labeling--in all,
measures to alter the characteristics of the technology such that solar
thermal is "intrinsically" more compatible with existing industry
dispositions and routines.
By contrast, a review of the theoretical literature on innovation
suggests a view of the innovation acceptance process that is at once more
dynamic and more complex. Innovations are not simply bundles of
intrinsic characteristics, and the process of innovation acceptance is
not likely to be as "objective" or rationally based as conventional
analyses imply. Rather, innovation acceptance is a process taking place
in the context of a larger "institutional" environment, that is, an
environment of regularized relationships, shared assumptions and
expections about different individuals and groups, appropriate behavior
in different contexts, and the like. In this context, the attributes of
an innovation like solar thermal are not entirely fixed, intrinsic to the
innovation, but instead, the product of the interchange between the
innovation and forces in the institutional environment. In other words,
the process of innovation acceptance is likely to be both objective and
subjective, depending on the intrinsic characteristics of the innovation
9as well as the "process" in which it is encountered in the existing
institutional environment.
In this study, the process of innovation acceptance is explored to
more fully understand the current resistance to solar thermal and to
assess the potentials suggested in the latter approach. Specifically,
the thesis examines three cases in which solar thermal was used in
housing, at the initiation of the homebuilder. [2] Three different
builder types are presented: the small to medium-sized speculative
builder, the housing cooperative, and the non-profit developer. By
considering each builder's likely predisposition toward solar thermal on
the basis of the technology's intrinsic compatibility with the builder's
disposition and routines, in addition to the process in which the
innovation was encountered and used in the context of the institutional
environment, the thesis attempts to identify the diverse forces
contributing to the acceptance of the innovation. In particular, the
thesis aims to assess the extent to which institutional forces played a
part in facilitating acceptance, and to identify those forces common to
the solar thermal acceptance process that may be of use in future
programs attempting to facilitate acceptance of the technology.
The thesis is divided into five major sections, organized as
follows. In the first section, Chapter 1, the theoretical framework is
2A11 three case studies are projects in the HUD Solar Heating and
Cooling Demonstration Program. This Program, the first federal
intervention in the housing market to encourage the use of solar thermal
technologies, provides grants to builders to cover the incremental costs
due to the use of solar thermal.
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presented; institutions, and the institutional context in which
innovation acceptance take place, are defined and described; factors
believed critical to the process of innovation acceptance are discussed.
In the following two chapters, Chapter 2 and 3, this framework is used to
assess the likely response of the homebuilding industry to an innovation
like solar thermal and to suggest the means by which the innovation
acceptance process might be helped along. Chapter 4 then presents the
case studies of solar thermal use in housing, and describes and analyzes
the forces contributing to acceptance of the technology. Finally,
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the case studies and presents
implications of the study for the design of future programs aiming to
facilitate the acceptance of solar thermal technologies in the
homebuilding industry.
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CHAPTER 1: INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION ANDDIFFUSION
Introduction
This chapter presents the analytic framework used in this thesis to
study the process of change, i.e., "innovation," in the homebuilding
industry. The framework is divided into three sections. First,
"institutions" are defined and described as the key analytic construct by
which to study innovation and the context in which innovation takes
place. Briefly, institutions are the major elements in society's
normative structure, in other words, the meanings we collectively develop
and use to define both society and ourselves. As such, they provide a
sense of order and stability to the social world, making life in society
both "comprehensible" and "routine."
"Innovations," defined and described in Section 2, stand in direct
contrast to institutions as "new" things which have yet to acquire social
meaning, i.e., shared assumptions and expectations. Innovation
acceptance is explained as a naming/integrating/routinizing process, in
short, the process of institutionalization.
Building on this framework, Section 3 describes some of the critical
factors in the process of innovation acceptance focusing on those factors
likely to contribute to the acceptance of an innovation. Briefly, in so
far as innovations can only be understood in terms of what is already
known, i.e., existing institutions, the probability of innovation
acceptance is hypothesized to be higher if, in its introduction, the
innovation is connected or in some way associated with the existing
institutional structure, in particular, through personal sources of
information.
12
Institutions Defined
To understand the context in which innovation takes place and the
concept of innovation itself, it is necessary to begin with the more
fundamental social construct, the institution. Traditionally, this term
has been used to denote one of two things: formal social groups and
organizations, for example, the US Senate or the Exxon Corporation, or
less formal societal dispositions, such as customs and folklore. In this
study a broader view encompassing both definitions is taken.
Institutions are defined as the repositories or carriers of social
meaning; they are manifestations of society's normative formulations,
i.e., society's notions of good/bad, appropriate/inappropriate,
worthy/undeserving--in short, the meanings we develop and use to define
both society and ourselves [1].
Anthropology and sociology, the disciplines traditionally concerned
with human social order, provide the context for understanding
institutions. In brief, "man" is said to occupy a peculiar position in
the animal kingdom because in contrast to other higher mammals, human
nature is not fixed to any large degree by biological drives. Thus "man"
can have no "species specific" environment, that is, no environment
naturally structured by instinctual organization [2]. Both human nature
and the human social world must largely be constructed. In other words,
1Thomas E. Nutt-Powell et al., "Towards a Theory of Institutional
Analysis," Cambridge, MA: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1978, p. 3.
2Peter'L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co. (Anchor Books), 1967,
p. 46.
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our identities as individuals as well as the human social world must be
humanly produced. Neither is "given" or "pre-defined" in the way things
are in the physical world. Thus neither has meaning in and of itself.
Our identities are real only to the extent that they are routinely
recognized by society. One cannot assume and/or maintain a position of
power if others are unwilling to confer and agree to such status; I
cannot think of myself as reliable or trustworthy all by myself. In a
similar vein, society requires our confirmation to exist. Social
phenomena, for example, social mores, marriage, divorce, our legal
sanctions, and so on, are "real" only because we as individuals agree to
them and routinely confirm their existence through our actions [3].
Although as we shall see, there is little likelihood of such occurence,
if individuals were to all of a sudden begin acting in ways to contradict
these parts of the social world, they would, quite simply, no longer
exist.
In sum, both society and human nature exist, to a very large extent,
by virtue of definition. Institutions, then, can be understood as the
constructs or meanings by which we define them; they are our shared
assumptions about social reality, the common frame of reference we use to
organize our individual activities and our interactions with others, to
carry out life in human society. Thus, we can speak of religion, of
class or of the economy as institutions. Similarly, the various customs,
3This phenomenological perspective toward social reality is more
fully explained in Berger and Luckmann; David Silverman, The Theory of
Organizations, New York: Basic Books, 1971, Chapter 6; and in a series
of working papers by Filmer et al., in New Directions in Sociological
Theory, London, England: MIT Press, 1972.
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practices, mores, and so on, dealing with the delegation and regulation
of power can be seen as political institutions, those dealing with the
administration, legal institutions, and those dealing with adjudication,
judicial institutions. In a similar vein, that wide range of customs,
practices, traditions and beliefs relating to the transmittal or learning
about society and social behavior, both the informal approaches found in
the home and the formal approaches found in schools, are examples of the
institutions of socialization.
Though institutions are characteristically either "prescriptive" or
"proscriptive," always carrying some one of the many qualitatively
different kinds of "shoulds" or "oughts," there is an enormous range in
the extent of such normative emphasis [4]. Obviously, there is a
significant difference between fashion and fads, and religious precepts.
Further, institutions exhibit enormous variability on such related issues
as enforcement modes, enforcing agencies, consistency of enforcement,
sources of authority for enforcement, penalties/rewards associated with
non-compliance, and so on [5]. For example, some institutions are
enforced entirely through informal means, e.g., gossip or ridicule, while
others are enforced through more formal and institutionalized mechanisms,
e.g., law enforcement agencies and the courts. Still other institutions
have no explicit means of enforcement at all. They may be internalized
in individual personalities such that individuals simply consider it to-
4Robin Williams Jr., American Society: A Sociological
Interpretation, New York: Alfred~A~~Kn6FpT170 (3rd edTfion), p. 29.
51bid., p. 30.
15
"be their duty," or "their right," and act in a manner consistent with
this view.
Another important aspect on which institutions vary considerably is
in their distribution, in other words, the extent to which they are known
and accepted and the extent to which they are actually deemed appropriate
and used [6]. Some institutions, for example, are widely known, and
agreed upon and also widely used, while others are known and used by only
a select group. There are other institutions that are known and
acknowledged by a broad public but considered relevant or applicable for
use by a much smaller class of individuals. Thus many may know and agree
on the appropriate roles for high school students and teachers, but these
roles are applicable only to these groups. In regard to the variations
in the prevalence of the actual application and use, institutions can be
viewed relative to a continuum ranging from the personal to the
societal. It is also important to recognize that between these extremes
institutions are manifest in many different forms. In addition to such
entities as individuals, formal organizations, or informal groups,
institutions are manifest in more amorphous entities such as social
orders (for example, the traditions of law) or collectives (such as
alternative energy advocates) [7].
In spite of these many variations, institutions have certain basic
features in common. One approach to identifying these features is to
consider the manner in which institutions develop and the manner in
6Ibid.
7Nutt-Powell, p. 21.
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which they are used. Here institutions are often visualized as the core
or critical elements in a social dialetic. "Man" defines society, i.e.,
through the creation of institutions. In turn, society, i.e.,
institutions define "man." Though the process is continual, for analytic
purposes, it is useful to discuss these two aspects of institutions and
the institutionalization process separately.
On the one hand, in the construction of the social world (i.e., "man"
defines society) institutions always have their origins in action, in
general, habitualized action. As explained in the anthropological
literature, all human activity is subject to habitualization. Actions
that are frequently repeated become "cast into patterns"--in a word,
"typified"; in this form, they can be repeated at will in the future,
with the same economy of effort and with recognition by their performers
as "those patterns" [8]. Most importantly, the actions retain their
meanings for their performers. Because they will serve the same
function, in other words, have the same meaning in future usage, future
activities can, in fact, be anticipated and alternative actions
considered.
This process of habitualization and recall is central to the process
of institutionalization. Institutionalization, however, has one further
requirement. It must involve more than one person; in other words, the
typifying experience must be shared. As Berger and Luckmann explain:
institutionalization occurs whenever there is a 'reciprocal
typification' of habitualized actions by types of actors . .
8Berger and Luckmann, p. 53.
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put differently, any such typification is an institution..." [9]. Berger
and Luckmann aim to stress two points in this account: first, the
"typicality" or "institutional reciprocity" of actions and forms of
action and secondly, the "typicality" or "institutional reciprocity" of
the actors themselves. In other words, actions and forms of action (and
forms of forms of action, and so on), are recognized -as performable or
relevant to not only particular actors, but to actors of certain types
(types of types and so on). In essence, the institution posits that
actions of type X will be performed by actors of type X such that the
institution is as much typification of the actor as it is of the
action [10].
Thus the practice of "carbohydrate loading," the various calisthenics
of the warm-up practice, the proverbial pre-race dinner, and the act of
participating in the marathon are actions that can be grouped together
and categorized as being of a distinct type as are the individuals who
characteristically engage in them. Such actions are considered
"institutionalized" when they are recognized as both appropriate and
applicable to other individuals in similar circumstances. Actions of
this type are distinct and typical for actors in this situation.
Admittedly, this is a simple example, but it does serve to illustrate
the general thrust of the institutionalization process, that is, the
association of meaning with action, and its retention for future use.
Language, of course, is basic to this process of meaning construction
9 Ibid., p. 54.
10 Ibid.
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as it is primarily through language that these experiences can be shared
on a societal scale. Clearly, only a small portion of such experiences
could possibly be retained in human consciousness. As Berger and
Luckmann explain, the typification of actions requires that these have an
"objective" sense; we must, in other words, have some form of a common
"language," a vocabulary relating to our routinized actions and types of
actions and actors such that we can speak of actions and their senses
apart from the individual performers. Only in this way, can these
actions become available on a societal scale; moreover, only in this way,
can we transmit our experiences from one generation to the next [11].
Thus institutionalization can be conceptualized as a routinizing,
standardizing, naming process. Words, gestures, pictorial symbols, and
the like, are attached to actions/actors and thereafter standardized,
such that a word/gesture/symbol means the same thing each time it is
used and to all who use it. In short, institutions are created.
On the other side of the dialectic (society defines "man") it is
institutions that we use as a frame of reference in future interactions.
As predefined patterns for conduct in different contexts, and as
different schemes for categorizing persons/places/processes/events,
institutions serve as scripts (or at least stage directions), supplying
typologies for individual actions and world view and helping to make
sense of the actions of others. Because there is general agreement about
the meaning of types of actions/actors, and about the various typifying
schemes, we can, upon seeing someone performing activity, make some sense
llIbid., pp. 67-72.
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of behavior. Importantly, institutions are germane to all major
functions in societal life as well as those of lesser significance.
Typificatory schemes are available for all categories of events and
experiences, for all the major routines of everyday life. I know, for
example, how I am expected to behave in any of various socialization
functions, say, as a teacher. I know the activities and rights and
obligations that go along with this position as do the others with whom I
am expected to interact--students, parents, administrators, and so on.
There exists a similar body of knowledge regarding research, political,
and production functions and for the activities and possible roles
through which they might be carried out.
By defining problems and solutions in this way, institutions channel
human behavior in certain directions, narrowing the range of the many
courses theoretically possible. In this capacity, institutions can be
considered similar to the construct anthopologists and sociologists have
traditionally called norms, defined as "customs with a binding
quality" [12]. Institutions, however, are generally considered to be
more than norms first, because of the degree to which they are applied
and supported, and secondly, because of the degree to which they exhibit
structure [13]. As we have seen, institutions do not concern single,
isolated actions but complexes of actions exhibiting an appreciable
degree of regularity and relationship. Socialization functions, for
example, are manifest in a number of different institutional entities
12 Nutt-Powell, p. 3.
13Williams, p. 37, quoted in Nutt-Powell, p. 3.
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e.g., the family, the schools, the courts... each dealing with particular
aspects of socialization but related to one another in fixed and
definable ways. Similarly, economic functions are manifest in such a
wide variety of forms as the Federal Reserve Bank, the U.S. Treasury, the
local credit union, and these too are related to one another in fixed and
identifiable ways. Thus, institutions not only concern the what, i.e.,
the normative aspects of behavior, but the how/when/in what form, as
well. As Nutt-Powell sums up, ". . . an institution has both form and
meaning; it persuades, but it also constrains; it charts directions and
sets contexts" [14].
Thus we have described the dual aspects of institutions, the two
sides of the dialectic in which they are involved. On the one hand,
institutions always originate in action; they are the products of our
interactions, our routine behaviors and interrelationships. At the same
time, institutions serve as framework or backdrop for our actions; in
supplying a pre-defined typology for action, they channel our behavior
along certain paths, limiting the range of behaviors theoretically
possible.
Because there are two sides to the dialectic, one must be careful not
to over-emphasize either. For example, one might hold an overly
deterministic view of institutions as rigid formulae or blueprints for
behavior. But, as noted earlier, institutions typically include varying
levels of compulsion and varying levels of reward and sanction. Thus
there is almost always some margin of choice or variability inherent in
14Nutt-Powell, p. 5.
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institutionalized modes of conduct. Moreover, there may be ambiguity if
not overt internal conflict among institutions, thus mandating individual
choice. Any individual has a particular social and religious origin, a
given occupation, and is perhaps a member of different formal and/or
informal organizations. Consequently, there are likely to be many
relevant institutional typologies and modes of conduct not all of which
are likely to be in accord, or entirely explicit as to their
differences. Thus it is not always possible to fulfill them all. There
may also be differences in personal psychological makeup, and thus
different perceptions or interpretations of institutions (e.g., their
normative content, their sanctions, and so on) thus making inevitable
varied responses to institutional imperatives and deviance from
institutionalized modes of conduct.
Even in principle, though, institutions should not be taken as rules
or determinants of behavior. It is more accurate to see them as
providing a framework for action. In the same way that roles in the
theatre may be ad libbed, or rejected altogether, even on stage, the same
is true of institutions. Situations, in other words, are examined and
appraised "over and against" the institution, and in the resolution
reached after examination and appraisal, the institution is either
sustained or changed [15]. Time brings forth new situations requiring a
testing or reassessment of our institutions. Institutions must thus be
reaffirmed in the actions of everyday life if they are to remain
institutions; expectations can, of course, only continue as expectations
15Ibid., p. 4.
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to the extent that they are proven reliable through action. Thus, while
it is correct to say that institutions originate in action, the view that
institutions are themselves a priori determinants of action should be
avoided [16].
At the same time that we avoid such an overly deterministic view of
institutions, we must also avoid going to the opposite extreme and
negating the significance of institutions in human behavior and in the
social world in general. For the fact is, despite some variability in
interpretation, once established, institutions have a tendency to
persist. To the extent that it does occur, institutional change proceeds
at a very slow pace. This is true at least for the most important of our
institutions, those dealing with the most fundamental human situations
and involving many individuals, e.g., law, education, finance. One
reason for the stability and permanence of our institutions is the fact
that institutions and the institutional order always precede us. We had
no part in its making; essentially it is "presented" to us during the
course of socialization: "this is how these things are done." Thus
institutions may not only seem factual and compelling, but also,
self-evident and self-validating. (They are there whether we like it or
not; we cannot wish them away and if we are to take part in the social
world we must "go out" and learn about them [18].) They may become, as
one sociologist has phrased it, a "commonsense" reality, in essence, a
16 This view is also elaborated in Silverman, Chapter 6.
17Berger and Luckmann, pp. 59-60.
18Ibid.
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world taken for granted [19]. To the extent that they are fully
internalized during the course of socialization, when we comply with the
institutionalized typologies for conduct, we believe that we are acting
in the most logical, natural way, doing what any reasonable individual
would expect.
It is also important to realize that the maintenance of our
institutional order satisfies a human need for order and stability.
Needless to say, without some degree of coherence and stability in our
actions as well as predictability of what others will do under given
circumstances, there could be no cooperation, no sharing of knowledge, in
short, no society. Even the simplest situations would become confusing,
resulting, in the extreme, in utter psychological disorder and
alienation, ("If we are lacking in the biological means to provide
order/stability for human affairs, it is this very situation that makes
.it imperative that we construct a stable background for our actions"
[20]). Thus, as Silverman notes: "...the fact that the stock of
knowledge upon which action is based tends to change rather slowly
reflects the vested interest that we all have in avoiding anomie by
maintaining a system of meanings which daily confirms the non-problematic
nature of our definitions of ourselves" [21].
It is this quality of stability and order that best characterizes the
functions served by institutions. Above all else, institutions ensure
19Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenonology of the Social World, Chicago:
Northwestern University Press, 196/, quoted in -ilmer et al., p. 7.
20Berger and Luckmann, p. 52.
21Silverman, p. 134.
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that life in human society is experienced as comprehensible as well as
commonplace. On the one hand, there is little cause for surprise when
individuals act in institutionally prescribed ways. The actors and the
actions are simply taken for granted; they are, in a word, routine. But
institutions are of perhaps even greater significance in providing us
with a framework within which to understand the new. For example, when
unexpected events occur [22] the usual response is to look around for an
already learned definition of the situation, i.e., an institution. In
other words, we try to relate the unfamiliar to what we already know. We
use our existing institutions to try to explain the new situation--
indeed, given the definitional quality of human reality, this is the best
we can do. In thus relating and integrating the new into the existing
institutional structure, it too becomes stable and routine; part of the
common stock of knowledge, in other words, part of the framework within
which still newer things may be explained.
Though institutions serve many other purposes still, in the final
analysis, the underlying structure of institutions and the
institutionalization process is one of stability and routine. Even
though there is no pre-defined social world, no pre-defined patterns for
human interaction, and even though the world around us is constantly
undergoing reassessment and change, it is made both comprehensible and
manageable by institutions, which exist and seem stable because we
22Here we define an "unexpected event" as a situation that
contradicts our expectations, a situation we have yet to experience in
common and thus for which we have yet to develop shared assumptions and
expectations, i.e., institutions.
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"name" them [23]. In sum, though they are undergoing constant change, at
any point in time there exist certain expectations and assumptions we
share about how to go about doing x, y, z, about how to carry out life in
the social world. These institutions serve to provide order and
stability; they serve as the framework within which anything "new" will
be known [24].
Innovation Defined
Innovations stand in direct contrast to institutions. Where
institutions are things with social meaning, identified as shared
assumptions and expectations, and thus representing the stable and the
routine, innovations are "new" things, that is, things which have yet to
acquire social meaning. However, an innovation need not be objectively
new. To qualify as an innovation it need only be perceived as new. It
is also important to point out at this defining stage that however new
and/or unusual an innovation may appear, or however vast the changes it
necessitates in institutional functions, activities and roles, it always
has antecedents. Given the definitional quality of the social world,
coupled with the dialectical nature of change, an innovation is typically
a combination of existing things; it is the manner and perception of this
combination that makes it new.
The process through which an innovation is introduced (known commonly
as diffusion),has been described from a variety of perspectives.
23Nutt-Powell, p. 5.
24 Berger and Luckmann, p. 66.
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Although the terminology varies depending on the discipline of the
analyst, most analysts focus on the stages or phases that individual
adopting units (i.e., institutional entities) go through in encountering
the innovation. -Most models of the process include at least five
stages: awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and
integration/rejection [25]. In general, after an entity becomes aware of
an innovation (through any of a variety of means) further information is
sought if it appears that the innovation might possibly apply to the
entity's particular needs. Then, to the extent that the attributes of
the innovation are evaluated positively, in regard to existing
institutional meanings and routines, the innovation is tested. Later, on
the same evaluative basis, the innovation is either rejected or
integrated (in original or modified form) into the entity's routine. It
becomes, in other words, a routine part of the adopters behavior, that
is, it is institutionalized.
Over time, the same process is repeated by other institutional
entities in the sectoral area (say other members of the industry, or
other offices in a branch of government) until all entities have been so
introduced. Institutional entities in different sectoral areas relate to
one another in fixed and definable ways. (They are thus often called
social systems). It is through the course of the exchanges between and
2 5Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of
Innovations: A Cross-Cultural Approach, New York Tie~FieePeiss, 1971,
ppji99::T33 passim~~~5ee -afiYonald G. Havelock, Plannin for Innovation
through Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge, Ann AFror: ~Ceier
for Research on Utilizatiof$cientific iKnowledge, University of
Michigan, 1970, Chapter 8, for a discussion of Rogers' model and other
major innovation diffusion theories.
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among entities that information about the innovation is passed on. Thus
most analysts also consider the communication channels and the media by
which an innovation is introduced. The whole diffusion process is, in
fact, often framed in terms of the communication model. An innovation
(i.e., something new) is communicated through certain channels over time
among the members of a social system i.e., institutional entities with
routinized relationships, shared values, and the like [26].
These models of the innovation diffusion process are useful for
highlighting some of the critical elements involved; however, on the
basis of the preceding discussion on institutions, the diffusion process
would appear to be far more dynamic and variable than these models
imply. In the same way that social order and social meaning is not
simply given or fixed, neither are the attributes of an innovation. Of
course certain attributes are fixed (e.g., a solar energy system with
flat plate collectors, storage bins and so on is a "heating" system to
all who use it.) However, on the basis of such objective attributes an
innovation generates its own meaning structure which must in turn, be
"institutionalized." Moreover, there are other, perhaps less tangible,
attributes of the system, e.g., whether it is a symbol of status or a
symbol of efficiency, which can only be determined in the course of the
interchange between the innovation and the environment.
Most importantly, an innovation can only be understood in terms of
what is already known i.e., existing institutions. An innovation may
26Ibid., p. 18. See also Havelock, Chapter 10, for a discussion of
the "social interaction" model of the innovation diffusion process.
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thus appear different to different institutional entities. Moreover, an
innovation may not effect all of these entities at the same time. Thus,
in so far as the innovation acquires social meaning in interchanges with
institutional entities, the innovation itself will have different
meanings at different times. The same innovation may appear different to
the same institutional entity when encountered at different times.
Another element contributing to the dynamic nature of the diffusion
process is the fact that the innovation may be modified in objective
(i.e., technical terms) as well. That is, in response to actual use and
meanings acquired from exchanges, the primary attributes of the
innovation may themselves be changed, once again setting the stage for a
new round of changed (as well as varied) perceptions on the part of
existing institutional entities.
Taking these factors into account, Nutt-Powell describes the
diffusion process as occuring over time in a series of stages as social
meaning is accumulated and sustained [27]. Although this is an ongoing
process, for analytic purposes, three distinct stages are assumed, each
stage identifiable by virtue of different objective characteristics of
the innovation [28]. In the first stage, the innovation is said to be
"undifferentiated;" that is, it is initially perceived in single form
because there is no body of knowledge, i.e., social meaning, regarding it
excepting, of course, the body of knowledge sustained by the inventor of
27 Nutt-Powell, pp. 24-25.
28 Ibid.
29
the innovation [29]. In these first encounters though, it may be assumed
that the innovation does acquire social meaning. (The innovation will be
defined in some way by the institutions encountering it). In turn, the
innovation is assumed to change in objective form. In the next stage,
the innovation is encountered by additional institutional entities. Like
the entities that encountered it in the first stage, these newer
participants will initially perceive the innovation in a single form,
i.e., as undifferentiated; however, the innovation will appear
differentiated at least to some extent, to the institutional entities
that encountered in the previous stage. For these entities there is some
social meaning, some shared experiences and expectations with the
innovation. A comparable process occurs in stage three as additional
entities encounter the innovation [30].
In sum, innovation diffusion occurs through a series of stages as
different institutional entities establish exchange relationships with
the innovation and social meaning is accumulated. Each stage and the
process as a whole involves work on the meaning structure and can be
characterized as a process leading from unknown to convention, innovation
to institution and no social meaning to social meaning" [31]. Although
institutional entities may encounter the innovation at different times.
(An innovation may have proceeded through any number of cycles before it
29Ibid., p. 25.
30 Ibid., p. 26.
3 1Ibid.
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is encountered by an entity for the first time) the process is not, on
the whole, necessarily cumulative [32].
Critical Elements in the Diffusion Process
Progress in the diffusion process--the rate at which an innovation is
tested and adopted and whether it is adopted at all--is thought to depend
on a wide range of issues. Though the precise terminology and usage
varies by the discipline of the analyst, most focus on three sets of
variables. Much emphasis is placed on the characteristics of the
innovation. Rogers and Shoemaker, for example, consider such variables
as relative advantage, compatability, complexity, triability and
observability, as the perceived attributes of innovations affecting the
rate of adoption [33]. Similarly, Havelock considers the scientific
status of the innovation, i.e., reliability, validity, communicability, a
variety of cost factors, e.g., psychological costs, financial costs and
the amount and type of change the innovation will require [34].
Characteristics of the social system are also considered, for
example, the general character of the institutional entities, whether
they are generally tradition-bound versus modern, open or resistant to
change, and so on, as well as the structural characteristics of the
sector under analysis. Here Havelock notes such variables as size,
32Ibid., p. 27.
33Rogers and Shoemaker, Chapter 4, pp. 135-172.
34Havelock, Chapter 8 passim.
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centralization versus decentralization, vertical versus horizontal
organization, among others [35].
The third area of concern centers on the communication of the
innovation, the information flow channels and patterns between and among
entities within the sector as well as the media used. Both channels and
media are considered to have different intrinsic as well as institutional
meanings and therefore different effects on diffusion and adoption rates.
These variables are, no doubt, helpful in providing some means of
gauging the likely course of the diffusion of any given innovation in a
given sector. However, they may be synthesized to form a more
fundamental hypothesis. That is, if an innovation will always be
introduced in an established institutional environment and will therefore
only be understandable and acceptable to the extent that it is consistent
with or at least appearing to make sense with existing institutional
meanings and routines, the obvious implication for affecting a successful
diffusion process is to maximize the bases of similarity between the
innovation and existing institutions. In ideal circumstances the
innovation would appear sufficiently connected or related to existing
institutional forms so as to appear not only understandable but the
logical, commonsense thing to do.
On this basis, it is suggested that innovation acceptance is likely
to be higher if an innovation is introduced through existing
institutional entities and in contexts that are consistent with current
institutional meanings and routines. In so introducing an innovation,
35 Ibid., Chapter 6 passim.
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the newness and the uncertainty of the innovation may be mediated and the
innovation itself may be made to appear more stable, more routine.
Similarly, by association with the existing institutional structure, the
meaning of the innovation may be deliberately manipulated and modified;
in other words, it may be made to take on a meaning that is more
compatible with existing institutional meanings and routines.
This is not to imply that an innovation will be accepted simply
because it is encountered through existing institutional entities and/or
in institutionally supportive contexts. As noted earlier, innovations
always have certain fixed and objective characteristics; for example,
product A currently costs $x; it functions at xI level of efficiency under
conditions y,, at x2 level of efficiency under conditions y2, and so on.
Thus certain innovations may be inherently more congruent or consistent
with existing institutional meanings and routines.
What is being stressed here is that innovations are not likely to be
accepted on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics alone.
Innovations are, as noted, new things which cannot be entirely
objectively understood. As noted in the first section, we use our
existing definitions and expectation, i.e., our existing institutions, to
try to understand innovations; however, it is only in rare cases, when
the intrinsic characteristics of the innovation are extraordinarily
similar or in some way comparable to our existing things, that we can
fully grasp what is meant or implied by an innovation. Thus, the process
by which a potential user evaluates and eventually determines to accept
or reject an innovation is rarely an entirely objective one. As
suggested in the previous section and explained more fully below,
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innovation acceptance is not based on judgments regarding the intrinsic
characteristics of an innovation alone.
Most importantly, it is necessary to realize that innovations, like
institutions and social order in general, always involve "social
meaning;" in other words, the meaning we attribute to an innovation, the
attributes we assume it to have, are not fixed or immutable, nor are they
necessarily intrinsic to the innovation alone. The meanings we attribute
to an innovation are the meanings we ourselves develop. Put in a
different way, they are the meanings that develop through our use and
through association and interchange with entities in the existing
institutional environment. As explained in the first section,
innovations are always introduced into an existing institutional
environment, that is an environment of shared meanings and assumptions
about persons, places and events, assumptions about what types of
behavior are appropriate in what contexts, and for which individuals and
groups. And the point is, that we not only use such meanings and
assumptions to try to understand and evaluate new things, they are also
likely to color our view toward an innovation. In short, how we view an
innovation will depend, at least to some degree, on the manner or process
through which it is encountered, in terms of existing institutional
environment.
Thus, innovations are new things, which, by the very fact of their
being different, cannot be objectively (or routinely) understood, while,
by contrast, institutions are things which we explicitly (or routinely)
understand, things which we have, in fact, come to agree upon. Thus, I
may not fully understand what product A entails, what X promises to do,
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or how it intends to achieve such ends. However, I do know, that
individual B has always given me good advice in the past; he has always
kept an eye out for my interests and introduced me to things that served
me well. Thus I may expect this to be the case in the future.
Similarly, if I see B using A, or behaving in an X manner in relation to
A, I am likely to view A in relation to B's behavior and use. Using the
assumptions and expectations that I have for individual B, product A or
behavior X takes on a certain meaning, likely very different from the
meaning or the assumption I might make about them if I saw Individual M
or Group N using A or behaving X. (Clearly, it is easy to see that we
would have different assumptions about the same product or process if,
say, we saw Jerome Weisner using them on the one hand and Sister Theresa
on the other!).
Utilization of the existing institutional structure in this way,
i.e., associating an innovation with an existing institutional entity
and/or context, is also important for reasons relating to uncertainty and
risk. By definition, all innovations are, at least to some extent,
uncertain and risky. After all, they have not been tried before; we have
not experienced them and thus we have yet to develop any expectations or
means of predicting what they will involve. On the other hand,
institutions are by definition stable and routine. Because they have
been used and experienced, we have certain assumptions, and expectations
about them.
Thus, connection of an innovation with an existing institution would
appear to have a mediating effect. As noted above, the innovation
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itself, may be made to appear more stable and more routine if the
institution itself is stable and routine. If I see K doing something
new, in X environment, under Y circumstances, all of which I understand,
this something new is not only immediately more understandable but also
less novel, less uncertain and risky. In associating this new thing with
group K, in an understandable X context, I immediately have a context or
framework for viewing it. Obviously, it is not all that new anymore; I
can try to understand it in terms of its association with the existing
institutions; further, I can expect to learn something from K's
experiences and use of the innovation.
In sum, while an innovation must obviously have some minimal degree
of commonality or congruence with existing institutional meanings and
routines if it is to be accepted, the process of innovation is likely to
be both objective and subjective, the proportions depending on both the
intrinsic characteristics of the innovation and on the process through
which it is encountered in the existing institutional environment. In
other words, there is always likely to be some middle ground, some range
within which the meaning of an innovation can be manipulated and
positively changed if it is encountered through existing institutional
entities and/or in institutionally supportive contexts. Though both
source and context are important, personal sources of information, in
particular, are more likely to facilitate innovation acceptance through
these means as it is "easier as well as more stable and routine to
identify whom one trusts (these exchanges happen constantly) than to
decide what one trusts" [36].
36Nutt-Powell, p. 32.
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The propositions put forth here are indeed very simple:
(1) An innovation is something new, something involving some
uncertainties and risks, and something that is not altogether
clearly understood,
(2) An innovation is always introduced and evaluated in terms of
existing institutional meanings and routines,
(3) The probability of innovation acceptance increases by purposely
maximizing the bases of similarity between the innovation and
existing institutions, by connecting the innovation to things
that are already known and accepted.
In sum, though an innovation is by definition disruptive, with
intrinsic characteristics which may not be in keeping with existing
institutional meaning and routines, and thus demanding changes- in
institutional functions, activities, and roles, innovation acceptance is
likely to be higher to the extent that the innovation is encountered
through the existing institutional structure, personal sources of
information in particular. Though this does not guarantee acceptance of
an innovation, in introducing an innovation through the existing
institutional structure, the risks and uncertainties may be mediated and
the innovation given a meaning more compatible with existing meanings and
routines.
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CHAPTER 2: THE HOMEBUILDING INDUSTRY
Introduction
This chapter surveys the homebuilding industry from the institutional
perspective, noting the major institutional entities, their routines and
the linkages between and among them. The industry is described as both
unique and complex; it is an environment of high risk and uncertainty,
horizontally stratified and economically precarious in its organization.
The review will consist of three major sections: first, a brief
introduction of the industry is provided, highlighting the factors which
contribute to its uniqueness and complexity; next, the housing production
process is reviewed, noting the major institutional entities involved at
each stage, their activities and the considerations which affect their
views. The final section examines some industry-wide dispositions in
light of their implications for innovation and technological change in
the industry.
Overview
The homebuilding industry, defined broadly to include all firms and
individuals sharing in the receipts of expenditures for housing is, by
all counts, one of the most complex as well as distinct of all economic
sectors [1]. As most housing analysts point out, the uniqueness of the
industry, its organization, structure, and the characteristics of its
members, evolve largely from the characteristics of the good itself.
IReport of the President's Committee on Urban Housing, (The Kaiser
Committee Report), A Decent Home, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1969, p. 113.
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One attribute frequently noted, for example, is the localism of the
industry. Because housing is inevitably tied to land, which has
traditionally been locally regulated, and also varies in such factors as
tradition, neighborhood, geographic and climatic conditions, housing
markets differ widely from one locality to the next. Thus key actors in
the housing production process typically restrict their activities to a
small geographic areas. (Only a few of the largest firms are active on
national or even state levels [2].) A local building fraternity
predominates and major socialization activities are carried out on the
local level. Thus geographic location may be as important an indicator
of an actor's overall disposition and mode of operation as an actor's
particular profession or trade.
Another distinguishing factor frequently cited is the horizontal
fragmentation of the industry. In contrast to most other developed
industries, operations in the homebuilding sector are highly
disaggregated, with responsibility for nearly all major activities
divided among several different actors. (The Kaiser Commission estimated
that, on average, the construction of a single-family dwelling unit
involved 14 different subcontractors and a multi-family project 20 [3]'
These various specialized actors combine into working teams on
2According to the most recent survey of the National Association of
Homebuilders, about 97 percent of the builders build only in one state
and 2.4 percent in two states. Only 1 percent build in three or more
states. Michael Sumichrast et al., Profile of the Builder and His
Industry, Washington, D.C.: NationaT'Association of Homebuilders, 1979,
p. 2/.-
3Kaiser Committee Report, p. 151.
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short-term, ad hoc bases, disbanding at the project's end. This rather
flexible organizational pattern is largely a response to the 'individual'
characteristics of the housing product. Housing is, of course, a very
personal item, with many varieties in demand. Moreover, because of local
variations in climate, topography, and the like, no two construction jobs
are exactly alike; different projects thus require different combinations
of skills.
Another factor of major importance is the discontinuity or volatility
of industry work. Housing is costly to produce and consume; the
activities of the sector are therefore dependent on credit and extremely
sensitive to interest rates, investment patterns and general economic
conditions. When the economy is active and interest rates rising, the
industry is unable to compete with other major users of capital; housing
production declines as funds flow away from the mortgage market. (In
turn, the economy is itself slowed down because housing has such forward
linkage, i.e., involves so many different sectors of the economy.)
Conversely, housing production begins to pick up when the economy is less
active and interest rates decline. This, in turn, helps to revive the
economy. These so-called "countercyclical" tendencies, and the
corresponding fluctuations in the rate of production, are not only
naturally occurring but made more severe because of traditional federal
reliance on monetary policy to stabilize the economy. Housing production
rates are made even more volatile because of seasonal variations.
Although the traditional slowdown during the winter months is believed to
be as much a result of tradition as of necessity, it is easy to see how
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day-to-day weather changes might have serious implications for on-site
construction work.
This variability in the rate and continuity of housing production
contributes to the fragmentation noted earlier. Under a system of
functional specialization, industry firms are better able to diversify
their operations moving into other sectors of the construction industry,
e.g., commercial, industrial, when demand in the homebuilding industry is
slack. Volatility is also a major contributor to other industry
characteristics, most importantly, the unusually high rate of entry and
exit of industry firms, their size and investment patterns and also, the
characteristics of the construction labor force. Except for a few of the
materials supply houses, firms in the industry are characteristically
small, employing few full-time workers and building fewer than 25 units
per year [4]. Similarly, homebuilding firms typically invest little in
labor-saving equipment, or in the training of large segments of the labor
force. The average builder has neither the resources nor the motivation
to formally train all members of his work force; construction labor is
too easily bid away by other higher-paying industrial sectors. Thus the
construction labor force is itself highly stratified, both by skill level
and trade. The labor environment of the industry is also unique because
of the existence of trade unions which exert enormous influence on
construction operations.
Also of considerable consequence is the lack of investment in
traditional research and development (R&D) activities. Industry firms
4See Sumichrast et al., pp. 40-41, 61-62.
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are typically too small and undercapitalized to undertake such
activities. In fact, the industry as a whole is lacking in large
organizational bodies of the kind that might assume R&D functions, the
only exceptions being the National Association of Homebuilders and some
of the larger trade unions. These organizations do engage in research
activities but the scale of such efforts is minor when the size of the
industry is considered. Historically, most R&D activities of importance
to the industry have been carried out by individuals and firms in other
industrial sectors. Typically, the benefits of such research come to the
homebuilding industry after having exhausted the industry for which they
were initially undertaken [5].
In sum, the homebuilding industry is a combination of many small
operators fragmented by size, location, and function, engaging in
production through the continual formation and disbandonment of
short-lived teams. Not only are these entities dependent on one another
because of such specialization, their size and capital resources but they
are also dependent on factors over which they have little direct
influence or control, for example, general economic and weather
conditions. Taken together, these factors combine to create an
environment that is, at best, replete with risk and inherently unstable.
This is a situation having considerable consequence on the nature and
5I beams, for example, were developed for use in the building
industry only after they had exhausted the railway market. See Donald A.
Schon, Technology and Change, New York: Delacorte Press, 1967, Chapter
6, pp. 139-171. See also Michael Furlong and Thomas Nutt-Powell,
"Institutional Analysis of Research and Socialization in Housing: A
Preliminary Exploration," Cambridge, MA: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1979, p.
17.
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rate of technological change within the industry, an issue to be more
fully discussed below. However, at this point it is useful to follow the
process by which housing is produced in order to gain a more
comprehensive view of the organization and context within which the
industry operates.
The Housing Production Process
As the preceding review suggests, the housing production process is
both complex and diverse, enlisting the participation of many groups and
individuals and bounded by an equally wide array of laws, customs and
other institutional constraints. The process varies depending on housing
type (single- or multi-family) [6], tenure (owner- or renter-occupied),
and also on production initiation (custom or speculative building).
Certain activities and arrangements are common to all projects. Thus the
housing production process can be viewed as advancing through a series of
identifiable stages. For the purposes of this study, four such stages
have been identified: preparation, production, distribution and service
[7]. In the review that follows the intent is to describe the activities
and entities characteristic of housing production in general, as well as
those pertaining to certain housing types.
The first phase in the production process, preparation, includes
such preliminary activities as: generation of the building concept,
61n this study, the term "single-family" refers to structures of
housing with 1-4 dwelling units and "multi-family," those with 5 or more
units. Multi-family is usually income-producing property.
7 This four-stage approach generally follows that outlined in the
Kaiser Committee Report, p. 115.
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determination of project feasibility, translation into detailed plans for
building design and development, land acquisition and securing of
building permits, zoning approvals, and the like.
The idea for a building might come from any of a variety of sources;
planners, engineers, private investors, public and private agencies might
each initiate building projects. The term "developer," [8] however, is
typically reserved for the individual (or group) taking responsibility
for judging project feasibility (i.e., determining whether the idea is to
become an "active project") as well as responsibility for the financial
risk that project development necessarily entails. This actor will play
the lead role throughout the production process, having responsibility
for coordinating and organizing all other participants and having veto
power at all times. He/she is thus initiator and entrepreneur as well as
manager of the development process.
Feasibility at this stage is typically a function of two sets of
factors: (1) regulations--the proposed development must comply with
zoning laws, building codes, and other applicable statutes; and (2)
market conditions--whether there is sufficient demand for housing of the
type under consideration and whether it can be produced at a cost within
bounds of the resources available. As noted earlier, housing is a highly
personal item involving more than simple economics. Typically, the
housing consumer is conservative, not wanting anything radically
different from the norm. Because housing markets are competitive,
81n the construction of single-family housing, the term "builder" is
generally used instead of "developer." In this study the terms will be
used interchangeably.
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developers make careful assessments of the characteristics of local
demand as well as the costs of development.
Developers often vary in the criteria they use for making the final
decision regarding project feasibility. Criteria used depend on a number
of factors, including the size of the proposed development, the size of
the developer's operations, and working capital, as well as the
organizational arrangements planned for the development process.
Particular criteria vary among developers; what may appear a highly
appealing proposal to one developer may seem altogether infeasible to the
next. What is important to realize, though, is that even if profit is
not the sole or even primary motivation for involvement in housing
production there will always be limits on financial resources.
Assessment of market conditions is thus the critical step in determining
whether or not to proceed with a proposed development.
Market conditions are surveyed at varying levels of detail and
through a variety of means, depending on the size, complexity and risk
involved. For example, developers of large-scale, income-producing
projects typically go to considerable lengths in their analyses, engaging
specialists such as market researchers or financial analysts to carry out
detailed projections on supply and demand characteristics so as to
estimate the project's expected return on investment. Public developers
(e.g., nonprofit development corporations and public housing
authorities), are less concerned with the "profitability" of the
development and thus more likely to focus their analyses on how user
needs can best be satisfied within the available resources.
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Small-scale developers, for example, the average speculative builder
producing fewer than 10 units/year, typically go about assessing market
conditions and potentials in a more informal way, noting the prices and
items included in units recently sold and obtaining estimates from local
contractors and materials suppliers as to the costs of producing them.
In general, small-scale builders are believed to be more conservative
than developers of income-producing properties. Because of size, lack of
capital, and importantly, their reputation in the local community, their
primary concern is the production of an "acceptable," i.e., easily
marketable, product.
When a project is deemed feasible detailed planning and design
begins. For the small-scale builder this activity is actually a
continuation of the previous stage. Having surveyed the local market and
determined the constituents of an "acceptable" product, on the basis of
recent sales, the builder simply reproduces these designs, often without
the assistance of an architect. Frequently, the builder uses stock plans
from plan books (compiled by architects) and modifies them according to
site, climate and expressed demand. In the competitive conditions in the
typical housing market, builders are concerned with the costs of items
included in the design. As a rule, items are included when there is a
fair degree of certainty (determined on the basis of past experiences)
that features will be seen as adding to the marketability of the house
and thus included in the property valuations of lenders. Otherwise, the
builder's personal cash involvement (i.e., equity requirement) will be
greater, this being something that builders/developers typically try to
keep as low as possible because of the risk and cost of borrowing money.
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Similarly, the marketability of the home might suffer, as a higher down
payment would likely be required for the prospective homebuyer, this
being something that homebuyers typically avoid for reasons similar to
the builder/developer. For these reasons, the typical speculative
single-family builder is generally reluctant to break with tradition and
pioneer design changes.
By contast, in the design of multi-family housing, the variety of
actors increases as does the number of constraints. In most cases, an
architect is engaged to translate the original ideas first into schematic
models and later into working drawings. Usually a series of designs is
drawn, each with different attributes at different projected costs, Here
the constraints of marketability are most evident. In general, project
design is first based on an estimate of rents that can be charged for
that location and that general housing type. More specific design
features are based on estimated construction costs and financing terms.
(Here developers consider the relationship between construction and
carrying costs, and projected rents.) As with single-family
developments, the inclusion of specific features is largely dependent on
the extent to which lenders will see them as adding to the value of the
project and thereby increasing mortgageability. Because of the higher
costs of multi-family development and the costs and risks associated with
borrowing such large sums, multi-family developers have even more reason
to try to keep personal cash involvement as low as possible.
Multi-family developments are typically carried out for investment
purposes with returns to be realized in the form of cash flow or non-cash
items such as depreciation, expenses and other tax write-offs.
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Thus, the multi-family developer wants to leverage the equity investment;
front-end costs are most important. Items that increase such costs, even
those that may be profitable on a long-term basis, are typically avoided.
Depending on the size and complexity of the project, the design of
multi-family developments may involve specialists in addition to the
architect. For example, any of a variety of engineering professionals
(mechanical, structural, electrical) may be consulted on technical
matters. Similarly, site planners, landscape architects, urban
designers, interior designers, and so on, might be consulted on matters
relating to site design, the appropriate integration of the structure
with its surroundings, user needs and employment of space. Although any
of these professionals may assume a major role in the design process, in
most cases, they are brought in by the architect after preliminary design
plans have been executed. Although the developer maintains final say on
all design decisions, the architect (acting as the developer's
representative) typically has responsibility for assigning and
coordinating the work of these specialists in executing the final design
scheme and in drawing up the final plans and specifications.
In addition to these specialists involved in plans for the physical
design, another group of actors usually provides information and advice
on design constraints, financial planning, and other more procedural
matters for carrying out the development process. Among these are
attorneys, who advise the devloper on the legality of different
development approaches and matters relating to tax laws; real estate and
land brokers, who provide information on local market conditions; and
public officials such as zoning and building code administrators,
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planning officials who, like attorneys, provide information and advice on
design constraints and development approaches permissible under the law.
The latter two groups of actors, i.e., real estate professionals and
public officials, are important in the two remaining activities carried
out during the preparation phase. Real estate brokers, together with
title companies and attorneys, assist in land acquisition (an activity
that is usually carried out concurrent with design development) while
public officials are involved in various regulatory activities, such as
the granting of building and zoning permits and the determination of
property tax status. This final activity tends to be a routine procedure
for the single-family builder who is typically conversant with local
regulations and also likely well acquainted with local officials. It is
primarily for this reason that the builder confines his activities to a
particular locality. This procedure is, however, often more complicated
for the multi-family developer because of the large scale and thus
potential impact--economic, physical as well as social--on the
surrounding community. Because time is the equivalent of money in
industry operations, developers often begin negotiations for plan
approval as soon as possible in order to avoid the possibility of having
to delay at a later stage. (On similar grounds, builder/developers often
avoid the inclusion of design features which might cause controversy and
thereby delay the plan approval processes.)
Production, the second stage of the housing process, entails three
major activities, two of which, team formation and project financing, are
typically carried out before the third activity, construction, begins.
As noted earlier, because of the seasonality and cyclicality of
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construction work, and the diversity of the housing product, industry
participants are characteristically small and horizontally fragmented by
function, such that few actors have the resources or skills to complete a
construction job singlehandedly. Thus, while one individual might have
proceeded through all activities in the preparation phase unassisted
(and, as noted, small-scale speculative builders of single-family housing
typically operate in this fashion), at this stage, it is necessary to
initiate if not finalize arrangements for carrying out the development.
In short, the building team must be formed.
Formation of the building team is essentially matter of contracting.
Because the extent of contracting varies, contracting arrangements take
many forms. The single-family builder, for example, typically keeps on
staff only those skills needed throughout a construction job, the most
important of these being carpentry. Operations most often performed by
subcontracting include heating, plumbing, and electrical work, as well as
site preparation activities, for example, surveying and grading. Larger
single-family builders, say those producing greater than 50 units/year
and multi-family developers, may keep some of these skills on staff, but
they too generally contract for most of their work.
In multi-family developments the developer typically selects a
general contractor either through private negotiation or public bidding,
the former being more common for the smaller-scale operator. Individual
contractors ad developers may know one another through the local builder
community and frequently work as a team. General contractors typically
serve as managers during the construction process. In most cases, the
developer and contractor agree on a fixed price contract implying that
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the general contractor is free to carry out the construction in his own
manner provided he remains within the terms specified by the contract.
(Typically, contracts call for purchasing and installation costs, time
schedules, and, in some cases, construction methods.) Although general
contractors vary in size and scope of operatons, like the builder, most
subcontract the bulk of their work to specialty contractors, again on the
basis of bidding or negotiation. (Here too, contracts typically call for
materials and installation, although in some cases, materials may be
chosen by the general contractor.) Both contractors and subcontractors
are usually selected on the basis of reputation and past performance
because of the obvious importance of remaining within projected budgets
and timetables.
Contracting for single-family construction follows a similar pattern,
although in many cases, particularly for small-scale speculative
projects, there is no general contractor involved; in other words, the
builder himself serves as the general contractor hiring subcontractors on
an as-needed basis. (There are, in fact, no major differences in
organization structure between the typical general contractor and the
typical small-scale builder [9].) Reputation and performance in the
local building community are critical factors in contractor selection.
In many cases, builders and subcontractors work together on more than one
project and enjoy continuing, close working relationships.
Thus, for single-family development the building team typically
includes builder-subcontractors or, in larger projects, builder-general
9.Kaiser Committee Report, pp. 152-153.
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contractor-subcontractors. For multi-family developments, the usual team
is developer-architect-general contractor-subcontractors; however, in
larger, more complex projects any of the professionals noted in the
design stage, e.g., engineering specialists or designers, might be part
of the project team.
Arrangements for project financing typically begin once team
selection and contract negotiations are well under way if not altogether
completed. As noted earlier, debt financing is necessary for nearly all
housing developments; builder/developers typically require financial
assistance for development and construction activities, and long-term
financing is needed for the homebuyer and multi-family investor.
Although only the capital for construction and development is usually
required at this point, it is nonetheless customary for arrangements, or
at least negotiations and commitments for the long-term loans, to begin
at this time as well; short-term lenders want some assurance that they
will be repaid when the construction phase is completed. Thus, most
lenders insist on a commitment for long-term financing as a prerequisite
for a short-term construction loan. Similarly, builder/developers want
assurance that, upon completion of the structure, capital will be
available either for the homebuyer or the housing investor. Thus, most
builders/developers do not proceed without at least informal commitments
for long-term financing [10].
10Single-family builders expect to repay short-term loans from the
proceeds of sales and thus often gain advance commitments from lenders to
provide loans for particular properties, upon approval of the prospective
buyer by the lender.
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Many different types of institutions provide funds for housing. The
most important of these are savings and loan associations (S&L's), mutual
and commercial banks, and life insurance companies, which, together
furnish nearly 80 percent of all mortgage monies [11]. Added to this are
the mortgage investment trusts, funds from pensions and similar holdings
and, on occason, funds from individuals. Another group of institutions
is important in providing loan guarantees, insurance and interest
subsidies, and thereby supporting the activities of the lending
institutions. This group includes federal credit agencies such as the
FHA, the VA, the FmHA and private mortgage insurance firms and
institutions specializing in secondary market operations such as FNMA,
GNMA, and the FHLMC.
In general, the major mortgage institutions do not compete to make
mortgage loans; the institutions vary in their primary reasons for
existence and thus have different reasons for engaging in mortgage
.lending. Of the three major lenders, thrift institutions (i.e., S&L's
and mutual banks) are best suited for and specialize in long-term loans
because their primary source of funds is least subject to withdrawal.
Commercial banks are more oriented toward short-term needs as their
principal source of funds, i.e., checking accounts, necessitates their
maintaining a high degree of liquidity. By contrast, the life insurance
companies tend to invest wherever the yields are greatest given the
long-term nature of their liabilities. It is important to realize though,
llSherman J. Maisel and Stephen E. Roulac, Real Estate Investment
and Finance, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196, p. 190.
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that even lending institutions of the same general type may differ in the
importance they attach to mortgage lending and the conditions by which
they engage in such activities because of varying state and local
regulations, size, or simply on the basis of a local tradition. For
example, a savings and loan or a mutual bank may perform some of the
functions traditionally associated with commercial banks simply because
of a longtime local need.
In spite of these many variations, certain generalizations are
necessary about the lending community overall and construction and
long-term financing more specifically. Financial institutions tend to be
on the whole very conservative in their operatons. Although they may
vary in the extent of risk they will customarily assume, all are careful
in their analyses of risk, and typically adhere to fairly fixed routines
and step-by-step procedures for mortgage lending; they are not ones to
test the unproven merely for the sake of novelty.
Of the two types of loans, construction lending is considered to be
far more risky. Many things may occur during construction to cause the
borrower to default on the loan and/or require additional funds from the
lender to complete the project. Cost overruns may occur simply because
of poor management or faulty estimates on the part of contractors or
subcontractors, developers' losses on other properties, or because of
events over which the developer and contractor have little control, e.g.,
strikes and bad weather. Thus a lender may end up with a structure that
is incomplete and for which additional resources must be committed if the
lender is to get its money out, or at least minimize losses. Moreover,
even if a structure is complete, in the event of cost overruns, the
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lender may have to assume responsibility for any outstanding debts to
subcontractors and/or material suppliers.
Recognizing these risks, construction lenders typically focus on
three areas when considering an application for construction financing:
(1) the overall reputation and credit worthiness of the
builder/developer and members of the development team--whether
they can "perform," whether they have steady financial sources
of their own to handle any difficulties that might arise;
(2) the marketability and value of the structure, taking into
account such factors as the site, the locaton, the neighborhood,
design, layout, and amenities, and
(3) the estimated construction costs and schedules, whether these
appear realistic for carrying out the proposed development [12].
In general, the reputation and credit worthiness of the applicant
followed by the overall marketability of the structure are the most
important issues in determining whether or not to lend. This is
particularly the case for the small-scale single-family builder with a
reputation in the local building community. In most cases, banks are
inclined to lend to those with good standing in the community and with
whom they have already done business. Moreover, with the exception of
the largest financial institutions, banks lack the skills needed to
examine the technical details of construction. Thus, for the average
single-family project, as compared with reputation, plans and
specifications are generally not too closely examined.
12 American Savings and Loan Institute, Lending Principles and
Practices, Chicago, Illinois: American Savings and Loan Institute, 1971,
Chapter 15 passim. See also Maisel and Roulac, pp. 77-82.
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Requirements for multi-family developments are, of course, more
stringent. Plans and specifications are carefully reviewed; if a bank
does not have a construction management capability in staff, it often
consults, on a contract basis, with engineers and construction
specialists. Here, in addition to the credit worthiness of the developer
and his team, another critical determinant in the lending decision is the
expected income of the project, that is, whether the income to be
generated will be sufficient to cover repayment of debt plus other
expenses. Thus lenders carefully analyze the applicant's pro forma
statement, i.e., the financial statement itemizing major components of
gross expense in determining whether or not to lend.
As for the level and terms of the loan, the focus is on the value of
the project, that is, how much it would be worth in the marketplace under
normal circumstances. This is determined by a number of different
measures, one of which is project cost. It is important to realize
though, that cost may not always be identical to value; certain items
(known as "overimprovements") may cost more to purchase and install than
they are worth in the market. More specifically, for single-family
dwellings, appraisers generally determine value on the basis of the sale
of comparable properties in the same market. Certain designs, layouts,
and amenities are accorded standard values and those features deemed
overimprovements discounted in value [13]. For multi-family
income-producing properties, the measure of value considered most
13Thus the influence of lenders in the design process noted earlier;
builder/developers generally aim to minimize personal cash involvement
and thus exclude from their design items which they anticipate lenders
will not consider mortgageable.
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accurate and typically employed is based on the property's expected
income discounted over time [14].
Construction lending is distinguished by a unique disbursement
method. Because the security for the loan is in the value of the
project, lenders want to ensure that at any time such value exists; in
other words, if they had to take over the project and complete
construction they would be able to do so within the remaining budget.
Thus, although the total amount is negotiated beforehand, construction
loans are planned to be disbursed in stages during the construction
process, usually after the completion of certain major activities, e.g.,
the foundation, the rough flooring, the roof, and so on, and, in the case
of large complex projects or those considered risky, after inspection by
the lender [15]. In most cases, lenders also try to ensure that the
amount of the loan is less than the value already included in the
property. Thus, lenders often plan to hold back a stipulated percentage
of the loan until the entire structure has been completed to the lender's
satisfaction. These procedures have important consequences for the
builder/developers, forcing them to rely on their own capital (or credit)
and decreasing their overall liquidity during construction [16].
14 This is another reason for excluding items that increase front-end
cost; anything requiring financing means a reduction in income and a
decrease in value and consequently, an increase in the developer's equity
requirement.
15Not all projects are inspected by the lending source; the manner
in which a development is inspected, or whether it is inspected at all,
will depend on the type and complexity of the project, the
builder/developer's credit standing and whether there are any liens
against the property.
16Maisel and Roulac, pp. 77-82.
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Long-term financing, although less risky than construction lending,
is made on the basis of similar criteria. Here it is the reputation and
credit worthiness of the housing purchaser and investor in lieu of the
builder/developer and members of the development team that is under
consideration. In addition to the value of the property estimated as
described above, the income of the housing purchaser is of central
importance in loans for single-family housing. Most lenders use a
comparison of projected housing costs to an applicant's income as a guide
to determining the maximum loan for which a given individual can qualify;
the standard most widely followed is that housing costs should not exceed
25-30 percent of income. Also of importance are the stability of income
and motivation of the borrower in maintaining the home. Loans for
multi-family developments are again more closely scrutinized on all
counts. In contrast to single-family loans, the characteristics of the
property--expected income and general ,marketabilty--are most important.
Whereas the purchaser (or builder) of a single-family unit might obtain a
loan on the basis of reputation and credit standing alone, this is rarely
the case with single-family developments because of the larger scale and
greater risk involved.
The construction phase begins after financing arrangements have been
made. As noted, construction work is carried out on the basis of
contracting; work progresses through a number of different operations,
each performed by different work groups or teams. Here the intricacy (as
well as the precariousness) of the homebuilding enterprise is most
evident; the work assigned to one team can usually be carried out by that
team only, and, in most cases, the work must be completed in ordered
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succession. In other words, work of one group is dependent upon the
completion of the work of one or more other groups.
As noted earlier, it is typically the job of the general contractor
(or the small builder acting as general contractor) to select and
assemble the work teams, either from his own staff or through
subcontracting and thereafter, to coordinate the work process. Although
not a specialist in every aspect of construction to the extent of the
specialty subcontractor, a general contractor must obviously have an
in-depth experience in each area as well as knowledge of all relevant
codes and regulations in order to monitor and supervise the work. He
must also have an understanding of basic architectural and engineering
matters in order to be able to communicate with these professionals.
(Although it is the general contractor's job to carry out construction,
architects and/or engineers typically monitor the work in progress,
checking to see that it is carried out in accordance with plans and
speficiations; also, it is not uncommon during construction for them to
call for design changes, called "change orders," with which the general
contractor must comply.) Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the
contractor must possess basic management skills to ensure effective and
efficient management of labor and materials such that work is completed
on schedule and within budgetary limitations. Subcontractors, under
contract to the general contractor as opposed to the developer, generally
possess the same set of skills as the general contractor although
obviously, on a smaller, more specialized scale.
Materials for construction are provided through a decentralized
system sharing many of the general characteristics of the building
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industry. Materials are manufactured by a large number of firms in
different industrial sectors. Although building supply firms are
generally more concentrated than those in the builder industry overall,
there are still few dominant firms in any of the four major building
supply categories, i.e., lumber and wood, stone and clay, HVAC and
primary iron and steel. Most producers serve highly diversified markets
often supplying all sectors of the construction industry.
Between these manufacturers and the builder/developer are dealers or
distributors who operate on the local or regional level, serving
essentially as middlemen and performing many useful functions for the
industry. Typically, they warehouse, merchandise, and distribute a wide
assortment of supplies. The range of services offered varies by dealer.
Some install their products, thus serving as subcontractors; some service
the products they distribute. In all cases, though, their function is
critical in saving the builder/developer from having to maintain
inventories, an operation which could obviously be very costly given the
wide fluctuations in production.
Local dealers are also important in the local building community by
serving as intermittent sources of credit. Because they operate on the
local level and know many of the builders and contractors personally,
they frequently allow individuals and firms with good standing in the
community to obtain materials on credit and in this way compensate for
the holdback provisions and timed disbursement schedules of construction
lenders.
Local dealers are also enormously important as sources of information
about new building products. Typically, the dealers watch for new
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equipment and products; manufacturers often persuade local dealers to
stock new materials as they are developed. Although a dealer's general
concern is to carry products already in demand in the area, because of
the role as a trusted and close associate of other principals in the
building process and moreover, the ability to set prices, the dealer has
the capacity to influence product demand. Historically, the major
impetus for change in the industry has come by way of materials
manufacturers and dealers.
Another group of major importance during construction is labor.
Construction labor faces a highly unstable work situation, having to move
from job to-job, usually from employer to employer, and in nearly all
cases, having to deal with intermittent periods of unemployment during
the winter months and general economic slowdowns.
Major differences exist between the union and non-union labor
sectors. As a general rule, the union sector includes workers in
multi-family high-rise (i.e., above 4 stories) construction and workers
in metropolitan areas, although certain trade specialties, e.g.,
mecahnical and structural trades, are more likely to be unionized in all
areas. Like the industry in general, labor unions are highly fragmented
by specialty (with no fewer than 19 national unions serving the industry
[17]). Also characteristic of the industry, the operating unit is on the
local level.
17 Howard G. Foster, Manpower in Homebuilding: A Preliminary
Analysis, Philadephia, Pa.: The Wharton School, University ot
Pennsylvania, 1974, p. 42.
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The functions served by the local associations vary widely, but most
perform important services regarding employee training, the typical union
program being modeled on the apprenticeship system, combining on-site
experience with off-site instruction. Unions also play a major role in
labor management functions, for example, matters regarding hiring and
firing practices, wages, and the like. Again, services vary by
particular union, however, most act as sources of information and contact
for their members, not unlike employment centers. For example,
contractors will notify the unions detailing the types and number of
workers they require and the unions in turn, notify their members and
thereafter, negotiate the terms and conditions of employment. (This
function, known as the union "hiring hall," is typically performed by the
union business agent.) Sometimes the unions negotiate with the
contractors' association or, more often, with individual employers.
Unions also play a central role in regulating on-site work
operations. Each union typically has a long list of rules regarding such
matters as the use of machines and tools, jurisdictional requirements,
the pacing of work, requirements for crew size, and the like. At any
time during employment a union worker can turn to his union in the event
that such requirements are not adhered to or to resolve any practical
difficulties that might arise. (Typically, this is the job of the union
steward, a laborer appointed by the union.)
It is work rules and practices of this sort that are often alleged to
be restrictive and to impede technological progress and change in the
industry. For example, new products may require a redefinition of the
responsibilities of many trades and thus involve a jurisdictional
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dispute. And although such incidences have occurred, the situation is,
needless to say, hardly so clear-cut. What is seen as a safety measure
by some is inevitably taken by others to be deliberately restrictive;
moreover, as the report of the Douglas Commission notes, some rules that
are blatantly restrictive (meaning that they are motivated purely out of
a concern for job security, and the like) are not enforced, while those
that are may be ignored [18]. In the final analysis, therefore, such
allegations must be taken as, at best, problematic. (This does not imply
that they do not have consequences in the production process and the
industry overall however, a matter to be discussed more fully in Section
3 of this chapter.)
By contrast, the non-union labor sector, which encompasses a high
percentage of the total labor force in the industry, [19] operates in a
far more informal, almost haphazard manner. There is no equivalent to
the union hiring hall, and the process of matching jobs to workers,
obviously of central importance because of the intermittency of most
construction jobs, is carried out through a network of information
contracts. For example, a builder may solicit applicants from former
18U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems (The Douglas
Commission), Building the American City, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Pr itniig Officel968~Part III, Chapter 4.
19As the NAHB Survey reports, most residential construction is
performed by non-union labor. In fact, in a large number of labor
markets single-family homes were found to be built almost exclusively
with non-union labor. According to the survey, 8.1 percent of the
builders use some unionized crafts while 91.9 percent do not. Further,
the proportion of union/non-union was found to be approximately the same
for both single-family and multi-family builders, e.g., 92.1 percent of
single-family builders employ non-union labor as compared to 82.9 percent
of multi-family builders. Sumichrast et al., p. 63.
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employees, his subcontractors, or even from his competitors in the local
market [20]. Job training procedures are similarly less formal. In
fact, there are few formal efforts of any kind and with the exception of
a few apprentice-style programs administered by the NAHB and instruction
in vocational schools, most training is done on the job. But even this
is not likely to be carried out in any systematic manner. As noted
earlier, formal training is too costly for the average builder, and there
is no guarantee that a trained worker will remain with the employer when
the training sessions are completed. Thus, in contrast to the union
sector, a large portion of the homebuilders' labor force is only
partially skilled. Typically, general contractors and subcontractors
have a few highly skilled workers which they employ year round (known
commonly as the "construction core") and the remainder of the work force
is hired on an as-needed basis as industry activity demands [21].
In addition to those involved in actual construction work, one final
group of actors is important for supervisory and regulatory functions
during this phase. This includes engineers and/or architects inspecting
the work for the developer. Inspections may also be carried out by the
lending source and/or by a variety of public officials. Typically,
representatives from different public agencies must inspect and certify
the work at various stages during construction.
The final two stages in the housing production process--distribution
and service, are comprised of a series of activities recurring throughout
20Foster, p. 104.
21See Foster, Chapter 4, for a more complete discussion of labor
training and skill development in the industry and Chapter 5 for a
discussion of the hiring process.
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the life of the structure. After the completed structures have been
inspected and certified by local officials as suitable for occupancy,
distribution activities may begin. Here major differences are apparent
between sales and rental housing. For sales units, housing distribution
marks the first complete cycle in the housing production process.
Following completion, a prospective buyer is sought sometimes with the
assistance of local sales brokers or on-staff marketing personnel.
Typically, the small-scale builder handles marketing efforts himeslf;
only the large-scale builders employ outside specialists. Then, upon
location of a buyer, and with a commitment for financing, transfer of the
deed takes place and the buyer assumes responsibility for subsequent use
and disposition of the property--in other words, there is no ongoing
relationship between the buyer and actors in the previous stages.
In general, few other persons are involved in the distribution of
sales housing. Attorneys may provide assistance and advice to
prospective buyers and assist in the closing of the sale. This same set
of actors is involved upon resale of the property to a new owner.
By contrast, the distribution of multi-family housing is more
complicated, involving the developer (or someone with similar profit
motives) in an ongoing process. Obviously, because he/she retains the
controlling financial interest, the developer maintains an active role in
assuring the projects continued marketability. Upon completion of the
structure, the developer turns to marketing and management specialists to
make detailed plans for "rent-up" and cost schedules for operatons. (In
most cases, preliminary planning for these activities begins well before
this time, as it is only with expectations of certain rents and thus
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anticipation of certain returns on investment that the development
continues beyond the preparation phase.) Typically, some management
skills are provided in-house, although it has become customary for
developers to employ outside management specialists as well.
The service phase following distribution involves three major
categories of activities--maintenance and management, repairs, and
improvements. Once again, these activities entail major differences for
sales and rental housing. As with distribution activities, in rental
housing, maintenance and management are ongoing processes. Typically,
during the "rent-up" phase in the distribution stage, the property
management firm gains familiarity with the structure and makes detailed
assessments and plans for ongoing maintenance and repairs. For
income-producing properties, there are standard rules for projecting
service needs and expenses; operating budgets typically include
allowances for such items as vacancies, routine maintenance procedures,
as well as major annual repairs. To carry out maintenance activities,
management firms either hire a maintenance staff directly or contract the
services of local maintenance firms. In the case of repairs and other
ongoing service needs, property managers also maintain relationships with
utility companies, tax assessors, and so on, as well as a variety of
firms specializing in building repairs. In some cases, these may be the
original subcontractors, although there are many firms specializing in
repair work which are more often involved. In all cases, though, it is
the reputation of the firm in the local community that is critical in its
selection.
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Typically, many of the building components are covered by warranties
or certificates for workmanship and parts. For example, construction
contracts often have warranty periods extending over several years as do
the major pieces of equipment, for example, plumbing and mechanical
parts. Thus, it is possible for any of the subcontractors or the general
contractor or materials suppliers to be consulted during the life of the
structure whether or not they are employed in more routine repair
matters. Similarly, the architect and the engineer have legal liability
for their work; thus, they too may be consulted in the event of major
difficulties.
In contrast, in sales housing, responsibility for ongoing maintenance
is with the home owners. Here too, building components are likely to be
covered by warranties for installation and parts. In some states
builders themselves provide warranties for their work. (For example,
Massachusetts just recently authorized a program of this type.) Thus,
though less likely, it is possible for actors involved in the previous
stages to take part in repair work during the life of the structure.
In addition to such general maintenance and repair work, it is
customary for major improvements or renovations to be undertaken during a
structure's life. When this occurs a series of activities takes place
similar to those involved in the initial production of the structure.
Here too, major differences exist for single and multi-family
developments; there are different constraints on development and
different decision factors on the part of key actors in the process.
For single-family housing, initiation of the project comes from the
homeowner. The type of improvement is obviously much of a personal
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matter, dependent on taste, need, income, and so forth. But in most
instances, property owners are concerned with how the improvement will
affect the marketability of the home, for example, whether the full cost
of the improvement can be included in the future sales price as well as
possible cost savings in such areas as maintenance or utilities. (The
average homeowner moves every 5-7 years; thus a 5-year payback period is
often used when calculating estimated savings in operations.) It is
important to bear in mind though, that because the homeowner typically
looks upon his home only partly as an investment, the homeowner might
still go ahead with the improvement even if such projections proved not
entirely favorable. Again, because of the "personal" characteristics of
housing, the calculus is not entirely an economic one.
Improvements for single-family homes are typically carried out by
specialty contractors (or, on small jobs, sometimes by the homeowner
himself.) Often property owners look to hardware stores, lumber yards,
and other building supply outlets for information on particular
productions and/or the names of local contractors. Some contractors
though, promote and solicit business for their particular products.
Labor requirements for home improvements are generally more demanding
than in new construction. New features must often be custom fit and
installed to fit the existing structural frame. Financing requirements,
though, are generally less important in single-family improvements than
in new construction. Here, the lender's principal concern is the
borrower's reputation and credit worthiness as opposed to the type or
value of the improvements. To the extent that lenders assess the type of
improvements they are typically more concerned that a borrower obtain a
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reputable product and proper installation rather than to assess the
attractiveness of the item from an investment point of view, on the
assumption that dissatisfied or defrauded consumers are more likely to
default on a loan [22].
Single-family improvements typically involve few other actors or
constraints. Only rarely are architects or engineers involved.
Similarly, building permits, zoning approvals and other permits are less
frequently required and/or secured.
On the other hand, multi-family improvements typically involve a
wider range of actors and constraints. As a general rule, developers
carry out improvements solely on the basis of the "return on investment"
calculus. In brief, wien the developer anticipates the return from the
improvement to exceed the return from the property without it and
moreover, when the gain anticipated over time is greater than might be
obtained from alternative investments, an improvement will be made.
Investors in multi-family developments typically have short-term
investment horizons and thus judge possible improvements on the basis of
2-5 year payback periods. Included in these assessments are any of a
variety of government subsidies aimed at encouraging building improvement
and/or the inclusion of specified design features, often in the form of
tax write-offs, as well as possible changes in the tax status of the
property, most importantly, whether a tax increase is likely to result.
22David Barrett et al., "Home Mortgage Lending and Solar Energy,"
Prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, (023-000-00387-2),
February 1977, p. 23.
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Financing for multi-family property improvements is typically more
difficult to obtain as well as more costly than long-term financing. As
with new construction, banks play a central role in determining the types
of improvements to be undertaken; again, the developer generally wants to
keep personal cash expense to a minimum and is thus likely to undertake
only those improvements which banks are willing to finance.
As with single-family improvements, multi-family projects are likely
to be carried out by specialized contractors; general contractors may be
involved on large jobs. Building permits and zoning approvals may be
necessary, obviously depending on the type of improvement. Similarly,
architects and engineers may be consulted.
Implications for Innovation Acceptance in the Homebuilding Industry
We now turn to some of the broader considerations affecting the views
and dispositions of industry members and the general institutional
climate of the industry. Of particular importance to this study, and
thus the focus of this section, are the implications of such dispositions
and industry structure on the potentials for change in the industry.
This is a subject that has received much attention from both scholars
and practioners and has been, on occasion, the source of much controversy
and debate. For example, one conception long popular has been that the
construction industry, the homebuilding industry in particular, is
technologically stagnant and largely incapable of major technological
change. In brief, the craft-based, manual operations of the homebuilding
industry are compared with the more routine, technologically based
activities in other industries, for example, in manufacturing or the
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automobile industry. From this and related comparisons, it is concluded
that the homebuidling industry has missed out on the major technological
breakthroughs of the twentieth century [23]. In the words of one major
study:". . . technological change has been primarily evolutionary, in
small increments, significant only in the aggregate . . . it can hardly
be called innovation." [24]
Perhaps not all analysts have been so extreme in their assessment of
the industry, but the popular view is that the industry is overly
tradition-bound and generally lethargic if not outright resistant to
innovation. Often this predicament is explained by pointing to the
industry's structural characteristics or one or more of the many risky or
problematic activities in the housing production process, some of which
have already been alluded to in the preceding section: local building
codes deter the development and use of new products and new designs
because of variations from locality to locality and because the process
of code change is typically a long and tedious one; labor unions impose
overly restrictive rules and regulations in the production process in
their efforts to ensure job stability for the construction labor force;
the homebuilding industry is lacking in the organizational capacity to
undertake research and development activities and moreover, the
organizational capacity to transfer technology from the stage of
23Francis T. Ventre, "Social Control of Technological Innovation:
The Regulation of Building Construction," Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, 1973.
See Chapter 1, pp. 18-62.
24Arthur D. Little, Inc., "Patterns and Problems of Technical
Innovation in American Industry: Report to National Science Foundation,"
September 1963, p. 133, quoted in Ventre, p. 31.
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development to actual application; the financial community is unwilling
to assume the risks associated with new products and practices; the
typical builder/developer has little additional capital, i.e., risk
capital, with which to try out a new product or work process, and so on.
Though in general agreement on the problematic nature of the
homebuilding industry and the difficulties presented by these and related
issues, other analysts, however, take pains to show that significant
changes have occurred even if the process has been incremental and at
times, a difficult one. One analyst, for example, claiming the
homebuilding industry to have experienced a "veritable technological
explosion since the 1950's," traces the progress of fourteen innovations
to show that their time periods for adoption (i.e., the time taken for
most potential users to adopt) have generally been as rapid as the
adoption of innovations considered equal in significance in other
industries [25].
According to this view, many of the important changes that have
occurred have been bypassed by traditional analysts and so-called
"sidewalk superintendents," first, because these changes are, in most
instances, not easily visible in the finished product--changes, in other
words, are deliberately masked by homebuilders because of the
conservatism of the housing consumer--and second, because of the measures
used--the structure of the hombuilding industry, its fragmentation and
25 Francis T. Ventre, "Innovation in Residential Construction,"
Technology Review, November 1979, pp. 51-59. Note that the findings
reported in this article are based on the author's doctoral dissertation,
i.e., Ventre, "Social Control of Technological Innovation: The
Regulation of Building Construction."
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the small size of industry participants coupled with the discontinuous
nature of the homebuilding enterprise, make the industry unique such that
conventional measures, e.g.,capitalization rates, value-added measures,
etc., are entirely inappropriate indicators of industry performance [26].
Further, these analysts point to studies on industrial innovation,
notably the study by Myers and Marquis, that confirm the view that the
process of industrial change is more likely to be based on small,
incremental changes rather than major scientific breakthroughs and
further, that the impetus to change is often external to a given sector
[27]. In other words, the lack of an R&D capability, while clearly not a
facilitating factor, need not be taken as an a priori cause for lack of
innovation in the industry.
In general, analysts of the latter persuasion see the problems
confronting the industry more holistically; in other words, it is not
simply the resistance of the unions, the conservatism of the financial
community, the variations in local building codes, or any one of the
so-called obstacles in the building process that account for the
industry's disposition toward change. Also importa.nt is the homebuilding
industry taken as a whole, in other words, the net effect of the
26Similarly, other industry characteristics, e.g., the small size of
industry firms, reliance on manual skills, the high rate of entry-exit,
need not be taken as reliable indicators of the industry's overall
receptivity toward innovation nor as indicators of disfunction in the
industry. Ventre, "Social Control of Technological Innovation: The
Regulation of Building Construction," pp. 18-62.
27 Sumner Myers and Donald Marquis, Successful Industrial
Innovation: A Study of Factors Underlying Innovation in Selected Firms,
lashington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1969.
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plurality of interests and groups that typically have a stake in an
innovation. As Ventre sums up this position:
"Our studies of the construction industry, including the
housebuilding subindustry, lead us to conclude that such scapegoating
betrays an ignorance of the dynamics and complexity of the
construction enterprise . . . The 'frictions' that delay the
evolution of building technology are more complex than obsolete
building codes and restrictive union practices . . . A more useful
formulation of the industry's dynamic can be drawn by analogy with
other systems in which power and responsibility are dispersed among
large numbers of actors, no one of which has more than a small
fraction of the resources and power required to redirect the whole.
Our analogy is with democratic, multifaceted political systems, where
hesitation in the face of technological innovation proliferates
through the whole" [28].
In essence, according to this -view, to understand the industry's overall
disposition toward change, and toward any one innovation in particular,
one must first come to terms with the social relationships within.
Though the latter viewpoint seems a more useful framework for the
present study, the purpose here is obviously not to resolve the different
emphases in these views toward the industry. Nor is it the objective to
determine the extent of industry change. Rather, on the basis of these
accounts and the preceding review of industry operations, some broad
generalizations regarding industry disposition toward change will be
drawn to provide a framework for understanding the industry's response to
an innovation like solar thermal.
From both the preceding discussion and the review of industry
operations, one point is clear: the homebuilding industry in an
institutional environment which poses significant challenges to
28Ventre, "Innovation in Residential Construction," pp. 57-58. See
also Ventre, "Social Control of Technological Innovation: The Regulation
of Building Construction," pp. 57-60.
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innovation, whether it is a matter of being outright resistant or just
generally hesitant or lethargic to change. First, it is easy to see why
the process of change is likely to be slow and incremental on the basis
of the industry's structural characteristics alone. The extreme
fragmentation of responsibility, as noted, the fact that of the hundreds
of actors involved in the industry, there are few dominants with power or
resources to redirect the system as a whole, ensures that considerable
time will be needed if only to disseminate information on new ideas to
industry members and thereafter, (assuming this new idea or product is
acceptable) to coordinate their efforts and gain experience with the new
practice or product. Obviously, the more disaggregated and functionally
fragmented the organizational units and the fewer the formal mechanisms
and channels for information dissemination and coordination (another
major industry characteristic) the more difficult the logistics of change.
While industry change is thus likely to proceed slowly and in
somewhat piecemeal fashion, simply for logistic reasons, it is also
essential to recognize that industry members may often be lacking in
basic incentives to commit themselves or even to experiment with
innovations for many of the same and related reasons.
For example, the fragmentation which makes diffusion slow and
difficult, dramatically increases industry interdependencies and thereby,
the vulnerability of industry members, a condition further heightened by
the small size and lack of capital of the average industry firm.
Moreover, as the preceding review displayed, every stage in the
production process and nearly every activity in each stage, entails at
least some uncertainties and a fairly high degree of risk. Again, this
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may be for logistic reasons. Financing arragements, for example, might
take longer than anticipated, or materials might not arrive on time and
thereby, hold up the construction process, and so on. But it might
easily involve substantive matters as well. The bank might determine the
project to be too risky and thus refuse to provide a mortgage loan;
market conditions, consumer preferences and/or production costs might
easily be misjudged; contractors, labor, or any member of the development
team might prove incompetent, and the like. There are also the external
constraints--seasonality and economic conditions--further heightening the
general atmosphere of uncertainty and instability in the industry.
In sun, the homebuilding industry is already so unstable and its
operations perpetually so uncertain that industry participants,
particularly the builder/developer, must be considered high risk-takers
simply for their involvement in the industry. On these grounds alone, it
would be understandable for industry members to look for ways to reduce
uncertanties and risks or at the least keep them to a minimum by
"sticking to the proven," the "routine." However, as explained,
innovation always involves some measure of uncertainty and thus an
increase in risk; by definition, it is partly on account of this newness,
this unfamiliarity, that something is considered an innovation.
Further, it is important to consider the potential effects of
industry structure and industry operations on the actual process of
change in the industry--what, in other words, an actual change (product
or process) would entail. Most importantly, because of the fragmentation
of industry functions, the sheer number of activities and individuals
whose efforts must be coordinated in the production process, and because
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of the uncertainties inherent in each of the activities themselves, it is
largely inevitable for any innovation to go through a period of
uncertainty as it is first introduced in the industry, irrespective of
the uncertainties inherent in the innovation itself. Clearly, even if
all participants were to agree, there is little chance of their doing so
simultaneously. Nor is there much chance that they could all ready
themselves for the innovation, in other words, make all the necessary
changes for the innovation, in a given period of time. During this
period of introduction and adjustment, the uncertainties and risks in the
housing production process would be greatly compounded, as any of the
various problematic activities might serve as constraints. For example,
during this time, a builder might be delayed if a new product does not
yet comply with existing building or zoning codes, or if a supplier does
not yet have the product "on the shelf." Similarly, labor might be
unfamiliar with a new material or the banking community might refuse to
finance it, not wanting to assume any additional risks. What is critical
to realize is that even though these factors may not prove problematic in
every instance--it is possible that a new material will not require code
changes or that labor unions will ignore rules and regulations that would
ordinarily restrict the use of a new product--they may serve as
constraints simply because of the uncertainty then engender. They are
likely perceived by industry actors as possible deterrents to innovation
even though this might not be true in each and every case.
Thus, industry structure and organization, and the general nature of
industry operations, likely impede the acceptance of innovations by
compounding the uncertainties and risks in an environemnt that is already
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so uncertain and risky under routine conditions. At the same time,
however, this discussion should not imply that such factors serve to
preclude acceptance of innovation across the board, as many popular
conceptions assume. For one thing, it is clear that all activities in
the housing production process are not of equal importance to the various
actors involved. Nor are they of equal magnitude in risk. In so far as
uncertainty and risk are invoved, the scale might be tipped in favor of
an innovation; in other words, it is at least possible that an innovation
will reduce the uncertainties and risks involved. For example, it would
likely be in a builder's best interest to try a new financing process
which, though somewhat uncertain and risky in itself (as all innovations
are apt to be) promised to lead to a lower equity requirement or lower
carrying charges, in turn enabling a possible reduction in the overall
risk of the housing development process and/or a greater or surer
profit. Perhaps an even more obvious example though, would be an
innovation dealing with consumer demand. It would appear to be in the
builder's best interest to try an innovation if it promised greater
certainty in the projection of consumer demand, importantly, even if this
meant engendering greater uncertainties and risks in other activities in
the production process. This is, in fact, one inducement to innovation
that is acknowledged by most industry analysts; when consumer demand is
evident, builders have been known to respond readily and quickly, in
spite of uncertainties engendered in other activities in the housing
production process.
Thus industry structure and activities need not serve as a priori
deterrents to innovation, in other words, there are certain circumstances
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under which innovations appear worthwhile for industry actors to pursue.
But the fact of the matter is that aside being of a rather limited range,
such circumstances do not often occur. For example, the builder is
likely to respond to changes in consumer demand; it is in the builder's
interests to do so. But as explained earlier, housing has unusually
strong normative associations; it is "more ego than economics" [29]; and
the housing consumer does not want anything that breaks too radically
with tradition. In fact, as Ventre noted, "so traditional are consumers'
preferences when it comes to their own housing, builders deliberately
disguise changes in technology . . ." [30]
Perhaps, in the final analysis, the decision to innovate on the part
of any one of the many participants in the homebuilding industry is best
conceptualized as a trade-off, depending in part, on the intrinsic
characteristics of the innovation and its compatibility with existing
motivations and routines, e.g., low first-cost items in the case of the
builder/developer, in addition to the various uncertainties and risks the
innovation is likely to entail. This latter consideration is also likely
to depend on a wide range of factors, including, for example, the
uncertainties and extent of risk inherent in the innovation itself, the
activities and actors involved (some obviously being more important in
the production process overall and in relationship to one another) the
number or proportion of the industry likely to be involved, and the
extent and type of change involved. Though rather overwhelming, all such
29Furlong and Nutt-Powell, p. 1.
30Ventre, "Social Control of Technological Innovation: The
Regulation of Building Construction," p. 51.
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factors are important to consider, as innovations varying in these areas
are likely to prompt different sets of issues, engendering different
responses on the parts of the many actors in the industry, and different
receptions in the industry overall.
For example, a builder might be expected to favor a process-oriented
change vs. a product or materials change because a process change is more
easily disguised from the housing consumer, and because it typically
involves fewer actors in the production process (and thus presents fewer
coordination problems, and a reduced likelihood for any of the various
activities in the building process to serve as constraints, e.g.,
building codes, labor unions). Moreover, process changes are typically
small and incremental and do not require drastic changes in the
activities of other participants in the building process. (This too, of
course, translates into reduced probability for the emergence of
obstacles [31]. Similarly, industry participants might be expected to
differ in their dispositions toward innovations which add to existing
services or products as contrasted to those which replace existing
products, for example, products that perform the same service as one
already in existence only doing so through different means or with minor
levels in improvement. In these cases, it is easy to see how innovations
of the former kind are much advantaged. Still further variations in
3 1By contrast, materials and product changes do not always easily
fit the rather unique supply and distribution system of the industry, and
therefore, often require major changes on the part of many participants
in the production process, thus subjecting the builder/developer to many
problematic situations and a much increased risk. See Ventre,
"Innovation in Residential Construction," pp. 51-59.
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response to innovation are likely to depend upon the social structure and
organization of the particular individuals and groups affected by the
innovation, if, for example, there are formal channels for information
dissemination, established organizational entities to serve as a forum
for events, the resolution of disputes, and the like [32].
Needless to say, any of an incredibly wide range of responses is
possible, and these examples and qualifications could continue ad
infinitum. The intent, however, is to point out the wide range of issues
relevant to the consideration of innovation in the industry. We can sum
up this discussion by restating the original proposition only now in a
somewhat qualified form. That is, though not a question of unilateral
resistance or even lethargy to change on the part of all actors in the
industry, on account of the industry's structural characteristics, and
the many uncertainties already existing in the industry environment,
individual actors in the industry are generally conservative, even
suspicious of change. In a certain sense, insofar as it is "new" things,
things different from existing institutional routines that industry
members characteristically avoid, on one level, the homebuilding industry
is "institutionally" opposed or at the least hesitant toward innovation.
32For example, in the Ventre study, innovations affecting plumbers
were identified as the most difficult change in eight times as many
localities as were changes affecting electricians. Ventre attributes
this result to the existence in the electrical contracting industry of
the Council on Industrial Relations, a national labor-management forum
designed to remove the causes of friction . . . by providing a forum for
. . . settlement of controversies between local chapters of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the National
Electrical Contractors Association." By contrast, there is no
counterpart in the plumbers' trades, Ventre notes. See Ventre,
"Innovation in Residential Construction," pp. 56-57; and Ventre, "Social
Control of Technological Innovation: The Regulation of Building
Construction," Chapter 6.
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Moreover, given the fragmentation and many interdependencies of
industry participants, there is one further complication still. That is,
the question of system effects, in other words, the result of one
industry actor predicating his or her behavior on that of another and
this actor, in turn, predicating his response on that of another still.
Such "second-guessing" is easy to imagine in an industry as fragmented
and interdependent as the homebuilding industry. While, as Ventre notes,
such systems effects might go either way, in other words, for or against
the acceptance of an innovation [33], this would nonetheless appear to be
a further deterrent to innovation in the industry. For one thing, it is
easy to foresee the possibility of prisoners' dilemma type problems, as
each actor waits until another tries it, that is, until another bears the
risk. But at the same time, given the extreme fragmentation, it is clear
that no major innovation can be accepted in the industry until a
significant number of industry participants concur, certain participants,
i.e., the builder/developer most importantly.
33Ventre, "Innovation in Residential Construction," p. 58.
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CHAPTER 3: THE HOMEBUILDING INDUSTRY AND SOLAR ENERGY ACCEPTANCE
Introduction
Thus far the theoretical framework for the study of innovation
acceptance has been described. Briefly, innovation acceptance was
explained to be a process taking place in the context of an existing
institutional environment. Thus, innovation acceptance is said to be
facilitated to the extent that the innovation appears consistent with
existing institutional meanings and routines.
Chapter 2 described the homebuilding industry from the institutional
perspective, noting the major institutional entities, their routines and
the linkages between and among them. The chapter concluded with a brief
assessment of the potentials for change, i.e., innovation, in the
industry.
In this chapter we will apply the theoretical framework to consider
the issues likely to be involved in the introduction and
institutionalization of a particular innovation, i.e., solar thermal.
Solar thermal technologies offer many obvious advantages over
conventional energy sources, and while interest in solar thermal appears
to be increasing, the technology is far fran the stage of
institutionalization in the industry. Most generally, this chapter aims
to explain the current' industry resistance to the use of solar thermal
and the manner in which the process of institutionalization might be
helped along. Finally, the details of the research design devised to
test the usefulness of the theory are presented.
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The Innovation: Solar Energy
Solar energy refers to an assortment of energy technologies--
photovoltaics, solar thermal, biomass, wind power--to name a few [1].
Though all convert sunlight into heat, electricity, or other energy
forms, it is important to distinguish clearly among them because they
vary considerably in scale and complexity and are presently at varying
stages of technical and commercial development. The particular
technologies under consideration in this study are the small-scale,
on-site, space and water conditioning technologies known commonly as
solar thermal [2]. Further, the concern here is with "active" (as
opposed to "passive") systems, termed "active" because they utilize a
number of movable parts and mechanical systems to. collect and circulate
the sun's rays. In contrast, a passive system is where the structure is
sited and designed to take advantage of the sun directly; in other words,
the heat "moves itself" to and throughout the structure.
In an attempt to clear up the confusion over the term "solar
energy," the Department of Energy has identified eight different types of
solar technologies and has grouped these into three major categories: 1)
Thermal (heating and cooling) applications; a) heating and cooling of
buildings; b) agriculture and industrial process heating; 2) Fuels from
biomass; a) plant matter; 3) Solar electric; a) photovol taics, e.g.,
solar coils; b) solar thermal electric, e.g., the power tower; c) wind;
d) ocean thermal electric; e) hydropower. Each of these categories can
be further subdivided. See U.S. Department of Energy; "Solar Energy, A
Status Report," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, (DOE
ET-0062), June 1978, Appendix A, Solar Technologies, pp. 13-39.
2Typically "solar thermal" includes both heating and cooling
technologies. This study, however, focuses exclusively on heating
technologies because of the differences in engineering and commercial
advancement between the two and also due to data availability. Solar
cooling technologies can, however, be expected to prompt a similar set of
issues at a later date.
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Of active systems, solar thermal technologies are generally agreed to
be the simplest (i.e., in terms of design and engineering) as well as the
most technically and commercially advanced of those in the on-site
group. Their principles of operation are well known. In brief, the heat
of the sun is collected and concentrated by panels (generally made of
glass, aluminum, and/or plastic) which, in turn, heat air or water in
coils or tubing that flows through them. Fans and/or pumps then
circulate this heat to a water-filled storage tank which can be used
directly for hot water or further circulated by conventional means, e.g.,
radiators, to wherever it is needed for space heating [3].
Essentially, solar thermal is a fuel replacement technology.
Conventional heating systems may still be needed for back-up, however,
during periods of sustained cloudiness. (Techniques for storing the
sun's heat for long periods of time have yet to be developed.) Though a
much debated subject, a typical solar thermal system is believed capable
of supplying only one-half to two-thirds of total heating needs. Solar
thermal would, however, serve as the principal energy source, in other
words, replacing (rather than simply adding to), a portion of the
services provided by oil, gas and other conventional fuels.
Considering current U.S. energy prospects the potential benefits from
widespread use of solar thermal are clear. Buildings play a significant
role in total energy consumption; home energy use alone (hot water, space
heating and cooling) accounts for roughly one-fifth of the national
3 For general information on active solar technologies, see Bruce
Anderson, Solar Energy: Fundamentals in Building Design, New York:
McGraw-Hil I, 19/.
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energy budget. In some parts of the country solar thermal is capable of
supplying over 70 percent of a building's thermal requirements. Though
estimates vary, even the most conservative forecasts project savings of
at least 50 percent in residential energy use if the majority of homes in
the U.S. were to become partially or wholly heated by solar thermal
systems [4]. Solar has other attractions as well. Not only is it a
nondepletable, renewable source of energy, but it is not beset by the
degrading environmental consequences of present conventional sources nor
the potential health and safety hazards of others. Use of solar
obviously adds no new heat to the environment. Further, solar is an
ubiquitous energy source, free, and not subject to foreign control.
This recounting of benefits is familiar. Indeed, solar advocates, a
small group generally associated with the "counter-culture" set, have
been proclaiming them for years. It has only been within the last decade
(actually since the oil embargo of '73) that solar thermal came to be
approached with any degree of seriousness and that solar-related research
R&D and commercialization activities of any significant scale began. For
a general sense of this change in attitude towards solar energy, the
federal budget is instructive. During the entire period from 1951 to
1973 something less than ten solar or solar-related bills had been
introduced with funding at generally no more than $10 million in the most
extravagant of the proposals. None of these was passed. By contrast,
during the two-year period of the 93rd Congress,
4John S. Reuyl et al., "Solar Energy in America's Future: A
Preliminary Assessment," Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research
Institute for the Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977.
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the period immediately following the embargo, more than twenty-five solar
and solar-related bills were introduced, all with funding levels set at
well over $10 million. And since that time federal involvement and
budgetary outlays have been increasing dramatically. Funding for federal
research, development and demonstration (R,D&D), for example, increased
from $14.8 million in FY 1974 to $151.6 million in FY 1976 to well over
$500 million in FY 1979, including $96 million for solar thermal
technologies alone [5].
Similarly, where a solar thermal industry was virtually nonexistent
in the early '70's, today it is highly active and growing. According to
a recent survey, industry sales, including installation, increased
tenfold in a three-year period, from $25 million in 1975 to $269 million
in 1977. In 1977 alone, 3,300 space and water heating systems and 63,000
solar hot water systems were sold [6]. Similarly, DOE's annual survey of
solar collector manufacturers' activity reveals continued growth in
industry volume (e.g., the sixth semiannual survey in the first half of
1977 revealed a 54 percent increase in productivity over the previous
period) as well as indicators of increasing industry stability. (Few
industry firms have dropped out; some new firms have entered, but on
5For a useful summary of current federal policies, programs and
expenditures for solar energy technologies through FY 1979, see U.S.
Department of Energy, "Domestic Policy Review of Solar Energy: A
Response Memorandum to the President of the United States," Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, (DOE-TID-22834), February 1979. See
especially Chapters 1 and 2.
6Stobaugh and Yergin, p. 188.
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average, production volumes have increased [7].
In one sense, solar thermal might be viewed as the innovation par
excellence. Currently, the whole field of solar energy is in a state of
flux; in addition to the high level of entrepreneurial activity, a good
deal of R&D activity is under way in both public and private sectors; the
intrinsic characteristics of the technology are undergoing continual
modification, for example, in engineering, design, and cost. And in
these variously changed forms, solar thermal technologies are being
introduced and experimented with in a variety of economic sectors, e.g.,
residential, agriculture, industry, and so on.
Thus it is reasonable to characterize solar thermal as being in the
early stages of the institutionalization process. Nonetheless, solar
thermal has a long way to go to achieve full-scale acceptance in the
homebuilding industry. One point is clear: solar thermal has yet to be
taken seriously by the general public and key actors in the homebuilding
industry. Perhaps they have heard about solar thermal; perhaps even
expressed something more than a casual interest. This is, however,
obviously a far step from routine acceptance of the technology. In fact,
it is not yet routine for members of the homebuilding community to even
consider solar thermal as a serious alternative in typical building
operations.
There can be little doubt that major innovations take time for
diffusion and adoption. As explained earlier, institutionalization is
For a presentation and discussion of the findings of DOE's Annual
Survey of Solar Collector Manufacturing, see Allan Frank, "Flat Plate
Collector Manufacturing: Up Again, and Steadying," Solar Age, June 1978,
pp. 36-39.
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almost always a slow and cumulative process. However, the slow pace at
which the innovation is being accepted in the industry is likely
something more than the usual time lag experienced in innovation
acceptance. As a matter of fact, there appears to be a substantial
mismatch between the solar thermal technology in its current state of
development and major homebuilding industry routines and dispositions.
The Innovation and The Industry
We have described the homebuilding industry as being a difficult
environment for innovation acceptance. The logistics of change are
problematical and the participants are generally conservative as they
avoid things perceived as uncertain and/or risky. Change can and does
occur, however, only under a rather limited range of circumstances. As
explained, industry acceptance of an innovation is likely to depend on a
number of factors, including the intrinsic characteristics of the
innovation, the actors and activities of the housing production process
most affected by the innovation, the number of actors, the extent of
change required, and so on. The fact is, in reviewing solar thermal in
its current state of development, the technology appears to present many
problems in these areas. On numerous counts, there appears to be a firm
basis for industry resistance.
First, solar thermal directly counters routines of particular
importance to critical industry actors. The most obvious incompatibility
is economics. For the user, solar thermal is often not yet economically
competitive with conventional energy systems. An even greater economic
obstacle, though, is that solar thermal systems will invariably involve a
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higher first cost even if they are economically more attractive on a life
cycle basis. As noted in the previous chapter, both the
builder/developer and the homebuyer are highly sensitive to initial
investments. Because of the high costs and difficulty of borrowing money
both the homebuilder and homebuyer typically look for ways to reduce
front-end costs, even if this means foregoing the chance for lower
operating cost. Further, to the extent that they are willing to increase
initial investments, time horizons are characteristically short. As a
recent study of consumer response to solar thermal revealed, consumers
want a fast return on their investment and expect to recoup the
additional front-end cost spent on installing the system in a short
number of years [8].
Design and aesthetics is another area in which solar thermal entail
outright incompatibilities with current industry standards and routines.
Clearly, a house with solar panels bolted on the roof looks different
from a house in which the heating system is enclosed and "out of sight"
in the conventional manner. Just the idea of having the heating system
on the roof is something "new and different." As noted earlier, because
housing is a highly personal good, "more ego than economics," the housing
consumer wants to maintain tradition, in short, a house that "looks and
feels" like the traditional home. Moreover, neither the
builder/developer nor the homebuyer want a house that appears too
8 0n average, a five-year payback, i.e., the investment recovered in
fuel savings in five years, was found necessary to attract serious
consideration by the homebuyer. And in order to get 80 percent of the
respondents to think about installing a system, a two-year or better
payback was required. Stobaugh and Yergin, p. 191.
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unusual, as deviation fran the norm (here in design and aesthetics,
mainly) is likely to limit the resaleability of the home.
These issues point to a matter of perhaps even more basic
incompatibility and cause for industry resistance to solar thermal, in
particular, resistance by the builder/developer. That is, the issue of
uncertainty. As discussed earlier, all innovations, by definition,
entail some measure of uncertainty and risk, as they have yet to be used
and experienced on any significant scale. Further, there can be little
doubt that solar thermal is an innovation currently involving more
uncertainty and more risk than most, or at least uncertainty and risk at
a scale far beyond the threshold for most actors in the homebuilding
industry, notably, the central actor, the builder/developer. As
explained above, the whole field of solar energy is currently in a state
of flux, solar thermal technologies in particular. Indeed, there appears
to be few things about solar thermal which are not perceived to involve a
good deal of uncertainty and high risk at the present time.
First, as seen in the instances of incompatibility cited above, solar
thermal engenders uncertainty in the one aspect of the housing production
process of most importance to the builder/developer, i.e., market
demand. Building with solar thermal at the present time entails building
something that deviates fran current design standards and traditional
notions of what a house "should" look like. It also has a large capital
cost and requires a high down payment, further limiting marketability and
thereby jeopardizing the builder/developer's position in the housing
production process overall.
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It is likely that these instances of incompatibility and the
increased risks they involve would suffice to cause resistance from the
average builder/developer. However, it is worth noting some of the other
uncertainties currently confronting the technology, some of which will
undoubtedly increase the resistance of the builder/developer as well as
the homebuyer. Most important are uncertainties concerning the
technology itself. The fact is, solar thermal is not only uncertain in
terms of economics and consumer demand, but on basic technological
matters as well. For example, at the current time there appears to be
little agreement on such a fundamental issue as whether the technology is
ready for commercial application or whether further design and
engineering development are required, or at least desirable. On the one
hand, there are the numerous studies and scientific reports going as far
back to the study by the National Science Foundation [9] in 1972 claiming
the near readiness of the technology. In the words of one recent study,
"solar thermal is not waiting for a technological breakthrough; this
assumption represents a great misunderstanding . . . active heating is a
here-and-now alternative to imported oil." [10] And then there are the
programs and demonstration projects designed to support such claims, to
demonstrate the presumed readiness and viability of the technology, the
HUD SHAC Program, for example. But concurrent with such efforts and
analyses are the many instances of mismanagement and technological
failure, and massive efforts at R&D in both the public and private
9 NSF/NASA Solar Energy Panel, "An Assessment of Solar Energy as a
National Energy Resource," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, (NSF/RA/N-73-001), 1972.
10Stobaugh and Yergin, p. 188.
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sectors [11].
Such simultaneous efforts at commercialization and R&D (both with
federal support) might confuse even the solar advocate. Clearly, the
fact that those who support the technology "don't really know" likely
serves as a substantial disincentive to both the homebuilder and the
homebuyer. Why should they try it if even the experts cannot even decide
if solar thermal is technically viable.
Similarly, there is much uncertainty if not direct disagreement on
matters dealing with product durability, safety, reliability, and the
like, in both design and performance. This is true for most solar
thermal products on the market today. The further disincentive caused by
this situation is apparent when one considers that conventional systems
are not only tried and proven in all these areas but are "backed up" by a
wide assortment of product guarantees, certificates, and warranties, not
to mention the reputation of the supplier, the installer, the builder,
and so on. As a new technology solar thermal has yet to earn such
credentials [12].
"
1See for instance the Report by the U.S. General Accounting Office,
"Solar Demonstration on Federal Residences--Better Planning and
Management Needed," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,(EMD-78-53), April 1978.
12Currently there is much activity in these areas. For example,
standardization activities involving members of the voluntary consensus
system, representatives from industry, and public and private groups,
have been under way since 1975. Similarly, efforts have been under way
to develop warranties, procedures to accredit testing laboratories,
procedures to certify, label, and rate solar components, and the like..
These and other efforts have resolved certain issues, e.g., intermediate
minimum property standards were published in 1977. But the point of the
matter is that data from these efforts are not readily available in a
form that enables easy comprehension of the state of the art, and
different solar products. See Thomas E. Nutt-Powell and Judith Wagner,
"Solar Heating and Cooling Standard Setting: An Institutional Analysis
Case Study," Cambridge, MA: MIT Energy Laboratory Report, 1979.
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There are also uncertainties on basic procedural matters relating to
product procurement and distribution. To date the major firms in the
solar thermal industry are small. In this early stage of
commercialization, the industry has yet to develop a marketing and
infrastructure capacity to match the local and fragmented structure of
the industry. The builder/developer cannot simply visit the local sales
representative or order solar systems from local dealers or distributors,
in the same way he might routinely obtain conventional heating systems.
(Further, given the lack of standardization, the builder/developer cannot
easily order the various components comprising a solar system from
different manufacturers, as he does other HVAC products, as there is no
guarantee of product compatibility.)
As solar thermal has yet to establish a system to meet the unique
needs of the industry, neither does it appear to have established a
parallel system of its own. A few of the largest firms are addressing
these issues and have developed some uniformity in their practices [13].
However, for the most part procurement and distribution practices are
idiosyncratic, meaning that even the simplest applications of solar
thermal must be custom ordered and arranged. Moreover, availabilities
and procedures for purchase and distribution can be expected to undergo
constant changes as the industry expands, new product lines' developed,
13The Daystar Corporation, for example, one of the largest solar
manufacturers in the U.S., has developed a system with local dealerships
emanating from a central production location in Burlington, Vermont. All
dealers have installment capability, "primarily out of concern for legal and
reputational liability." Interview with Barry Tepper, Daystar Corporation,
January 18, 1978. Similarly, Grumman, another major manufacturer, is
aggressively addressing management and marketing issues. See Stobaugh and
Yergin, p. 190.
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existing products modified, and so on. Thus, at this stage, even if a
builder/developer tried to follow the pattern of a completed project,
while obviously helpful, there stands a chance that procedures and
possibly products would no longer be the same.
Further uncertainties are likely for other major activities in the
housing production process, in fact, for nearly every major activity
described in each phase, from preparation through distribution. Because
the average builder/developer does not yet have even a general
understanding of the technology, he is not equipped to design a solar
thermal system or to integrate a solar thermal system into his routine
process of home design. At the same time, the solar industry is
generally unprepared to provide the technical assistance required at the
local level. Further, it is clear that solar will entail some changes in
the design process notably in involving engineering skills in different
ways in both single and multi-family developments. Currently, engineers
are rarely involved in the design of single-family dwellings and in
multi-family projects, only on a subcontract basis, in most instances,
after all major design decisions have been made. Yet for optimal
efficiency of a solar dwelling design, engineers should assume a more
central role from the start of the design stage. Added to the impact of
such organizational changes is the fact that at the present time there
are few architects or engineers qualified to provide such services. As
one-recent study discovered, a solar engineer or an architect with more
than three years experience is a rarity [14]. Thus, in using solar
14 Stobaugh and Yergin, p. 194.
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thermal, the builder/developer would not be able to select members of the
building team on the basis of reputation as is the customary practice in
the industry.
After the actual design of the structure, use of solar thermal will
likely involve further uncertainties in the code approval process. Of
the thousands of codes in existence, only a few presently have provisions
regarding solar thermal usage. That most codes provide specification (as
opposed to performance) standards (i.e., specifying the use of particular
products and/or materials rather than the conditions to be satisfied in
operation) means that solar technologies are apt to be prohibited, thus
ensuring some measure of uncertainty, even if code officials have in the
past ignored such laws or express a willingness to do so in the future.
Similar legal uncertainties exist regarding zoning laws, whether, for
example, solar thermal is allowable under existing statutes. Also at
stake is the issue of "solar access" or "sun rights." Presently few
zoning codes include solar access provisions and there exists little
legal precedent in this area.
Uncertainties are also likely to occur in the production phase.
First, given the short supply of solar skills (engineering, architecture,
HVAC, and so on) team selection could only be an activity of a highly
uncertain nature. Indeed, without an understanding of the basic
technological issues and the process of solar thermal design, coupled
with the lack of firms and individuals with established repuations, it is
difficult to imagine on what basis a builder/developer would establish
the "building team," to say nothing of establishing project cost
estimates, schedules, and the like. Also at this stage, project
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financing is likely to be uncertain. For example, questions remain
concerning the willingness of lenders to provide mortgage funding for
homes with solar thermal systems as well as questions relating to the
terms of the loans. Most importantly, precedents for the valuation of
solar thermal units have yet to develop. By virtue of the newness of the
technology, the lending community is itself uncertain as to solar
thermal's market value. Ultimately, the market will be the final
arbiter, but in the meantime, the builder/developer as well as the
housing purchaser cannot be assured that solar thermal will not be
treated as an overimprovement and thereby excluded from the value of the
mortgage loan [15].
Still further uncertainties are inevitable during the construction
phase. To date it is unclear whether solar thermal will require the
establishment of new jurisdictional boundaries among the work of various
trades, e.g., the plumbers and the roofers. For example, will collectors
mounted on flat roofs be treated as other conventional roof-mounted HVAC
components and thereby considered the work of the trades? Will this vary
if the collectors are integrated into glazed window walls in the form of
vertical wall systems [16]. While these and related questions remain
15See David Barrett et al., Financing the Solar Home, Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1977, and Barrett et al., "Home Mortgage Lending
and Solar Energy."
16As one study notes, conventional wall systems are normally
installed by glazing and miscellaneous metal or iron workers, yet wall
collectors would require the use of plumbers. Richard Shoen, Alan
Hirshberg, and Jerome Weingart, New Energy Technoloes for Buildings:
Institutional Problems and Solutions, Cambridge, MA: BalTlnger, 1975, p.
95.
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unanswered, at this time, an even more basic question persists: will new
skills and new techniques be required for installation of solar thermal
systems? In other words, will the existing labor force have the
requisite technical skills at all? As noted, solar skills are in short
supply. It is the solar installation technician, often the plumber with
no experience in working with solar thermal equipment, who is believed to
be the weakest link in the chain [17]. Further, even if labor skills
were sufficient, the construction phase-would remain a period of
uncertainty because of possible mechanical problems with the system and
its integration with the conventional heating system, in addition to
possible problems in procuring systems parts. It is not difficult to
imagine a situation similar to the foreign auto repair process- in this
country, where a customer, in this case the builder/developer, would be
forced to wait weeks on end for a certain system part, or for someone to
redesign the system such that it would function without such components.
Further, considering the builder/developer's lack of understanding about
the technology, and infrastructure uncertainties, the builder/developer
is likely to have a difficult time supervising and managing the
construction process. Clearly, with the many uncertainties and
deficiencies mentioned above, the builder/developer's position during
construction could only be a highly precarious one.
There are undoubtedly other uncertainties still [18]. However, this
17Stobaugh and Yergin, p. 194.
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short review should suffice to demonstrate that the builder/developer has
good reason to resist the use of a technology like solar thermal. First,
it is incompatible with routines of critical importance to the
builder/developer, and as a result, vastly increases the uncertainties
and risks in the most important of all aspects of the housing production
process, i.e., marketability and consumer demand. On this basis alone,
it is clear that use of the technology would undermine the
builder/developer's position. However, there are further uncertainties
adding to the builder/developer's already risky position. The technology
itself is not proven, and as it is just now being introduced into the
homebuilding industry, it entails major uncertainties at nearly each and
every stage of the housing production process.
Though the principal concern in this study is with the
builder/developer, it is important to recognize the circularity of the
problem and some of the many system effects likely to occur. For
example, the builder/developer is likely to refrain from use of the
technology because of the many incompatibilities and uncertainties
concerning the product and its use. Yet without market demand, the solar
product is not likely to improve, nor is the industry infrastructure
18 For example, one other major problem still to be resolved concerns
the role and attitudes of the utility companies. Solar thermal will
almost always require backup systems, and the rate structure for such
sources will determine the ultimate cost competitiveness of solar thermal
vs. conventional systems. Many utility companies are currently
investigating solar thermal opportunities and the roles they might
assume. However, there has yet to develop a pattern as to the manner in
which the utilities will cooperate, or if they are willing to cooperate
at all. For a more complete discussion, see "Utility Involvement: A
Roundtable Discussion," Solar Age, December 1978, pp. 12-17.
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likely to develop. Clearly, without some certainty in levels of demand,
the solar manufacturer will find few justifications for "tooling up" for
production and for developing marketing and distribution systems tailored
to the unique needs of the industry. If using solar thermal at the
present time is too costly and risky for the builder/developer, such
efforts, typically involving large capital investments, are likely too
costly and risky for the average solar manufacturer.
While these factors in themselves are obviously deterrents to both
the builder/developer and the solar industry, it is also important to
recognize the effects caused by the response of the housing consumer.
For while the current state of the solar art and the many uncertainties
regarding industry infrastructure serve as deterrents to the use of the
technology on the part of the builder/developer, it is clear that the
builder/developer will not use the technology if consumer demand is not
evidenced. And yet the consumer is not likely to favor solar thermal,
for one thing, until the costs have improved, and this, in turn, is at
least partly a function of industry efforts. Nor is the consumer likely
to favor the technology until it is technically proven, in other words,
of demonstrated viability in terms of efficiency, safety, reliability,
and so on. This, too, is a function of builder/developer and industry
combined efforts.
Studying Solar Acceptance in the Homebuilding Industry
On reading the previous section, one would conclude the acceptance of
solar thermal technologies in the homebuilding industry to be an
altogether formidable proposition. Indeed, by this brief review, it
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would appear to be nearly impossible. But it is the case that
innovations are accepted in the homebuilding industry, and that certain
builder/developers have used solar thermal technologies, in spite of the
many uncertainties and other reasons seeming to deter their use. This
section sets forth an approach to studying and understanding those
factors which have influenced acceptance of solar thermal in the
homebuilding industry, despite the apparent sources of resistance
discussed in the preceding section.
As discussed in Chapter 1, an innovation is something "new," that is,
something that has yet to acquire social meaning. It will always be
introduced in the context of an existing institutional environment; thus
to be acceptable, it must be comprehensible in terms of existing
institutional meanings and routines. Comprehensibility, however, is not
likely to be achieved on the basis of the innovation's intrinsic
characteristics or objective status alone. For one thing, because
innovations are new things we have yet to use or experience, they can
rarely be altogether objectively seen and understood. Indeed, as
explained in Chapter 1, it is almost definitionally impossible to
"objectively" evaluate something that qualifies as an innovation.
Secondly, as new things which we have yet to use or experience,
innovations always involve some degree of risk and uncertainty, which, as
explained, institutional entities in the homebuilding industry
characteristically aim to avoid.
Thus, there must be factor(s) other than intrinsic charcteristics
which account for the acceptance of an innovation. The proposition put
forward in this study is that innovation acceptance will also depend, at
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least to some extent, on the process or manner in which the innovation is
introduced and presented in the institutional environment. That is,
innovation acceptance is likely to be higher if, in its introduction, the
innovation is linked or associated with existing institutional entities
and routines. For example, Widget X is deemed more acceptable to Builder
A if his conservative banker friend B introduces him to Widget Salesman
C. Here the innovation acceptance probability is higher because the
innovation is introduced by a credible information source. Similarly, as
explained in Chapter 1, an innovation encountered in a context that is
institutionally plausible (that is, at a time or in a context when or
where one typically expects to encounter things of that type) has a
higher probability of acceptance. By thus introducing the innovation
through the existing institutional structure, maintaining existing
routine, the newness and uncertainty of the innovation may be mediated.
The innovation itself may be made to appear more stable and routine.
Similarly, by association with existing entities and routines the
innovation itself may be given a particular meaning, thus seeming both
more compatible and more routine.
In sum, though by definition an innovation is something new and
risky, and may even have intrinsic characteristics that counter favored
institutional routines, its acceptability is likely to be higher if the
innovation is introduced or in some way connected with institutional
meanings and routines, notably personal sources of information. It is
this general proposition which is investigated in this study.
Identifying and assessing the importance of institutional factors in
facilitating the comprehensibility of solar thermal technologies in the
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homebuilding industry requires a close look at the decision processes of
potential users. Specifically, we will have to examine the criteria by
which they have determined to accept (or alternatively reject) the
technology and the process by which such criteria evolved. In other
words, what does solar thermal mean to potential users, and how did it
come to be seen in this way?
For the purposes of this study we will use the HUD Solar Heating and
Cooling Demonstration Program as a data source. This program, initiated
in 1974, was the first in a series of energy-related programs prompted by
the oil embargo. It was the first public intervention into the housing
market intended to encourage the use of solar thermal technologies in the
homebuilding industry. The HUD Program (known commonly as the HUD SHAC
Program) employs a single focus intervention strategy, that is, financial
grants to builders/developers. More specifically, the program provides
grants to builders/developers to cover the incremental costs due to
installation of solar thermal systems in residences. HUD has been
awarding these grants in a series of cycles, each cycle stressing
increasing technical and market performance in its requirements. In all
cases, though, only builders/developers proposing complete, "marketable"
packages, for units to be sold or rented on the open market have been
eligible to apply [19].
The HUD SHAC Program was not, of course, specifically designed to
explore the kinds of questions of concern in this study. It is therefore
19U.S. Department of Energy, "National Program for Solar Heating and
Cooling of Buildings: Annual Report," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
of Energy, (DOE/CS-0007), 1978.
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necessary to consider how the program alters the industry/innovation
relationship as we have described it. Most important, of course, is the
HUD subsidy to cover the additional costs of using solar. By providing
this subsidy, HUD obviously assumes a large part of the additional
financial risk that use of a solar thermal technology entails. However,
this element should not significantly affect the data for this study.
The HUD subsidy may be important, perhaps even a necessary factor in
making the intrinsic characteristics of solar thermal more attractive,
and the innovation overall, more comprehensible. However, given the many
other issues at stake in the use of solar thermal, the subsidy alone
would appear an insufficient basis for making solar thermal altogether
comprehensible, or at least of sufficient comphrensibility and appeal to
be used.
Thus In studying the participants in the HUD SHAC Program we will
want to examine the participants' full set of reasons for using solar
thermal seeking to determine the basis by which the innovation appeared
comprehensible. Careful attention will be given to the. meaning given to
solar thermal and the process by which project participants came to the
decision to use the technology, for example, the contexts in which they
encountered the innovation, their principal sources of information, the
form of the information, and so on. In this way, we will try to come to
some conslusions as to the extent to which institutional forces were able
to compensate for some of the less favorable attributes of the technology
and overall, facilitate its 'acceptance. Similarly, conclusions will be
drawn regarding forces in the institutional structure of the homebuilding
industry of potential use in facilitating acceptance of this new
technology.
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The case study format was chosen for presentation of the material
because of the nature of the information sought and because of obvious
resource constraints. Specific projects were selected on the basis of
indicative sampling, that is, the likelihood of illustrating
institutional interactions of the type hypothesized here [20]. The
primary variable used in sample selection was developer type, as the
background exploration into the homebuilding industry suggested that
comprehensibility would vary in this manner. (As described in Chapter 2,
different developers have different motivations for becoming involved in
housing development, work under different constraints, and so on.) Ten
developer types were identified, although only three, the small-medium
sized speculative builder, the non-profit development corporation, and
the housing cooperative, are illustrated here.
Data collection efforts were carried out primarily during January and
February 1979. Following an initial note to the builder/developer on
record for each project, site visits were held; an open-ended,
semi-structured survey research instrument was used (see Appendix:
Exhibit A). Additional interviews were held with other project
informants upon recommendation by the builder/developer.
20 The projects selected for study are among those used in the
Photovoltaics Institutional Analysis Project conducted at MIT. This
project, part of a larger project involving the MIT Department of Urban
Studies and Planning, the MIT Energy Laboratory, and the Sloan School of
Management, is intended to explore the institutional forces in the
homebuilding industry so as to guide future tests and demonstration programs
for photovoltaic technologies. See Thomas E. Nutt-Powell, "Research Design
for Institutional Analysis of HUD's Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration
Program," Cambridge, MA: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1979, for a more complete
account of the sample selection procedures, data collection methodology, and
other matters relating to the research design. For an account of the other
projects studied, see Thomas E. Nutt-Powell et al., "Solar Heating and
Cooling of Housing: Five Institutional Analysis Case Studies," Cambridge,
MA: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1979.
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CHAPTER 4: THREE SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING CASE STUDIES
Introduction
This chapter presents in depth case studies of participants in the
HUD SHAC Program, the objective being to uncover and more fully
understand the processes and criteria by which members of the
homebuilding industry (notably the key actor, the builder/developer)
determine to accept or reject (or at least experiment with) a new
technology such as solar thermal. Three case studies are presented.
They are: Project Solar for Indiana, a group project under the
sponsorship of the Home Builders Association of Indiana, with different
builders constructing a house with the same design and solar unit in
seven different regions of the state; 924 West End Avenue, a project
involving the solar retrofit of a 65-year-old, cooperative apartment
building on New York City's West Side; Cathedral Square, a 100 unit
development for the elderly and the handicapped in Burlington, Vermont,
developed under the sponsorship of a non-profit church group.
Though each case is presented separately, a common format is used.
First, a brief introduction of each project is provided, noting the
characteristics that distinguish both the project and its developer.
Next, the project chronology is presented, tracing the progression of
activities and events having bearing on the project and project
participants' general attitudes toward solar thermal. The third section
discusses the project chronology and the project developer from a more
analytic perspective.
In the previous chapter it was explained that, though solar thermal
counters many industry routines, innovations are not likely to be
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accepted on the basis of intrinsic characteristics alone and that
institutional factors might, in some ways, compensate for negative
attributes as well as the risk and uncertainty that innovations
characteristically entail. In this section then, we will try to
determine the means by which program participants were able to resolve
the particular attributes of the technology countering their routines and
in the end, find solar thermal sufficiently attractive to be used. By
focusing on the roles adopted by different individuals and groups, and
the contexts in which the innovation was encountered and used, we will
try to come to some conclusions as to their full reasons for using solar
thermal and the extent to which institutional factors played a part.
Project Solar for Indiana
Project Solar for Indiana, a participant in HUD Cycle 3, involved
seven builders, each building a single-family house, identical in terms
of design, square footage, insolation factors and solar units, in seven
different regions of the state. Though each builder applied separately
for the grant, Project Solar was essentially a group project. The
builders' efforts were coordinated and assisted by the Home Builders
Association of Indiana (HBAI), the statewide organization for builders
and related professionals to which all seven project participants belong;
the applications were submitted under a common identity, Project Solar
for Indiana.
Project Solar for Indiana illustrates the case of the small- to
medium-sized builder, in particular, the speculative builder producing
units for sale on the open market. This category of builders,
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responsible for the bulk of the country's building, is distinguished
first, by a strong financial motivation (speculative builders engage in
housing production on entrepreneurial bases) and second, by a
single-handed mode of operation; the small to medium-sized speculative
builder typically -carries out all major activities in the housing
production process himself, without the assistance of architects,
designers, engineers, market analysts, or other building specialists.
Because of the uncertainties and large risks involved in these activities
and the builder's small size and limited capital resources, the small to
medium-sized speculative builder is typically conservative. He is not
one to pioneer design changes or make radical breaks with tradition
simply for the sake of trying something new. . In general, new products
and/or practices are accepted only when they have been proven to reduce
costs and ensure a higher profit or when they have been shown to reduce
risks and uncertainties in any of the major activities in the housing
production process, most importantly, uncertainties relating to local
market conditions and consumer demand.
Project Solar for Indiana illustrates how this generally conservative
predisposition of the small to medium-sized speculative builder can be
moderated in favor of innovaton acceptance when the innovation is
encountered in the context of a supportive institutional environment. As
we shall see in this study, when solar thermal is introduced and
associated with an organization of unusual prominence in the state's
homebuilding industry, a network of supporting figures is generated,
giving the builders easy access to a wide range of resources and
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expertise--general and specialized facilitating skills as well as
technical expertise.
Project Chronology
To fully account for the origins of Project Solar for Indiana, it is
necessary to go back to 1975. Though the HUD SHAC Program had been in
operation since 1974, Tom Kibler (then Director of the State Energy
Office) did not hear about it until after the first-cycle grants had
already been awarded. After reading about the program in a publication
of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), Kibler, in
turn, informed his supervisor, then Lt. Governor Robert Orr, who "hit the
ceiling" because Indiana had received no funds. Orr was particularly
disappointed because Indiana had recently legislated a property tax
incentive to encourage the use of solar thermal, being the first state in
the country to do so. Thus Kibler and Orr decided that something be done
to ensure Indiana's involvement in Cycle 2 of the HUD SHAC Program.
Thus following his attendance at an ERDA-sponsored program for state
energy officials in March 1976, Kibler's office (now with a staff person
specifically assigned to solar) planned a seminar to publicize the
availability of the HUD SHAC grants and to stimulate interest in the
program. Over 400 invitations were sent to trade associations,
architects, developers, and other building-related professionals. Three
hundred responses were received; however, of these, only twelve were
builders, a response state officials attributed to the cautious and
conservative nature of Indiana. As John Chaille of the State Energy
Office remarked, "It's a particularly closed state when it comes to
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taking money from the federal government. Builders shy away from federal
programs because of perceived delays, red tape, and perhaps, some moral
reservations . . . there's a hard work ethic out here . . . no one likes
to think that they (or anyone else) is getting something for nothing."
Moreover, as one builder explained, "Most builders didn't know very much
about solar energy then, and most weren't in any great rush to learn.
There didn't seem to be much opportunity or promise in it." In sum,
neither federal programs nor solar energy seemed very popular in the
Indiana building community at the time.
There was one notable exception, however--Steve Moulder of the
Moulder Corporation, of Greenwood, Indiana, a relative newcomer to the
homebuilding field. An engineer by training, he had always been
interested in architecture and building "in a special way." After
building on a small scale, he entered the market as a full-time
homebuilder doing custom building in 1971. Moulder had been intrigued by
the first solar installation in the area. (A solar thermal system had
recently been installed in the office of Dr. Thomas Bohnert, a prominent
Indianapolis dentist.) Then, after hearing about the HUD SHAC Program at
the seminar hosted by the Energy Office, he began to think more seriously
about it. Explained Moulder, "Although still somewhat skeptical, like
everyone else, after attending the meeting I contacted my heating
contractor, who put me in touch with his equipment supplier, Lee Kennedy
of the Hedback Corporation, Indianapolis distributors of heating and
cooling equipment. I was curious to see if solar could be adapted to
houses of the type I was used to building."
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Moulder spent the next thirty days learning about solar from
Kennedy. (Kennedy had first learned about solar when assisting architect
Gordon Clark in integrating the solar unit with the conventional heating
system in the Bohnert office.) Then, with Kennedy's assistance, Moulder
applied for the grant. As Moulder explained, an important motivation at
this time was publicity: "Because of the conservatism of Indiana
builders, their skepticism, and reluctance to get involved in federal
programs, I was nearly certain that no one else would apply; thus, I
could get the only Indiana grant."
Moulder's predictions proved nearly correct. Of the few builders to
apply, only Moulder received a Cycle 2 award, in May 1977. Later he was
to benefit significantly from this: coverage by all local television
stations, press releases, full coverage in the Indiana Bildor (the
monthly newpaper of the HBAI), ribbon-cutting ceremonies with the Lt.
Governor, and the like. As Moulder summed up, "I- entirely capitalized on
it and got twelve months of heavy publicity."
It was during the time that Moulder was busy taking advantage of his
participation in the program, and in his words, "becoming hooked on
solar," that the next round of activities with solar began, this time
under the sponsorship of the HBAI. This organization is one in a network
of national organizations serving the building community, and on the
basis of the high proportion of the state's builders and related
professionals enlisted in its membership, and its high level of activity,
one of obvious centrality to the building industry in the state. As Bob
Weiss, the HBAI's associate director explained, "The Association is
generally regarded as the representative of the state's building
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industry. We sponsor a wide range and number of activities--seminars,
conventions, our monthly newspaper, for example. Most of our members
take a real interest in these affairs. They want to know what's
happening in the industry, and we try to keep them abreast." In addition
to these formal activities, functions and services, the HBAI, like any
formal association, is a place for personal interaction. "It's been a
source of a good number of contacts and connections, both personal and
business-related," explained Weiss.
Within the HBAI, Project Solar for Indiana was the idea of the newly
elected association president, Thomas Laycock. In assuming this position
in January 1977 and drawing up the association's annual agenda, as he put
it, "what he wanted to accomplish during the year," Laycock proposed that
the HBAI sponsor a group of builders to participate in Cycle 3 of the HUD
SHAC Program. Presently owner/director of A.H.M. Graves, Inc., Builders
& Developers, Laycock is an architect by training, and as he explained,
he had always taken an interest in energy conservation in buildings.
Thus, considering the energy situation, Indiana's very cold winters and
the availability of funds (which he knew about via Moulder as well as an
ERDA publications) it sounded like "a good idea to get some solar
activity started in Indiana." Laycock favored the idea of a group
project, that is, having a group of builders use the same house and the
same solar unit, to allow the measurement of energy efficiency in
different climatic regions of the state. Moreover, Laycock reasoned,
"Different builders do things different ways: a group project would be
more meaningful, more visible. Also, in making the project appear more
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unique, it might help in ensuring grant awards for all the builders in
the group."
Thus, following the approval of the proposal by the HBAI's executive
and general boards, Laycock turned to his friend and fellow HBAI member
Kenneth A. Puller, for assistance in exploring the matter. Shortly
thereafter, he asked Puller to chair the HBAI's Solar Energy Committee,
taking responsibility for formal direction of the project. Puller knew
very little about solar energy at the time. As he explained, "As usual
with Tom's foresight and wisdom, he picked somebody who knows absolutely
nothing about solar heat . . . Under Tom's direction the blind were
leading the blind." But Puller obviously had other areas of expertise.
Currently president of Puller Mortgage Associates of Indianapolis, a
mortgage banking operation which he describes as a "one-stop
clearinghouse," Puller had extensive experience in real estate sales,
management, and building development, as well as an equally diversified
array of experiences during eight years at HUD. Puller also had
extensive involvement in local land development and housing affairs, for
example, he had recently assisted in the writing of the statute for the
state's housing finance agency. Furthermore, as one associate explained,
"Puller had a known talent' for making people work together." Puller did
not know exactly what the job of chairman of the Solar Energy Committee
would entail, but he agreed to take the position, wanting, as he put it,
"to help give the builders a start."
To notify the state's builders and get the project under way, Puller
and Laycock then turned to the internal structure of the HBAI. Laycock
called a meeting of the six area vice presidents, asking them to
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publicize the effort. The intention at that time was to have one
applicant from each of the six membership areas, but to the surprise of
Puller and Laycock, over a dozen builders expressed interest in
participating in the project. In general, the motives expressed by the
builders were twofold: a desire for publicity, and a desire to learn
about solar.
In the meantime (while preliminary discussions with the builders were
being held), the members of the Solar Energy Committee, under the
direction of Puller, were trying to become more familiar with solar and
the workings of the HUD SHAC Program. But here, even after pooling their
resources, they considered themselves still to be sorely deficient.
Explained Puller, "No one in the group really knew anything about solar
heating. So naturally, we turned to the only known expert, Steve
Moulder, and asked him to join our committee."
Moulder then agreed to assist the group, and shortly thereafter, the
first formal meeting was held with Laycock, Puller, Bob Weiss, A. William
Carson (executive director of the HBAI), Moulder, and the builders (now
numbering seven). After the preliminary meeting, only seven of the
builders remained seriously committed to participation in the project.)
Here, Moulder recounted his experiences with the program and also advised
the group on basic technical matters. Recalled Puller, "Here we were
with lots of unanswered questions and here he was with all the answers
Here was someone who had been there before."
After this first meeting in February, the group began to meet on a
regular basis with the continuing assistance of Moulder. Early on in the
discussions, Moulder actually took the entire group out to Greenwood for
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a tour of his solar home. In addition to Moulder, the group was offered
assistance from professors from Ball State University, who thereafter
provided advice on technical aspects, and also Lee Kennedy.. On a
recommendation by Moulder, Kennedy had been contacted by the committee
and he too began to advise the group on the technical aspects of solar.
Puller summed up the group's predicament and general attitude at the
time, "All possible resources were actively sought and utilized because
of the obvious lack of expertise . . . The first meeting had generated
tremendous interest and excitement about the procedures and requirements
of the grant and particularly about solar energy in the home. . . But
there were still so many shaky areas. At the same time we knew that we
had many things to decide on, and that we were going to have to proceed
quickly if we were to meet a March 29th deadline."
One of the earliest decisions to be made by the group concerned the
design of the house. Each builder was asked to bring in a plan suitable
for the "project house." After some initial difficulties in agreeing
upon a common design, a plan was selected. At this point, Al Vandermeer,
director of Sales and Marketing of Davidson Industries (a large
manufacturer and distributor of building components) and an an associate
member of the HBAI, was contracted to make the house "energy-efficient"
and to draw up the blueprints and specifications, as he had done for the
Moulder house.
The other major decision made by the group, executed concurrently
with the house design, was the choice of a solar unit, a matter which
proved to be far more difficult. As Puller explained, "The group had
learned something fran Moulder and Kennedy as well as the professors from
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Ball State; they at least knew how the system was supposed to work and
what they were supposed to look for. But when it came down to actually
choosing a system, they didn't know what to do . . . So, when in one day
they heard presentations from three solar equipment distributors,
Westinghouse, Solaran, and Hedback, they didn't know who to go with.
Recalled Puller, "Westinghouse had the best presentation . . . but
because of our uncertainty we pretty much had to go with our gut reaction
here." After a period of some indecisiveness, they chose Rom-aire, the
product distributed by Kennedy's firm, the Hedback Corporation. As
Puller explained, "Hedback was a local firm, with a local reputation, and
would be around when we needed them." But even more important, "Hedback
(i.e., Kennedy) had previous experience with Moulder and the HUD SHAC
Program; like Moulder, they had been there before."
With these decisions made, the group spent the remainder of the time
compiling the necessary information and preparing the grant
applications. Members of the HBAI, notably Bob Weiss, assisted the group
by gathering support letters from elected officials, government agencies,
and generally keeping abreast of what everyone else was doing. Lee
Kennedy prepared the technical areas in the application as he had done
for Moulder. Puller and staff, notably Patricia Shure, Puller's
assistant at the time, coordinated and packaged the effort, holding group
meetings to instruct the builders section by section in preparing the
application, and later, reviewing and reworking the applications in order
that they conform to HUD standards.
Thus concluded the planning stage for Project Solar for Indiana.
News of the grant awards was received in late May, each builder receiving
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the requested amount, i.e., $8,500, and work on the houses began in early
summer. No major difficulties were experienced during construction. In
general, the contractors followed the instructions given by Lee Kennedy.
(After his firm's selection, Kennedy had hosted a series of seminars for
the builders and their respective heating and cooling contractors on
installation procedures for the units.) However, as Weiss explained,
"Because this was each contractor's first solar job, there was still much
uncertainty as to whether the systems were being properly installed, and
even the builders couldn't help them." "So," continued Weiss, "as one
might expect, there were constant calls to Lee Kennedy, who, in his
typically cooperative manner, provided ongoing assistance. One might
even go so far as to say that Kennedy supervised the jobs, even if only
informally."
By the fall of 1977, all houses were nearly (if not completely)
operational and the builders were preparing them for marketing. As they
had hoped, the solar component proved quite an attraction for most.
Hoosiers may be conservative about and even skeptical of solar, as one
builder noted, but they are curious nevertheless, and at least a few were
interested in buying. None of the builders reported any difficulties
selling their homes. (In fact, two of the seven are still holding their
homes by choice, for publicity and related reasons.)
Project Analysis
In analyzing the project "approach" to solar thermal, we will examine
the means by which solar thermal came to be of sufficient
comprehensibility and appeal to be used by the builders, despite the
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negative intrinsic charcteristics of the innovation. Similarly, we will
consider how the builders managed the planning and design-related
activities that use of solar and participation in the HUD SHAC Program
entailed.
First, it is necessary to elaborate upon the routines and general
disposition of the small to medium-sized speculative builder and on this
basis the likely predisposition of the Indiana builders toward a
technology such as solar thermal. As explained in the introduction, the
small- to medium-sized builder is motivated by financial incentives and
engages in housing production on an entrepreneurial basis. Another
distinguishing factor is the "single-handed" mode of operation.
Typically, the small to medium-sized builder carries out all major
activities in the production process himself. For example, on the basis
of an assessment of the local market and consumer demand, he alone
devises the general building concept as well as the building design.
Similarly, he "single-handedly" arranges for the financing needed for
construction and then, acting as the general contractor, directs all
activities during the construction period; in most cases, the builder
handles the marketing and sale of his units as well.
Given the many risks and uncertainties involved in these activities,
the general vagaries of the market and economic conditions, and the
builder's limited supply of capital, the precariousness of the builder's
position is easy to see. If everything proceeds smoothly, he can be
quite successful, but problems or complications in any of these
activities, (for example, misjudgments in market demand, delays in
financing or zoning approvals) can easily lead the speculative builder to
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failure. Thus it is easy to understand why the builder is often cautious
in terms of technological innovation and generally conservative in the
products and practices he chooses to employ. True, a competitive edge on
the local market is always desired and thus there may be some motivation
to try something new. However, the small to medium-sized speculative
builder's principal concern is with the production of an "acceptable"
product, in other words, a product that will easily and quickly sell and
that is easily designed, financed, and constructed as well. As a general
rule, the small to medium-sized speculative builder will accept new
products and/or practices only when they will positively affect the
marketability or saleability of his units (and only when he has a fairly
high degree of certainty that this will, in fact, occur) and/or when new
products or practices will enable the builder to reduce costs or risks in
production, enabling a higher and/or surer profit.
Though this does not rule out the possibility for innovation, it is,
of course, not entirely favorable in this regard. Given the intrinsic
charcteristics of solar thermal in its present state of development, one
might anticipate much resistance on the part of the small to medium-sized
speculative builder in this particular case.
Most obvious is the issue of product cost, notably the matter of
higher first cost. Because items of high first cost require a higher
downpayment and increased carrying costs for the homebuyer, they
automatically reduce the marketability of the home. Thus, in the
competitive conditions of local housing markets, small to medium-sized
speculative builders have characteristically considered decisions to
increase housing costs with much care. For similar reasons, further
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resistance to solar thermal might be expected on the basis of design and
aesthetic issues, that is, how the appearance and the general idea of
solar thermal affect the marketability of the home. As explained in
previous chapters, marketability is never a straightforward question of
economics; housing is a highly personal good, and the average homebuyer
wants a traditional-looking home.
Still further resistance is likely to result from the generally
turbulent state of the solar art. As explained above, the small to
medium-sized speculative builder is already in a high-risk position and
characteristically tries to reduce his risks in the housing production
process. He not only wants a product that he is sure will sell, but a
product that will be readily available from the dealer or manufacturer, a
product easily financed, easily installed, easily serviced and repaired,
circumstances not presently characteristic of solar thermal.
It is also likely that the small to medium-sized speculative builder
will be the least informed of developer types about a new technology like
solar thermal on account of his local focus and lack of capital resources
with which to "seek out" and experiment with new products. Thus, even if
many of the uncertain issues presently confronting solar thermal were to
be resolved, this information is slow in reaching the speculative
builder/developer. This is even more likely to be the case for midwest
builders, as compared with builders in the southwest, an area of much
greater solar activity and therefore more generally available information.
Thus there are many reasons why the typical small to medium-sized
speculative builder in Indiana might have little knowledge and interest
in a technology like solar thermal. Why then, in the face of all such
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uncertainties and deterrents did the Indiana builders determine to use
solar thermal and participate in the HUD SHAC Program? How were they
able to assemble all the resources needed and to successfully manage all
the planning and design activities that use of the technology and
participation in the HUD SHAC Program entailed?
A review of the project chronology reveals that Project Solar for
Indiana is the result of the workings of a diverse group of organizations
and individuals, who, because of their positions and previous experience
in the state's homebuilding industry, were able to perform a variety of
supporting and generally facilitating functions, to convince the builders
of the "do-ability" of solar thermal and participation in the HUD SHAC
Program, and to help them achieve such ends. The part played by the HBAI
was, of course, of central importance throughout. As noted, it was the
HBAI's newly elected president Thomas Laycock who conceived of the idea
for the project and first introduced it to the HBAI. As an architect and
developer with some years experience in the local building community,
Laycock was clearly an individual viewed with both personal and
professional respect. He had served as an officer of the HBAI for three
years and had recently been elected association president. Thus, on the
basis of personal and professional status alone, one would expect
Laycock's ideas to be considered seriously. However, rather than
Laycock's personal and professional stature, it was his association with
an organization of the stature, resources, and general facilitating
capabilities of the HBAI, that helped make solar thermal seem a
reasonable technology for the builders to use.
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The HBAI is a highly active organization, respected in the state's
building community and a reliable and credible source of information.
Moreover, as a focus for activities of the state's builders and related
professionals, it encompasses an unsually rich and diversified complex of
resources and capabilities. As such, the HBAI functions as an opinion
leader; it is the place that industry members customarily turn to learn
about new products and practices. It is equally important to recognize
the socialization functions of the organization. The HBAI is a formal,
understandable, institutional entity with internally shared norms and
values, and established social groups with routinized patterns and
relationships. Interpersonal contacts, information exchanges, work
processes and activities are all guided by rules as well as custom and/or
tradition. The act of organizational affiliation, and acceptance of and
participation in its activities, is a central routine in Indiana's
homebuilding industry.
Thus, as association president, Laycock did more than simply pass on
information about the HUD SHAC Program or suggest, as one colleague to
another, that the builders use solar thermal. By associating solar
thermal with the HBAI, and with his term as president, Laycock
legitimated the technology itself. Because of its position in the
state's building community, the HBAI acted as a "seal of approval,"
validating the use of solar thermal as well as the participation in
federal programs.
Further, the familiar HBAI operations and procedures were able to
mediate uncertainties and risks inherent in the technology. In
particular, the HBAI's role as a project facilitator (sponsoring
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projects, access to and organization of diverse resources, and so on)
made Project Solar for Indiana almost a routine activity. It was "just
another HBAI project," not the risky acceptance of an uncertain
technology.
The contribution of the HBAI was not, however, merely a symbolic
one. With Laycock's prompting, the HBAI took on major project
development functions, allowing the seven builders to pool and therefore
dilute, individual risk. For example, appointment of Puller to head the
effort was undoubtedly critical. Though Puller had no experience with
solar thermal, he was highly skilled in housing finance, management,
development, and the like, and plays a major role in the Indiana
homebuilding industry in these areas. He has, as his associate
described, a talent for making people work together well. Furthermore,
Puller has an understanding of the public bureaucracy, notably HUD, and
the process of obtaining federal funds. He is also active in the HBAI,
and a personal friend of Laycock. Puller thus carried both formal and
informal legitimacy of the organization and its current president.
Thus Laycock transformed one innovation (solar thermal) into
something more routine (an HBAI project) while Puller folded a second
innovation (federal grant funds) into another, the first routine (the
HBAI project) adding the weight of another routine (project
coordination/leadership by Puller's mortgage company). In this way, the
general sense of uncertainty expected on the part of the builders was
eliminated, while at the same time, the builders were provided the means
by which to compensate for solar thermal's high first cost, i.e., through
the posssibility of a grant fran the HUD SHAC Program.
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Where the HBAI thus provided the impetus for participation in the
project, and Puller removed the uncertainties about funding and
application procedures, it was Moulder who provided the legitimacy of
actually using solar thermal in a successful development venture. Though
Moulder was obviously an individual with more of a predisposition toward
risk than the average small to medium-sized speculative
builder/developer, i.e., a "plunger," he was also a fellow builder with
interests and concerns similar to the seven builders in the project. As
such, he was a generally credible information source. Moreover,
irrespective of the extent to which the builders could identify
personally with Moulder, they could certainly identify with the house
Moulder had constructed and the attention that this solar house was
attracting to Moulder's subdivision. In short, here was concrete
evidence that building a solar home and participating in the HUD SHAC
Program met marketability criteria. Further, like the HBAI, Moulder's
role proved not just a symbolic one; he too provided direct assistance,
translating solar thermal into the routines of speculative homebuilding.
As Puller succinctly put it, "Moulder's presence was of great assistance,
in a word, invaluable. Only with his agreement to join our effort, only
with the recounting of his experiences with solar thermal and the HUD
SHAC Program, and moreover, the excitement he conveyed, did we become
convinced that we could and would go ahead with Project Solar."
Importantly, Moulder also served in the capacity of a linking-pin
through his introduction of the group to Kennedy. In turn, Kennedy
further reduced the uncertainties by taking the highly technical
information about solar thermal and putting it into a form that the
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builders could more clearly understand, as he had done for Moulder.
Kennedy could be trusted, not only because of his membership in the HBAI
and his importance as a materials supplier, but also because of his
previous experience with Moulder and the Moulder home. That the
information had legitimacy because of Kennedy's personal (as opposed to
"technical") status is revealed in the group's selection of his firm as
solar supplier based on "gut reaction," despite the excellent (and
presumably "technical") presentation given by Westinghouse. In a similar
manner, Vandermeer's final drawings of a group-developed design provided
a legitimacy to solar based on ongoing routines.
Thus we now see both why and how seven Indiana builders agreed to use
a new technology--solar thermal--as well as a new financing
mechanism--federal grant funds. Project Solar for Indiana is a prime
illustration of the importance of supportive institutional networks in
facilitating the acceptance of innovation in the homebuilding industry.
In the first two cycles of the HUD SHAC Program, only one grant was given
in Indiana, to a builder whom we have characterized as a plunger, an
innovator. In the third cycle, seven builders became involved,
encouraged by the interest and support given the program by the HBAI.
The HBAI's sponsorship proved the initial motivating institutional force,
eliminating the barriers of lack of information, general -uncertainties,
and individual risk. Puller's packaging made the financing aspect more
of a routine. Moulder's advice reduced the barriers in the production
process, and those relating to marketability. Kennedy resolved
uncertainties about design integration and provided ongoing technical
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support, while Vandermeer provided the final drawings, again maintaining
routine.
As Bob Weiss of the HBAI summed up, "Without the HBAI's formal
sponsorship, without Puller's supervision and packaging of the
application and without Moulder's and Kennedy's assistance in technical
matters, there would have been no Project Solar for Indiana." What made
it thinkable was that it was an HBAI activity, organized and run in a
manner consistent with other association projects. What made it
understandable for the individual builders was the evidence of a
colleague (Moulder) who could show that it worked and was profitable; and
the interpretation of the innovation by an expert (Kennedy) in the
technical area in which he was trusted. What made it happen in relation
to financial bureaucratic complexity was the coordination of an expert
(Puller) who acted in a manner consistent with other dealings the
builders would have with him. What made it visible were the drawings by
a source (Vandermeer) who routinely illustrated project ideas. Thus,
what was otherwise complicated, mysterious and confusing, became an
activity which was, in many respects, routine. In Indiana, Project Solar
for Indiana was, to a very large degree, "business as usual."
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Chronology
Project Solar for Indiana
1975
December Thomas Kibler (then director of Indiana State Energy
Office) reads about the HUD SHAC Program in an ERDA
publication; informs Lt. Governor Robert Orr.
1976
May Kibler's office sponsors seminar for state builders and
related professionals to stimulate interest in solar
thermal and the HUD SHAC Program.
Summer Steve Moulder, an attendee of the meeting, consults
with Lee Kennedy of the Hedback Corporation about the
possibilities of solar thermal; with Kennedy's
assistance, Moulder applies for a HUD Cycle 2 grant.
October Moulder receives the HUD SHAC grant; begins
construction of solar unit.
1977
January Thomas Laycock assumes the presidency of the HBAI and
proposes that the HBAI sponsor a group of builders to
participate in Cycle 3 of the HUD SHAC Program; project
idea approved by the HBAI's executive and general
boards; Kenneth Puller agrees to take formal direction
of the project as chairman of the HBAI's Solar Energy
Committee.
Puller and Laycock hold meeting with six area vice
presidents to publicize the project; preliminary
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discussions with the builders held.
Puller asks Moulder to join the HBAI Solar Energy
Committee and to assist project efforts.
February First formal project meeting held with Laycock, Puller,
Bob Weiss, A. William Carson (HBAI administrators),
Moulder, and the builders attending.
Group meetings held throughout month with the
continuing assistance of Moulder and also, Lee Kennedy
brought in on a recommendation by Moulder.
Group decides upon a common plan for the "project
house;" Al Vandermeer contracted to make the house
"energy-efficient" and to draw up the blueprints and
specifications.
Group hears presentations from various solar equipment
distributors; selects Rom-aire, the product distributed
by Kennedy's firm (i.e., the Hedback Corporation);
Kennedy hosts a series of seminars for the builders and
their respective heating and cooling contractors on
installation procedures.
March Grant applications prepared under supervision of Puller
and with assistance of Weiss and the HBAI; submitted to
HUD.
May HUD awards each builder grant of $8,500.
Construction of units begins.
Fall All units completed; builders prepare for marketing.
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Five of the seven units marketed.
Two units still held by their builders as models, for
publicity and related reasons.
1978
1979
January
129
924 West End Avenue
924 West End Avenue, a participant in HUD Cycle 3, involved the solar
conversion of a 68 year old, 64 unit, cooperative apartment building on
New York City's West Side. Utilizing 117 solar panels in a two story
array (i.e., nearly 2,500 square feet of collectors) the project is
believed to be the largest solar energy retrofit in the northeast, if not
the entire country. The system at 924 West End Avenue is expected to
supply 50-60 percent of the building's annual domestic hot water
requirements, savings equivalent to an estimated 10,000 gallons of oil a
year.
924 West End Avenue illustrates the case of the housing cooperative
as developer. In the cooperative form of tenure, residents own their
property jointly, i.e., cooperatively, and the project is operated
entirely on their behalf. In essence, residents serve as both owners and
consumers; they are responsible for determining the type and level of
services to be consumed and have responsibility for the financing,
management, maintenance, and repair of the services as well. Thus the
housing cooperative has good reason to be concerned with long term
operating costs and performance characteristics of housing products and
services, in addition to the front end investments they may entail. In
fact, though overall dispositions of housing cooperatives vary on account
of such factors as size and income, it is because of their dual roles and
responsibilities as housing owners and consumers, that housing
cooperatives tend to be conservative in terms of financial management and
in the products and services they use. As a general rule, housing
cooperatives will undertake improvements, or at least replacements of
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existing services or products, only when long term costs savings can be
achieved and further, when the products or services are of proven
reliability, durability and quality, in design and performance.
The 924 West End Avenue case illustrates this generally conservative
predisposition of housing cooperatives toward the acceptance of product
innovations. But importantly, the case also demonstrates how this
conservatism may be moderated when the innovation is encountered in the
context of a supportive institutional environment. As we shall discuss
more fully below, acceptability of the technology is significantly
enhanced when it is associated with an organization having access to a
wide range of trusted and expert resources, in addition to general
facilitating skills of its own, and further, when the technology is
promoted by an individual of unusually high standing and credibility in
the co-op community, and an expert on energy as well.
Project Chronology
The origins of 924 West End Avenue can be traced back to the mid
1970's when Consumer Action Now, a New York City based public interest
organization (known commonly as CAN), determined to change its focus and
concentrate exclusively on issues in the energy field. Founded in 1970
by Lola Redford and a group of approximately twenty women, CAN was
originally intended to address environmental problems. Of particular
concern at the time of its establishment were problems relating to the
consumer and the environment. For its first three years, CAN published a
newsletter exploring a different environmental/consumer topic each
month. By 1973, however, believing the level of public awareness of
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environmental problems to have increased to the point that they were
duplicating efforts, CAN decided to discontinue the newsletter and to
undertake projects in other fields, including energy. CAN then
established a tax-exempt sister organization, the Friends of CAN, to
enable the organization to undertake such projects.
The newly established arm of CAN carried out a variety of educational
projects in the following year. Then, in 1974, as the energy crisis
assumed national proportions, CAN decided to concentrate its efforts
entirely in the energy field. By this time the organization had
developed a strong anti-nuclear philosophy. Concerned with what they saw
as a low lev.el of public awareness of the "cleaner and safer energy
alternatives," i.e., solar, coupled with a lack of adequate information
on the subject, they decided to launch a solar energy education program,
to inform the public of the potentialities of the technology and
generally, promote its use. It was in the context of this effort then,
that late in 1974, CAN conceived of the idea of a solar demonstration
project for New York City, hoping to demonstrate the viability of the
technology for older buildings in urban areas.
Being relatively new to the energy field and lacking actual design
experience with solar, it was clear that CAN would require outside
assistance. Thus, under the direction of Lola Redford, one of CAN's
first steps was to contact Richard Napoli, an individual known to the
organization by way of a personal connection; Maryann Napoli, Napoli's
wife, had been an active member of CAN since 1972. Presently Deputy
Director of the Center for Regional Technology and the Solar Energy
Application Center, interdisciplinary research centers at New York
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Polytechnic Institute, Napoli had just completed a four year term with
New York City's Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) when he was
approached by CAN early in 1975. Though he had then had little actual
experience with solar thermal--in a recent project at the EPA he had
designed some experimental greenhouses, but these had been essentially
"passive" solar designs--Napoli had a strong background in the sciences
and, as one colleague summed up, "a good working knowledge of
engineering." Further, Napoli had an obvious interest and expertise in
environmental issues; he had, in fact, taken an active interest in CAN's
affairs in the past, participating in some of the organization's informal
seminars and meetings. Napoli shared with CAN an interest and commitment
to furthering the use of solar thermal. On the basis of these interests
and concerns, and what he described as his "in-between job status at the
time," Napoli agreed to lead the CAN project team.
Shortly thereafter, CAN also contacted Arthur Weinstein. Now an
attorney in private practice specializing in co-op law, Weinstein was at
the time the Deputy General Counsel for the New York State Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the state legislated
corporation established to investigate energy alternatives. Having been
directed to Weinstein by way of a personal contact (Weinstein having
worked with a friend of someone then at CAN), CAN approached Weinstein
for a sort of introduction to the issues involving both housing and
energy. As Weinstein explained, CAN came to him "asking for a briefing
on both fields; in other words, what it would take, politically, legally,
financially, and so on, to get a solar demonstration project. started in
New York City."
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Weinstein too had had little direct experience with solar and knew
very little about the technical aspects of the technology. However,
having also been active in the housing co-op movement of the late 60's
and early 70's, while employed at ERDA (Weinstein had, in fact, been
responsible for the conversion of his building, i.e., 924 West End
Avenue, from a rental to a cooperative in 1974, and since then had sat on
the Board of Directors) Weinstein was an individual with in depth
knowledge of the financial, legal, and management aspects of housing, New
York City housing market operations in particular. Similarly, on the
basis of his experience with the New York State ERDA, Weinstein had an
obvious interest and in depth knowledge of issues and developments in the
energy field. And though Weinstein differs somewhat with CAN's energy
philosophy, ("I'm not as vehemently anti-nuclear as they,") he too
expresses a commitment to the development of alternative energy
resources. "We should be willing to consider anything that will reduce
our reliance on foreign oils." Thus like Napoli, out of a sense of
personal and professional interest and commitment, Weinstein agreed to
join efforts with the CAN project team.
With a group established, work on the project got under way in late
spring 1975. At the earliest meetings, goals and objectives for the
demonstration project were more fully elaborated, as were plans for
implementation. One important decision made at this time was that the
project be totally private. CAN was concerned with visibility and
expediency and they feared, "rightly so," noted Weinstein, that "anything
involving public funding would get bogged down in the usual bureaucratic
mess and thus not likely to be visible for years." A second important
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decision concerned the location of the project. Following Weinstein's
advice, it was decided to try to locate the project on the West Side of
the City. As he explained, "We didn't want solar or the project in
general to be criticized as a rich man's play thing, something that might
easily have resulted considering the backgrounds and general prominence
of most CAN members. It was important that the project have a broad
appeal, that it appear a viable alternative for a wide range of income
groups and building types in the City."
With objectives so established, the next step was to locate a
building suitable for the demonstration project. To these ends,
Weinstein introduced the group to a number of West Side property owners,
many of which, he noted, he knew on both professional and personal
bases. Similarly, CAN contacted property owners known to CAN members.
Also at this time, CAN contacted architect Travis Price for assistance
with the more technical aspects of the project. In essence, Price agreed
to help the group by conducting technical evaluations of the possible
sites and executing a preliminary system design. Price had had previous
experience with solar, having been the architect and system designer for
a small retrofit project in the East Village, which, as the City's first
solar retrofit, had received considerable media coverage. CAN knew of
Price on this basis and also, because he was a close personal friend of a
CAN member.
After a month or so of investigation, Weinstein's building was
selected from a number of possible sites. Not only was the building
found to heat hot water very inefficiently, especially during the summer
months when solar thermal systems are most effective, but it had the
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proper physical characteristics as well, i.e., a large shadow free roof
area, a good southern exposure, and an old coal bin believed suitable for
the solar storage insolation tank. The co-op aspect of the building also
proved an important consideration. As Napoli explained, "Considering the
front end costs, which we realized were likely to be rather high, coupled
with CAN's desire to keep the project entirely private, only the co-op
form of tenure, where the tenants have a vested interest in operating
costs, appeared a realistic choice for the project." Moreover, as
everyone involved agreed, "924 West End Avenue was not your usual prime
location, i.e., East Side luxury co-op, but one with a highly diversified
clientele."
With the proposed site selected, Price put together a preliminarly
system design which he presented at a meeting between CAN and the 924
Co-op's Board of Directors in December 1975. Up until this time the
Board had made no real decisions on the matter. Weinstein had simply
notified them of the possibility of the project when the building was
first under consideration. Upon selection, the 924 Co-op Board agreed to
meet with CAN and Price, and hear the proposal out. In other words,
explained Weinstein, "I set up the introduction; here was CAN's chance to
sell the idea to the Board, myself included."
According to one attendee of the meeting, however, Price had not
gotten too far in his presentation of the system before the Board stopped
him on the issue of projected costs. Recalled Weinstein, "We really
understood very little about how the system would work, technically, but
we certainly understood the financial end involved . . . Right away we
asked the right questions and found out that the system would not pay for
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itself, at least not with the conventional financing then proposed. This
much was clear even if we weren't altogether certain of our current water
usage, possible solar efficiencies, and so on, to say nothing of the
extra costs associated with building in New York City or the issue of a
contingency fund." Thus solar, or at least Travis Price's proposed
systen, was flatly rejected by Weinstein and the 924 Co-op's Board of
Directors. As Weinstein summed up the Board's position at the time,
"However attractive solar may have been on political, philosophic or
environmental grounds, no one was in any way willing to sell out the
building for it."
Though it appeared that the project had come to a dead end, CAN was
not willing to give up just yet. For second opinions and perhaps fresh
ideas, CAN sought the advice of other professionals, some of whom they
knew on the basis of previous projects, others, for example, like Fred
Dubin, of Dubin, Bloome Associates, the prominent New York City based
engineering firm, through personal contacts and more informal means.
Discussions at this time centered largely on alternative means of
financing. For example, as Weinstein recalled, "there was initially some
talk about trying to obtain bank financing at more favorable interest
rates." After a series of such discussions, however, all came to agree
that given the high front end costs, the only way to make sense of the
project, i.e., to make it acceptable to property owners, whether the 924
Co-op or any other, was to use public monies. A bank, they finally
considered, was not likely to assume the risk, while property owners,
like the 924 Co-op, could not manage the front end investment on their
own.
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Having thus agreed to the use of public monies, however, the group
was not entirely sure about which program to use. They were aware of the
beginnings of the HUD SHAC Program (Lola Redford had, in fact, testified
at the Oversight Hearings for the Program in May 1975). However, on the
basis of the first cycle grants awarded in the program (awarded in mid
January 1976) and moreover, Lola Redford's informal discussions with
persons at HUD, 'CAN perceived something of anti-urban, anti-retrofit bias
on HUD's part, and thus did not believe the prospects of obtaining funds
for a large scale, solar retrofit project in New York City to be very
good. Further, CAN was not aware of any other program that might provide
resources of the kind needed for a project of this scale. Thus, as one
project participant explained, "Though no one outwardly admitted it,
interest in the project began to dwindle. It wasn't that we had
concluded the idea to be infeasible, but it was clear from the first
meeting with the 924 Co-op's Board of Directors that they would only go
ahead with the project with additional financial support, and we had no
brilliant schemes in the works . . . so we unofficially tabled the
discussions . . . more or less, put the project off to the side for the
time."
By late spring the status of the project remained essentially the
same. And if plans for the project had been only informally tabled
during the spring, they were to be more or less officially held at bay
during the summer months when most members of CAN, as well as their
volunteer consultants, took their vacations or worked elsewhere. It was
just at this time, however, when least expected, that interest and
planning for the project was revived once more, this time largely by a
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matter of chance. By sheer coincidence, Napoli had met Fred Dubin in
June, at the Energy Fair at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst,
where both were holding seminars. Dubin, who had apparently spoken with
persons at HUD since his consultations with CAN, then informed Napoli of
HUD's interest in undertaking more urban retrofit projects in future
cycles of the HUD SHAC Program. In essence, if CAN had a building and
could put together a proposal in conformance with HUD SHAC program
requirements, HUD might very well fund it.
Thus, upon returning to New York, Napoli told Weinstein about Dubin's
offer and the HUD SHAC Program. With the possibility of resolving the
financial issue, Weinstein's interest was once again revived, and
Weinstein and Napoli got together to determine what they would need to do
to apply for the HUD grant. "It was already so late, recalled Napoli,
(the application deadline being approximately eight weeks away) that we
knew we could never do a thorough and professional job for a project of
this complication and size. But having gone this far, we thought we
would attempt it anyway." Dubin then sent one of his engineers to CAN,
who, together with Napoli, reworked Travis Price's original design, while
Weinstein assembled various support letters and wrote up the project
rationale. And through what was described as "an altogether harried and
chaotic group effort," they managed to get the application in on time.
As Napoli summed up, "It was really only the rough schematics for the
project; we had no working drawings, and the application was, overall,
very poorly documented; but we sent it in anyway hoping for a chance to
prepare a more detailed proposal at a later date.
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In mid fall the group was notified of the proposal's rejection. HUD
did suggest, however, that they rework the application and re-submit for
Cycle 3 which both CAN and Weinstein agreed to do. This time, however,
the group determined that both the system design and the application be
professionally done. Recalled Napoli, "If we were going to go through it
the second time around, we were going to do it right." Thus, he
continued, "I contacted the one solar architect whose work I know and
trust," this being Donald Watson, known to Napoli through meetings and
informal events sponsored by CAN.
Then residing and working in Connecticut, Watson was unable to take
the job. He did, however, refer Napoli to an architect with whom he had
previously worked, and he explained, he "entirely trusted." This was the
Ehrenkrantz Group, a large New York City based firm that, as Napoli
explained, "had just begun to make a name for itself with solar." (The
Ehrenkrantz Group had just recently designed 50 units of solar assisted
housing for the Department of Defense and 20 units for the Navy.)
Early in November, then, Napoli approached the Ehrenkrantz Group who
agreed to design the system and prepare the grant application in
cooperation with CAN and Weinstein. A new system was then designed for
the structure during the ensuing months. Under the direction of Stephen
Weinstein, i.e., project architect, the Ehrenkrantz Group maintained
formal responsibility throughout the design process; however, as Arthur
Weinstein noted, "he and Napoli as well as Dubin were consulted from time
to time on major aspects of the design." For example, the choice of a
solar manufacturer had been one important decision made, more or less,
collectively. Recalled Weinstein, "There was one critical meeting early
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in the winter of 1976 at the office of the Ehrenkrantz Group; I was there
as the building's representative, Napoli as CAN's; representatives from
the Daystar Corporation were there too. Here, Stephen Weinstein
presented us with a breakdown of solar energy performance efficiency
curves prepared at the Daystar Laboratories, the logic being that Daystar
collectors were the most efficient ones to use. Moreover, we were
informed, the Ehrenkrantz Group had used Daystar collectors in their
previous project. Continued Weinstein, "There were many things we should
have known about at the time (and the Ehrenkrantz Group should have known
them too), i.e., that Daystar collectors are highly vulnerable to water
stagnation conditions . . . but the idea of maximizing efficiency was
obviously appealing . . . Daystar's simulations, Steve Weinstein's
presentation, all sounded reasonable enough, and so we all agreed."
And thus proceeded the design process. With a solar manufacturer
selected, the Ehrenkrantz Group completed the system design. They also
made preliminary arrangements for the installation of the system,
subcontracting the work, with the approval of Weinstein and Napoli, to
Harold Crane, of Crane Thermodynamics, someone with wham they had worked
before. In the meantime, Weinstein and Napoli touched up the project
rationale, compiled a variety of support letters from city and state
agencies, government officials, the news media, and the like, and this
time, the group was able to submit the application well in advance of the
March 29th program deadline.
Thus concluded the planning stage for 924 West End Avenue. In May,
notification of the grant award was received; however, it was not for the
entire amount. For reasons still unclear, HUD had agreed to give them
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only $112,000 of the $156,000 requested. Thus, once again, it was time
to consider project costs. Explained Weinstein, "By this time we
obviously wanted to go ahead with the project, but it was also apparent
that a gap of $44,000 put this very much in doubt. At the same time, we
knew that if we had any intention of trying to raise the funds, we would
have to act fast as HUD had given us less than one week to decide whether
or not to accept the grant." Thus, continued Weinstein, "Over the next
few days, Napoli, Steve Weinstein and myself got together for a little
'charrette,' trying to see what we could whittle away from our initial
cost estimates and also trying to see if we could extract something more
from HUD."
The group was unsuccessful in their attempts to gain additional
monies from HUD; however, by obtaining a firm quote from Crane, the
general contractor arranged by the Ehrenkrantz Group, and as Napoli
explained, essentially eliminating any reserve or contingency fund, the
group brought the total estimated project cost down to $140,000 leaving a
gap of $28,000. This, however, was the bottom line; as one project
participant summed up, "The co-op had to come up with these funds or
there would be no project."
Weinstein, in turn, explained the current status of the project to
the 924 Co-op's Board of Directors. No formal vote was taken; however, a
full tenants meeting was held, and after a somewhat lengthy and heated
session with the Board, the co-op agreed to assume this expense; this
would be its contribution to the project. Explained Weinstein, "Of
course, we didn't want to commit co-op resources; it wasn't as though we
had the additional funds to spend; there were, in fact, many other ways
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we might have used 328,000 at the time, for example, to repair the roof,
the elevators . . . but as I proposed to the Board, with reasonable
interest rates on a bank loan, cost per unit could not be too great; all
environmental and political considerations aside, in getting the system
at a cost of $28,000, we were sure to get our investment back; it was
justifiable on the basis of financial considerations alone."
Thus obtaining the Board's approval, Weinstein notified HUD of their
desire to accept the grant and shortly thereafter, set out to arrange the
loan. This too, however, proved to be no easy task. Explained
Weinstein, "New York City banks were not particularly enthusiastic,
perhaps, understandably so; solar is risky and there is nothing really
backing up a loan like this. Finally, Manufacturers Hanover agreed to
make the loan, "but only after a lot of legwork on my part; I certainly
earned this one," recalled Weinstein.
With project financing all lined up, a system design ready, a solar
subcontractor who had been "highly recommended," it seemed that all
headaches were over and installation could begin; with Crane commencing
work in late summer, it was expected that the system would be ready for
use early in the following spring. But like the planning and financing
phases that preceded it, the installation period proved replete with
difficulties as well. For example, simply locating the building's
existing steel roof beams, onto which the steel supporting structure for
the array was to be welded, proved an altogether formidable task. The
original architectural drawings from 1911 were inaccurate, and after
punching a few holes in the roof and finding nothing, they had resorted
to the use of a mine detector to locate the beams through the roofing
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material. Similarly, just drilling through the eighteen inches of
concrete between each floor of the building stairwell proved no simple
task, nor was the job of getting the collectors up to the roof; weighing
nearly 150 pounds apiece and measuring four feet by six and one half,
Weinstein and other co-op members had actually unloaded them from the
delivery truck themselves in efforts to keep down project costs.
The most serious problems, however, problems which were to delay the
operationalization of the system for over one year, were those that
developed after the system was in place. As Weinstein explained, "We had
many difficulties all the way through installation, but through Crane's
expert supervision, our patience . . . somehow we managed; the panels
were in place by early spring, and we thought we'd have the system
working by mid summer, at the very least. Only then did we learn,
however, that not only would our system likely not work, but there was a
good chance that the panels might melt . . . The Daystar collectors we
were using are highly prone to water stagnation; in a sense, they're too
efficient for themselves; they collect an abundance of heat to the point
that the safety valves just blow up."
Most infuriating, though, explained Weinstein, was the manner in
which the co-op first learned of this predicament, how HUD's technical
representative from Boeing had simply mentioned, in a very off the cuff
manner, that projects similar to theirs were experiencing difficulties,
and that their system would probably not work. "Solar may be a new
field," commented Weinstein, "but you have to be some kind of bloody
genius to anticipate problems like these . . . and why HUD didn't inform
us, I don't know. HUD certainly knew what kind of collectors each
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project was using because it insisted that project participants remain
with the solar manufacturers listed in their applications."
Needless to say, Weinstein and co-op residents were not pleased. In
any event, after discussing the matter with the Ehrenkrantz Group, who
apparently had been unaware of the problems with this particular Daystar
collector, Weinstein contacted Daystar, informing them of the
difficulties and further, the co-op's refusal to accept the panels, their
refusal to pay for them, that is, until the system was thoroughly tested
and brought to proper working order, whatever this necessitated on
Daystar's part.
And thus began a period of seemingly endless discussions between
Daystar and Weinstein, and Daystar efforts to repair the faulty system.
After some initial difficulties, Daystar proved entirely cooperative,
explained Weinstein, "promising to do whatever was needed to resolve the
situation, to make good on their contract." "But what made the situation
so difficult," continued Weinstein, "was that no one really had the
technical sophistication to fully comprehend what was involved in the
redesign at each and every step. Daystar conducted many tests and
analyses, and there were many solutions proposed at different times .
but there could be no guarantees; solar is a new field; it's not like you
can pick up a phone and dial some center for technical assistance."
But finally, after nearly a year's work, Daystar devised a new system
that under test conditions, appeared to take the strain off the
collectors and insure a more effective dissipation of heat (now using a
row of thin tubing under each row of collectors instead of one mechanism
at each end). Crane, still serving as the solar subcontractor, but now
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under contract to Daystar, made the necessary installation changes. And
finally, in the spring of 1979, the system at 924 West End Avenue was
successfully operationalized.
Project Analysis
In analyzing the project "approach" to solar thermal, we will examine
the means by which solar thermal came to be of sufficient
comprehensibility and appeal to be used by the co-op, despite the
negative intrinsic characteristics described in Chapter 3. We will also
consider how the co-op, in conjunction with other project participants,
executed the planning and design activities that the use of solar thermal
and participation in the HUD SHAC Program entailed.
First, it is important to elaborate upon the routines and general
disposition of the housing cooperative as a developer type, and on this
basis, consider the co-op's likely predisposition toward a new technology
such as solar thermal. As explained in the introduction, the cooperative
form of tenure is distinguished by the fact that residents serve not only
as housing consumers, but as housing owners as well. Acting through an
elected board of directors, co-op members collectively determine the type
and level of housing services to be consumed. They alone arrange for
procurement, service, management, maintenance, and of course, their
financing as well.
Devoid of intermediaries, all cost savings (or cost increases)
resulting from the use of new products or practices, accrue directly to
co-op residents. Thus, in contrast to the profit oriented developer, who
may avoid items of high first cost in order to "leverage" his equity
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investment, or the small scale speculative builder who must consider how
products or services of high first cost will effect the marketability of
his homes (higher priced units requiring higher downpayments) the housing
cooperative is lacking in "first cost sensitivity." In general, in
assessing the financial desirability of replacing an existing product or
service with something new, a housing cooperative is likely to consider
how the initial investment will balance out in future years, in other
words, what the payback period will be.
Thus a housing cooperative is likely to be less repelled by the
higher first cost of solar thermal than other industry developers. In
fact, at least on the basis of an economic analysis, one might expect a
housing cooperative to look with some favor, or at least with some
interest, toward a technology of this type, that is, if it appeared that
the initial investment would be repaid over a reasonable number of
years. By the same token, though, one might expect a housing cooperative
to conclude a technology such as solar thermal to be altogether
undesirable if it appeared that it would not pay for itself; that is, if
it appeared that the front end investment could not be recouped over the
desired number of years.
Considering current costs of solar thermal and prospects for the
immediate future, the latter proposition appears the more realistic
case. Thus, even though a co-op might find solar thermal to be less
objectionable than the typical industry developer or housing consumer on
account of its high first cost, it would still likely be unable to find
economic justification for using the technology.
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Further resistance to solar thermal, though, might be expected to
result from dispositional elements and factors relating to the current
state of the solar art. Needless to say, a new product entails more than
financial differences, and a housing cooperative has responsibilities and
concerns extending beyond those of financing a product's initial cost.
As noted earlier, in the capacity of housing owner, a cooperative must
not only finance a new product or service, but must carry out all
planning, service, management, and maintenance functions as well.
Because the cooperative is also the ultimate consumer of these products
or services, it is obviously to the co-op's advantage to see that all
such functions are satisfactorily performed and all new products working
well. In short, on the basis of this dual status, the housing
cooperative might be expected to favor products which will entail few
problems or complications in the housing production process (i.e., like
the speculative builder or multi-family developer) and, at the same time,
(like the housing consumer) products of proven reliability, durability,
and quality, in design and performance.
As explained in the preceding chapter, however, solar thermal is
presently undergoing many changes, and is likely to be perceived as
uncertain or at least problematic on nearly all such counts, whether or
not this is actually the case. This includes uncertainties on basic
technological issues as well as matters relating to product financing,
code and zoning approval, product procurement, distribution and
installation--in short, nearly every important activity in the housing
production process. Even though a housing cooperative would subcontract
the work if it chose to use solar thermal, it could not help but be
148
affected by these and other uncertainties as well. For example, given
the generally turbulent state of the solar field and the lack of firms
and individuals with established reputations, on what basis would a
housing cooperative select a solar subcontractor or a system designer?
Similarly, without a working knowledge of the technical aspects of the
technology and without product standards, warranties, guarantees, and the
like, by what criteria would a housing cooperative select a "good" solar
product or determine an installation job well done?
Earlier it was explained that because of industry structure and
organization, any new product was likely to undergo a period of some such
uncertainty as it made its introduction through the various segments of
the industry. It was also noted that because of the unusually high level
of activity in the solar field, solar thermal likely entails even more
uncertainty (if not outright confusion) than one might anticipate
considering the industry's structural characteristics alone. What is
important to recognize is that using solar thermal with existing
structures involves even greater uncertainties than in new construction
because of the possibility of further complications in the integration of
the solar system with the existing site. Because of the uniqueness of
most existing structures, solar systems must be completely custom
designed and custom fit, certainly the case with a pre-WWI structure of
the type and size involved in this project.
Thus there would appear to be many reasons why a housing cooperative
would not use a technology like solar thermal on its own. On the one
hand, the economics, factors of considerable consequence to a housing
cooperative, argue against it. Why replace an existing product with one
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that would, in the final analysis, increase operating costs? Similarly,
all of the uncertainties argue against it. Why replace an existing
product with one whose operations are not entirely understood, whose
qualifications are, at best, uncertain, and may entail complications in
nearly every activity in the housing production process?
In fact, considering the current status of solar thermal and the many
uncertainties confronting the technology at this time, there seems little
likelihood that a housing cooperative would agree to use the technology
even if it entailed no additional cost, that is, even with a subsidy such
as a grant from the HUD SHAC Program. In other words, however critical a
subsidy might be, it alone would appear insufficient to induce a housing
cooperative to use solar thermal at the present time. In all, this would
appear to be one of those situations where a housing cooperative, if it
had any inclination to even consider using the technology, would be
better off waiting until the "co-op next door" tried it, rather than
being first, that is, the New York City pioneer.
How then, does one explain 924 West End Avenue's decision to
participate in the HUD SHAC Program and use solar thermal, in fact one of
the largest retrofit projects ever attempted? Further, how were they
able to manage all the uncertainties and risks that this entailed?
Indeed, one might suspect there to have been unusually compelling reasons
to induce the co-op's agreement, even contributing $28,000 of their own
funds, and moreover, to have successfully managed the planning and
impoementation of a project of such complexity and scale. Needless to
say, it would have been altogether unusual for 924 West End Avenue, or
any co-op for that matter, to have had all the necessary skills in-house
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or within easy access, let alone even a basic understanding of the
technology and the issues prompted by its use.
By reviewing the major events in the project we can readily
understand both how and why 924 West End Avenue came to use solar
thermal. Together with the HUD grant, this project is the result of the
workings of a large number of individuals and organizations, some in
general facilitating roles, for example, CAN, helping to diagnose
problems and resource needs and/or providing channels for resource
coordination and distribution to users, others serving more specialized
functions, either providing more specialized information on substantive
issues or serving more specialized supporting functions. Interestingly,
nearly all such sources were connected through either formal or informal
ties, in many instances by both. Indeed, it is this quality of linkage,
the sense of a series of connections from one individual or organization
to the next (often termed "networking" in the literature on innovation)
that most distinguishes the 924 West End Avenue case.
The critical force in initiating the project and in generating and
sustaining the network on its behalf was, of course, CAN. As explained
in the preceding section, it was CAN's intention to sponsor a solar
demonstration project to stimulate further use and interest in the
technology. CAN's interest and concern seem commendable in themselves,
but what seems most important is that having once conceived of the idea,
CAN knew whon to see, and what to do, to get a project of this sort under
way. In other words, though CAN had little prior experience with solar
thermal, at least not in terms of practical application, it had an
established organizational base from which to work and the organizational
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skills and resources to facilitate a project of this type. Further, on
the basis of CAN's previous work in the environmental field, informal
meetings and seminars sponsored by the organization, as well as the
personal affiliations of CAN members, the group had ties to leading
scholars and practicioners in most contemporary fields, including solar.
In short, though CAN did not have all requisite skills in house, it had
the organizational capacity to identify major project tasks and needed
resources; the personal and professional ties by which to reach them; and
established organizational channels by which to assemble and coordinate
their efforts. On the basis of such connections and mechanisms for
coordination, CAN could serve as a sort of linking institution, and
together with its more general skills, project facilitator.
Thus, having determined the need for a demonstration project, CAN
knew just where to go for assistance in the areas in which it was
deficient to get project efforts under way. For example, one of CAN's
first steps was to enlist the support of Richard Napoli. Even though
Napoli too had had little practical experience with large scale solar
conversion projects of the type then envisioned by CAN, he did have an
understanding of the basics involved in solar thermal design. -Moreover,
on the basis of his experience at the New York City EPA and related work,
he had an understanding of the administrative and institutional issues,
what, in other words, the planning and implementation of a project of
this kind would entail, whether public or private. Thus Napoli was an
individual having just the right skills to complement CAN and to
facilitate project efforts on both procedural and substantive grounds.
Importantly, Napoli 's credibility as an information source, his
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professional competence and expertise, could be readily assumed by CAN,
not only because of Napoli 's previous positions and work at the EPA or
related work done as an environmental consultant, but also, because of
his close personal affiliation with CAN, i.e., the fact that he had been
introduced through Maryann Napoli, an active CAN member and his wife.
In addition to Napoli, CAN had been able to enlist the support and
assistance of another expert, Arthur Weinstein, in a somewhat similar
fashion. Weinstein too had had little prior experience with solar
thermal and had virtually no understanding of the technical aspects of
the technology; but he did have other skills needed to complement the CAN
tean. For example, Weinstein had an in depth knowledge and practical
experience with the political, legal, and financial aspects of both
housing and energy. Like Napoli, Weinstein's credibility and reliability
as an information source, his expertise in housing and energy related
fields, could be assumed by CAN, not only on the basis of Weinstein's
professional attributes and credentials, for example, his position as
Deputy General Counsel of the New York State ERDA, his knowledge as
attorney, in particular, co-op law, but also, from the manner of his
introduction. He had come highly recommended as "the expert" by a friend
of someone then at CAN, in essence, "the man to see for housing and
energy.
Thus with the addition of these resources CAN was able to more fully
and realistically assess the situation and to formulate project goals and
objectives. Similarly, it was with this assistance that project
strategies were devised, for example, deciding, on the basis of
Weinstein's advice concerning the politics involved, that the project be
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located on the West Side of New York, and determining that it be financed
entirely with private funding. Having thus charted a more definitive
course for the project, it was again on the basis of the organization's
personal and professional affiliations that the group had been able to
connect with the varied resources needed to facilitate project efforts.
For example, as explained in the preceding section, CAN contacted a
number of property owners known to CAN members in efforts to locate a
structure suitable for the project. Similarly, Weinstein was able to
play the role of the linker, introducing CAN to West Side property owners
that he knew either personally or professionally. It was then on the
basis of another organizational affiliation still that CAN connected with
another expert, solar architect Travis Price, and thus obtained the
technical skills needed at the time. Importantly, Price too was taken to
be a credible and reliable information source, and an expert in solar
thermal design, not only on the basis of his professional credentials,
and accomplishments, i.e., the fact that he was an architect and had been
the designer for the West l1th Street project, but also, by way of his
introduction and association with CAN. Price too was reported to be a
close personal acquaintance of someone at CAN. In the same way that
Weinstein had been highly recommended as the expert, the "man to see for
housing and energy," Price was the "one to see for a solar thermal
retrofit design."
Thus, on the basis of its wide range of personal and professional
affiliations and general organizational skills, CAN was able to serve as
an effective linking institution and project facilitator. Having thus
located a site believed technically and politically suitable for the
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demonstration project, i.e., 924 West End Avenue, and arranged for the
development of a preliminary system design, the next major step was to
convince the 924 West End Avenue Co-op, in other words, to gain
acceptance of the technology. At this point, focus shifted away from
CAN, and Arthur Weinstein assumed center stage. Without doubt, Weinstein
played a part of critical importance in first introducing the idea to the
co-op and in making solar thermal appear a conceivable if not altogether
reasonable technology for the co-op to use.
Weinstein's power and influence in the co-op community appears the
result of both personal and professional attributes and experiences. For
example, as an attorney, having had formal responsibility for all legal
work involved in the conversion of the building from rental to co-op
status, and maintaining an active role in its management since
conversion, Weinstein could be taken by the Board as an altogether
credible and reliable source of information, someone whose ideas and
opinions were to be considered seriously. After all, Weinstein had not
only done the legal work involved in the conversion, but had originated
the idea in collaboration with another 924 resident. The fact that
Weinstein himself resided at the building also seems important. Insofar
as it was a new product or service under consideration, Weinstein's
advice was obviously more than that of the expert, however great the
expertise. By contrast, because he was a co-op resident, Weinstein could
be expected to have motivations and interests similar to other co-op
residents. What would benefit Weinstein would likely benefit other co-op
residents as well. Thus he could be assumed to have their best interests
in mind. Another factor that seems important to consider is that energy
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is an area of particular interest to Weinstein, an area which, like
housing and the legal field, he has a proven competence and expertise.
Clearly, if anyone was likely to be knowledgeable, on top of new issues
and developments in the energy field, particularly as they relate to
housing, one might expect this to be Weinstein.
However obvious these factors, or however convincing the case might
appear, this discussion is not meant to imply that solar thermal was
immediately and unquestionably acceptable to the 924 West End Avenue
Co-op simply because it was introduced by or associated with Arthur
Weinstein. As it turned out, the 924 Co-op's Board of Directors
unanimously rejected the idea when the preliminary system design was
presented to them at the first meeting between the Board and CAN. In
fact, Weinstein himself, was against it at this point: it had been
altogether out of the question. As he had explained at the time, "The
economics weren't right; the system wouldn't pay for itself, and however
appealing solar thermal might have been for other reasons, no one was
going to sell out the co-op for it."
In spite of this initial rejection, however, the idea of using solar
thermal had apparently gained something in appeal. For as the preceding
discussion reveals, acceptance came to be contingent on financial
issues. In other words, the 924 Co-op Board was prepared to go ahead
with the technology, admittedly new and risky, and about which their
general knowledge and understanding was virtually nill; at the very
least, they were still open to using solar thermal at the end of this
first meeting; they were interested in pursuing further exploratory
studies provided the financial picture improved.
156
The extent to which Weinstein was responsible for the Board's
response is, of course, difficult to gauge. But it is clear, that he
acted as more than a simple conveyor of information; he did more than
simply inform the Board about the possibilites of the project and the
offer of assistance from CAN, say, in the way that a news article or some
other written media might have informed them. More likely, on the basis
of his personal and professional statuses and his overall role in the
co-op community, Weinstein was able to perform as a sort of translator or
decoder between CAN and the Board, serving mediating and enerally
legitimating functions. In other words, by introducing solar thermal
through Weinstein, the perceived uncertainties, and riskiness were likely
mediated. For one thing, it was customary, i.e., in keeping with
routine, for Weinstein to suggest trying something new, in particular,
things having to do with the management of the co-op as well as energy.
After all, these were the major concerns in his professional life, his
interests, and areas of expertise. In essence, Weinstein was able to
endow the technology with positive attributes because of his own status;
it was then something legitimate, something worth a try, if the financial
situation could be improved.
Though for a time financial prospects remained dim, and interest in
the project appeared to wane, it was once again on the basis of CAN's
connections that the group learned of recent developments in the HUD SHAC
Program and the possibility of project funding. Even though the June
meeting between Napoli and Dubin did not afford sufficient time to fully
explore system needs and compile all information needed for the grant,
given the chance to reapply, CAN effectively assumed the role of the
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linker and project facilitator. Again we see a series of connections
emanating from CAN, for example, Napoli turning to Watson, the solar
architect he knew and trusted (via CAN), and in turn, being referred to
the Ehrenkrantz Group, the architect with whom Watson had worked and whom
he trusted, and the Ehrenkrantz Group, in turn, contacting Daystar and
Crane--in short, one trusted source confirming another all the way down
the line.
Thus through its connections and general facilitating skills, under
the direction of Napoli, CAN served as the principal actor, assembling
all necessary resources and coordinating all efforts to insure that this
time the "job was done right." When the grant finally came through,
however, for less than the requested amount, it was, of course, Arthur
Weinstein who again took center stage. In essence, CAN had set up the
project; it had done nearly all that it could do. At this point, it was
up to Weinstein to present the situation to the Co-op Board, and if there
was to be a solar system at 924 West End Avenue, to convince them to
contribute co-op funds.
Again, the precise role played by Weinstein, the extent of his
influence on the Board, is difficult to assess. However, there can be
little doubt that Weinstein's role was an instrumental one in gaining the
Board's final approval of the project and their agreement to use co-op
funds. One factor that seems to have been important was the manner in
which Weinstein presented the situation to the Board, his emphasis on the
financial considerations involved. As opposed to the technical aspects
or any of the intangible benefits associated with solar thermal, it was
the financial aspects that Board members most clearly understood and to
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which they were most likely to respond to. Needless to say, financial
matters were of major concern to the 924 Co-op (and to all co-ops for
that matter) and the possibility of cost savings, as Weinstein put it, of
"getting a system worth $28,000,' was likely to have much appeal.
Another factor of obvious importance was the personal influence of
Weinstein himself. For however appealing the promise of future cost
savings, solar thermal was still a technology about which the Board knew
very little; in other words, there could be no guarantees. And as
expressed at the board meeting, there were clearly other ways the co-op
might use $28,000 in funds. Insofar as the Board agreed to the solar
project, one might suspect that Weinstein served mediating and generally
legitimating functions once again. In the same way that solar thermal
was seen as something plausible if not altogether reasonable when first
introduced by an individual of Weinstein's competence and expertise, the
possibility of financial savings now seemed reasonable with Weinstein's
continued support and assurances. Again, solar thermal could not be that
risky; the projected financial gains had to be somewhere within reason,
with the backing of someone of Weinstein's capabilities.
Thus on the basis of expected financial gains, and Weinstein's
mediating and legitimating influences, 924 West End Avenue's final
decision to participate in the HUD SHAC Program can be more fully
understood. To conclude the project analysis at this point, however,
would leave one very important question untouched. And that is, if solar
thermal was so risky and uncertain, "such a new field," as Arthur
Weinstein commented many times, why Weinstein himself was so ready and
willing to go ahead with it. We have explained that Weinstein was
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committed to furthering the development and use of alternative energy
resources and that he believed the co-op's decision to use the
technology, even to contribute $28,000 in its own monies, to be justified
on the basis of financial considerations alone. Nonetheless, however one
assesses the situation, there can be little doubt that Weinstein was
putting himself on the line; if anything were to go wrong, financially or
technically, it would be easy to point a finger at Weinstein. And, as a
co-op resident, by this date, even having established a private law
practice with an office in the building, this was not a situation from
which Weinstein could easily walk away. At least to some degree,
Weinstein's personal and professional reputations were at stake. As
Napoli succintly put it, commenting on Weinstein's overall importance to
the project, ". . . Art not only had to face a financial problem if the
project failed, but having to live with sixty-three other owners made his
position extraordinarily perilous. One has to live in a New York co-op
to understand the magnitude of Weinstein's effort . .
Weinstein's willingness to assume such risks might be explained in
two ways. On the one hand, it seems likely that some of the riskiness
was mediated by the support and encouragement of the many individuals and
organizations involved in the project. CAN, for example, proved itself a
highly capable facilitator; indeed, it seemed that CAN had connections
and access to resources everywhere. Richard Napoli, in particular, was
someone for whom Weinstein had both personal admiration and professional
trust and respect. As Weinstein had once explained, "Napoli was
thoroughly cooperative; he could only be an asset to any project or group
effort of this type." Further, he was someone whose opinion Weinstein
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had come to trust on technical matters; " . he (Napoli) may not have
an advanced degree in engineering but he certainly knows the part . . .
Moreover, the Ehrenkrantz Group had had previous experience with the
technology, as did Daystar, and importantly, they had been introduced to
Weinstein through such a trusted source as Napoli.
Thus, in the same way that Weinstein had performed mediating and
generally legitimating functions for the 924 Co-op's Board of Directors,
this group of organizations and individuals, i.e., CAN , Napoli, the
Ehrenkrantz Group, the Daystar Corporation, Harold Crane, likely served
mediating and legitimating functions for Weinstein; with their support,
and promises of assistance, they were able to lessen the amount of risk
seemingly involved. At the same time, however, it is important to
recognize that, given Weinstein's expertise in housing and energy
(indeed, it takes an expert to know just how uncertain the solar field is
these days) there was undoubtedly a limit on the extent of their
mediating influence. In other words, however supportive or resourceful
they or anyone else could be, they could not entirely change the
situation, and Weinstein assumed his position with at least some
awareness of the uncertainties and risks involved. Thus, in the final
analysis, one might view Weinstein as an individual with something of a
predisposition toward taking risks; in addition to the mediating and
legitimating roles assumed by Weinstein, and with CAN and Napoli, the
role of project facilitator, by endorsing and promoting the project in
spite of the many risks and uncertainties at hand, Weinstein played the
part of the innovator, the "plunger," as well.
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Thus we see how a supportive institutional network helped to make
solar thermal a more acceptable technology. As a housing cooperative,
with responsibility for long term management and operating costs, 924
West End Avenue was likely to find the idea of a technology with a high
first cost less objectionable than the average industry developer;
however, given the unusually large front end investment currently
required for solar thermal, the initial investment could not be recouped
within any reasonable period of time, and the housing cooperative could
not justify use of the technology on financial grounds. For this reason,
the subsidy provided by the HUD SHAC Program proved altogether critical,
the "sine qua non," as one project participant explained.
At the same time, however, due to the many uncertainties presently
confronting the technology, coupled with the co-op's lack of technical
expertise;' the subsidy was not likely sufficient to induce the co-op to
use solar thermal on its own. The critical force in bringing this about
was CAN, who, on the basis of general facilitating skills and a network
of personal and professional affiliations, was able to identify and
assemble all the resources and technical expertise needed to initiate the
project, and, time and time again, to keep project efforts moving along.
One individual of obvious importance in the institutional network
"linked" by CAN was Richard Napoli; on the basis of administrative skills
and technical expertise, Napoli was able to serve as a highly effective
project facilitator leading the CAN project team. The other critical
figure in the network was, of course, Arthur Weinstein. As an expert in
housing and energy and with administrative skills as well, Weinstein was
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able to assist CAN and Napoli on both substantive and procedural matters
and generally, facilitate project efforts.
Even more important though, were the mediating and legitimating
functions Weinstein served, first, in introducing the idea to the 924
Co-op's Board of Directors and later, in gaining their final approval to
go ahead with the project and contribute co-op funds. Because of
Weinstein's proven competence in housing and energy, and his prominent
stature in the co-op community, solar thermal appeared as a plausible if
not altogether reasonable technology for the co-op to use. In a similar
vein, the other figures in the supportive institutional network, i.e.,
Napoli, the Ehrenkrantz Group, the Daystar Corporation and Harold Crane,
likely helped to mediate and legitimate the use of solar thermal for
Weinstein; however, in the final analysis, Weinstein proved an individual
personally disposed to taking risks, and in addition to serving
mediating, legitimating and generally facilitating functions, Weinstein
played the part of the innovator as well.
Together with the HUD SHAC subsidy, it was by means of this cast of
supporting individuals and organizations, performing in their various
"linking," "mediating," "legitimating," and "facilitating" roles that
solar thermal became something thinkable, that it was moved from the
category of an innovation to something more routine. In short, it was
the supportive institutional network that made solar thermal acceptable
and "do-able" at 924 West End Avenue.
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Project Chronology
924 West End Avenue
1973 CAN determines to broaden focus and to undertake projects
in the energy field.
1974 CAN begins to concentrate efforts in the energy field;
determines to explore the possibilities of a solar thermal
demonstration project for New York City as part of a solar
energy education effort.
1975
Winter CAN contacts Richard Napoli for assistance; Napoli agrees
to lead CAN efforts in investigating project possibilities.
CAN approaches Arthur Weinstein for assistance in exploring
issues relevant to housing and energy; Weinstein agrees to
join efforts with CAN.
Spring First meetings held to formulate project goals and
objectives and plans for implementation.
CAN begins search for building suitable for the
demonstration project; contacts a number of West Side
property owners.
Summer CAN contacts Travis Price for assistance with technical
aspects; Price agrees to conduct technical evaluation of
proposed sites and execution of a preliminary system design.
Arthur Weinstein's building, i.e., 924 West End Avenue,
selected for demonstration project.
December First meeting held between CAN and the Co-op's Board of
Directors; Price presents preliminary system design;
164
proposal rejected by Co-op Board on financial grounds.
1976
Winter CAN seeks advice of other professionals, e.g., Fred Dubin,
of Dubin Bloome Associates, in efforts to resolve financial
problem.
Spring Financial issue not resolved; project efforts, more or
less, unofficially tabled.
June Napoli meets Fred Dubin at Energy Fair at University of
Massachusetts; Dubin informs Napoli about possibility of
grant from the HUD SHAC Program.
July Napoli informs Weinstein about possibility of the grant;
924 West End Avenue agrees to apply for grant.
August Grant application prepared; submitted to HUD.
October Grant application rejected; HUD, however, suggests
re-submission.
Napoli contacts architect Donald Watson to undertake system
redesign; Watson declines offer; refers Napoli to the
Ehrenkrantz Group.
November Napoli approaches the Ehrenkrantz Group who agree to
undertake system design and preparation of the grant
application.
December Meeting held at office of the Ehrenkrantz Group with
Stephen Weinstein, Arthur Weinstein, Napoli, and
representatives from the Daystar Corporation attending;
Daystar selected as solar manufacturer.
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1977
January
March
May
June
1977
Summer
1978
Spring
Installation of system begins.
System installation completed; Weinstein learns of
technical difficulties with Daystar collectors. Weinstein
notifies the Daystar Corporation.
Daystar begins year-long period of investigation of
alternative system designs.
Daystar devises system to take strain off collectors and
ensure proper dissipation of heat; Crane executes
installation changes.
System successfully operationalized.
The Ehrenkrantz Group completes system design; makes
preliminary arrangements for installation of the system.
Grant application prepared; submitted to HUD.
Notification of grant award received for $112,000 of
$156,000 requested.
Weinstein (Arthur), Napoli, Weinstein (Stephen) work on
project cost breakdown; project costs brought down to
$140,000, leaving a gap of $28,000.
Weinstein explains status of project to Co-op's Board of
Directors; tenants meeting held; co-op agrees to contribute
remaining $28,000.
Weinstein notifies HUD of co-op's agreement to accept grant.
Weinstein arranges loan with Manufacturers Hanover.
1979
Spring
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Cathedral Square
Cathedral Square, a participant in HUD Cycle 3, is a 100 unit
development for the elderly and handicapped in Burlington, Vermont.
Located in the downtown Burlington area, in an expanding urban renewal
zone (and adjacent to Lake Champlain), the project commands unusually
high visibility. Utilizing nearly 1,700 square feet of solar collectors
to provide 50 percent of the building's annual hot water requirement, it
is likely the largest solar installation in the region in addition to
being the first of any size to receive federal assistance.
Cathedral Square, developed with major commitments of public monies
under the sponsorship of the Cathedral Square Corporation, illustrates
the case of the non-profit developer. In general, this category of
developers is distinguished by what has been termed a "normative"
motivation; typically non-profit developers are motivated to become
involved in housing development in order to realize certain ideals or
beliefs. Financial aspects of development are still important as there
are always constraints on resources. Yet for the non-profit developer
financial aspects are typically of lesser importance in dictating the
terms of the development than the group's norms or ideals.
The Cathedral Square case illustrates the importance of such
normative aspects of development, showing how this predisposition of
non-profit developers can facilitate the acceptance of an innovation. As
we shall see in this study, this is particularly the case when the
non-profit's orientation is combined with similarly supportive elements
in the institutional environment, i.e., an architect with a strong sense
of commitment and ideals and close ties to a network of similarly
supportive sources of information.
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Project Chronology
Cathedral Square had its beginnings in two separate developments in
the early and mid 70's. In 1976, the National Episcopal Church was
notified of the availability of $10 million in HUD Section 202 funds,
i.e., low interest mortgage loans for the construction of housing for the
elderly and the handicapped. The Church had applied for $50 million in
funding three years earlier, but been rejected due to the moratorium on
federal housing monies imposed by the Nixon administration.
During the same period, the Cathedral Church of St. Paul of
Burlington was in the process of changing its image, in general, looking
for ways to become more involved in community affairs. A particular
interest was to find a "civic-minded" use for a church-owned parcel of
land in an expanding urban renewal area, conveniently located to the
downtown. The Church's original building had burned in the early 70's.
Faced with the question of rebuilding, the Church had re-evaluated its
objectives and overall purpose as well. (The old church building had had
neither the space nor facilities to afford community outreach activities,
and the Church had been, overall, "inwardlooking"--its activities limited
to traditional church affairs.) As on? parish member explained:
"e . . we seriously questioned the purpose of rebuilding; was it truly
worthwhile if we were just going to be another stuffy, inward-looking
organization? Perhaps, we had some broader, more important mission to
fulfill."
Thus, following a period of self-evaluation, the parish had
determined to rebuild the church and to alter its image as well.
Reflecting this new attitude, "the realization that the church's mission
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was to better serve the community," the new church structure, erected in
1972, was designed to be flexible, enabling .the interior to be used for
any of a variety of purposes. The church building was purposely sited on
a corner of the parcel (which was to become known as Cathedral Square) so
as to leave room for the eventual development of some structure for use
by the local community. Also at this time, the Cathedral Church of St.
Paul notified the National Church of the availability of the parcel and
its desire to sponsor the development of a housing project, most likely,
housing for the elderly, given the need for this service in the area.
Thus, in September 1976, when federal monies were made available to
the National Church, they went back to the Church of Cathedral Square to
see if they were still interested. The Church had not yet developed the
land due to a lack of funding; thus, they readily accepted the offer.
The Cathedral Square Corporation was thereafter established under the
direction of parish member James Viele, as a non-profit corporation to
have full responsibility for the development and operation of the housing
project, thereby limiting the liability of the church proper. Following
the typical development strategy, an architect was then contracted by the
Corporation to execute preliminary plans and designs for the development,
this being Anthony Adams AIA Architect of Burlington. Adams was himself
a member of the Cathedral parish and had assisted in the design of the
new church facility in 1972.
With these arrangements made, the design stage for the Cathedral
Square housing project began in late September 1976. During this time,
in the very early stages of the design period, Adams' firm (chiefly,
Adams and Frank M. Guillot, an associate in the firm) considered the
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possibility of using a solar thermal heating and/or hot water system, in
addition to passive solar design techniques. Though Adams had had little
actual experience with solar--his firm had been involved in the design of
a few single family residences using solar thermal systems, but the
systems had been both vendor designed and supplied--Adams had a longtime
interest in conservation and alternative energy technologies; (In 1975,
he had published a self-help type book entitled Your Energy Efficient
Home, illustrating basic concepts in conservation and passive solar
design techniques.) Moreover, though he views solar technologies as "not
yet sufficiently advanced, at least not in technological or economic
terms," he expresses a serious commitment to furthering their
development. As he explains: ". . . there are many good things going on
in the solar field, but it is still a brand new industry; solar's
economic advantages and effectiveness have not yet been demonstrated.
Yet someone has to try it; in fact, many must experiment with it if the
industry is ever to get its feet off the ground." For Adams, solar
thermal has an obvious symbolic value as well: ". . . although it's
really an intangible sort of thing, visibility of solar is important;
people like to see things like this (referring to the array) . . . you
take a public spirited type; he looks at the array, and it makes him feel
warm; in general, it gives people confidence that the federal government
is trying to do something about our energy circumstances."
With this strong sense of commitment, Adams was very enthusiastic
about the possibilities of employing solar technologies at the Cathedral
Square Project. However, such enthusiasm was curtailed, after an initial
period of investigation. As Adams explained, his firm had researched
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various solar components and systems in architectural magazines,
catalogues, trade journals, and the like, and thereafter, explored the
possibilities of designing a system on their own. However, it became
clear rather quickly that they would have to abandon the idea of using an
active solar thermal system, first, Adams explained, because of cost
considerations. "There was absolutely no room in the project budget for
the additional front-end costs or the costs associated with
installation." Further, Adams recalled, "We were concerned because of
the lack of technical support--though we had some understanding of the
basics of the technology; it is sort of a hobby in this firm--we were not
confident about designing a system of this scale on our own."
For these reasons, the idea of using a solar thermal system was
rejected, and work on the design progressed under the assumption that a
conventional system would be used. However, after roughly three months
into the design stage, Adams learned about the HUD SHAC Program (in
January 1977) through a publication of the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA). Then, with the possibility of
funding, interest in a solar thermal system was revived. Recalled Adams,
". . . reading that projects should be combined efforts of architects,
developers and contractors I immediately considered the idea for the
Cathedral Square project."
With interest so revived, Adams determined to seek outside
assistance. Thus shortly thereafter he contacted Robert Wheeler of
Yankee Solar Inc., Burlington, a broad based vendor of energy conserving
products and systems in northern New England and also, the local dealer
for the Daystar Corporation (one of the largest manufacturers of solar
components, also Burlington based).
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Adams did not know Wheeler personally, nor had he worked with him prior
to this time, but he knew of him by way of the local building community;
as the men agreed: "Burlington is basically a small town; people in
related fields are likely to know of one another even if only on the
basis of reputation." And though Wheeler had no previous experience with
the HUD SHAC Program, Daystar had been the supplier for projects in the
Program's two previous cycles, and as Wheeler knew, they had provided
assistance to the applicants in designing a system and in preparing the
application. Wheeler thus expected that Daystar would provide similar
services for the Cathedral Square Project.
With these plans in the works, Adams approached the Corporation's
Board of Directors with the idea of using solar in January 1977.
Initially, the Board's response was one of reservation, if not outright
opposition, primarily because of their lack of experience and the
perceived riskiness of housing development. As Viele explained: "Just
building a $3 million housing project scared us; this was something we
felt uncertain about right from the start, and now, on top of this,
solar, something about which we knew absolutely nothing."
Further discussions regarding solar were held between Adams and the
Board, however, during February 1977. Adams noted the possibility of
support from Wheeler and the Daystar Corporation, and explained the
advantages of solar and the general appeal of the technology. He did
discuss solar thermal's current status, i.e., uncertainties regarding
technological and economic matters. But at the same time, he stressed
the need for experimentation and experience with solar. Even if there
were uncertainties at the time, and as Adams admitted to the Board, "on
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large scale projects of this type, it was not possible to know just what
would be involved beforehand . . ." it was nonetheless critical to gain
experience with solar, specifically on projects of this scale. In all,
Adams stressed the idealistic or normative aspects of the technology,
describing it as the progressive, civic-minded thing to do.
And finally, on the basis of such discussions, the Board concluded
solar to be "worth a try." As Viele recalled: "In the end, it was a
gamble. But we're good citizens, we were building this project for civic
betterment and we are, of course, concerned about the quality of our
environment. Obviously, we had to be somewhat concerned with the
economics of it . . . but in the end we decided we would be the guinea
pigs; we would try it. We bought the farm on faith."
Thus, with the Board's encouragement early in 1977, Adams' firm began
investigating the possibilities of solar thermal in collaboration with
Wheeler and the Daystar Corporation. The Daystar Corporation had agreed
to provide technical assistance with the system design and the HUD grant
application as Wheeler and Adams had planned.
Also at this time, while preliminary investigations were under way
with Adams, Wheeler and Daystar, Wheeler contacted James Brown, a
mechanical engineer and principal of Jennison Engineers, Inc., for
further assistance with system design. Also of Burlington, Brown was
known to Wheeler by way of the local building community. Brown too
lacked actual design experience with solar. But, as he recalled, "the
project did interest him, and it sounded like a good way to learn;" thus
Brown agreed to join Wheeler and Adams on the project team.
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Together then, these three individuals in collaboration with Daystar,
had responsibility for planning and designing the solar system at the
Cathedral Square project; first, with Daystar's assistance, determining
the overall feasibility of the idea; (using computer simulations, it was
estimated that a solar thermal system could supply approximately 50
percent of the structure's annual hot water requirements), next; checking
out performance data and construction quality of the various types of
solar equipment, then; selecting components, designing and integrating
the system with the site, and finally; preparing the grant application.
Adams served as overall coordinator of the process, having primary
responsibility for advance planning and, as is customary in development
activities, acting as the representative for the developer, i.e., the
Cathedral Square Corporation. Brown was responsible for the actual
system design and integration with the structure, while Wheeler, in
addition- to providing general assistance with technical matters,
coordinated the group's efforts with the Daystar Corporation. Later, in
preparing the grant application, Adams' office provided the overall
project rationale, Brown, the design drawings and descriptions, and
Wheeler, the technical information required on the system and the Daystar
components.
In spite of these individual responsibilities, the planning process
was largely one of a team approach. There was less than five weeks to
plan and design the system and get the application in order. (Adams did
not receive the Board's final okay until February and the grant
application was due in mid March.) Thus, as Adams recalled ". . . we
were forced to work closely and quickly; it was then or never." Further,
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no one in the group had any prior experience with solar. (Wheeler had,
of course, supplied solar components on previous occasions but not for
projects of this scale). And with the exception of Daystar, the group
had few other sources to turn to. Thus as Wheeler summed up ". . . we
had to rely entirely on our own judgements, to piece things out together,
as we went along; who else could we ask about this? Where could we go?"
For similar reasons, the group kept everything in the design as simple as
possible. As Adams recalled, "Given time and resource requirements,
experimentation was not possible; we took the data and went strictly with
the basics, nothing exotic. And we were lucky, even then, to get the
system design completed and the application in on time." Bob Wheeler
had, in fact, had to hand deliver the application in Washington, on the
final day.
Thus concluded the planning stage for the solar portion of the
Cathedral Square Project. In spring 1977, notification of the grant
award was received for the full amount requested, i.e., $91,000.
Additionally, the project was one of the five, Cycle 3 projects selected
for instrumentation and monitoring for the succeeding five years (to be
carried out by Boeing under contract to HUD).
While the solar aspects of the development appeared to be proceeding
smoothly, complications had developed regarding other aspects of the
project design, forcing project work a few months behind schedule.
(Original plans called for the final design to have been completed by the
end of July; in a revised schedule, design completion was postponed until
late November.) In large part, these delays resulted from bureaucratic
processes and what Adams described as "piecemeal revisions required to
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keep the project within budgetary limitations and also, in compliance
with HUD 202 regulations." Another major difficulty though, and the
reason for having to redesign the entire structure during March, stemmed
from a problem with a local zoning statute. In 1975, a master plan had
been developed for the downtown area including a provision that no new
structure "substantially obstruct" the view of the Lake, i.e., Lake
Champlain, nor the Mountains, i.e., the Adirondacks. As in many statutes
of this type, what specifically was meant by "substantial obstruction"
was nowhere further defined. But, as Viele recalled, it was apparent to
all involved that the proposed eight story structure, located so near to
the shoreline, obstructed the views, at least to some degree. On the
basis of discussions with local zoning and planning board members an
agreement was reached to increase the height of the structure to ten
stories. By thus making it taller, but more narrow, they reasoned,
visibility of the Lake and other scenic views was enhanced.
In any event, whatever the logic behind this decision, it obviously
required major changes in the project design. And though all agreed that
the issue had little to do with the fact that the structure was solar,
the requisite changes nonetheless had major implications on the solar
aspects of the design. In the taller and narrower version of the
structure, the previously rectangular roof was replaced by one with a
triangular shape. Thus, as one project participant recalled, "it was
back to the drawing boards for the solar array as well"; changes were
required in both the size and placement of the panels, e.g., in the final
design the panels do not face directly south, the optimal direction for
solar ray absorption, but instead slightly to the southwest.
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With all such revisions, construction at Cathedral Square began late
in the fall of 1977. Work on the structure proceeded on schedule through
the spring of 1978, and in early summer, installation of the solar system
began. Though this too proceeded according to schedule, it was not
without a general sense of uncertainty nor entirely without complication.
For example, one series of complications developed with the roofing
subcontractor; at some point during the construction period (some time
after the subcontract had been let by Cummings, the general contractor)
it was recognized that a steel frame would be required to support the
array. This, in turn, necessitated additional changes in the penthouse
area of the structure as the steel frame reduced the amount of space
available for piping, the elevators, and other mechanical components.
Other complications with the roofer centered on safety concerns. As
Adams explained: "Knowing that the roofers might be exposed to
additional hazards when installing the solar panels, he had contacted HUD
to determine safety requirements." And though he was told that no
regulations applied to this situation, and that a protective railing was
likely not necessary, when it came time for installation the roofers
"balked on the issue of safety"; their insurers would not allow them to
work on the roof without a railing. Thus, recalled Viele, a protective
railing was finally installed at the Corporation's expense, "with funds
drawn up at the eleventh hour."
These complications aside, there were few reported difficulties
experienced in installing the solar system at Cathedral Square. Under
Brown's supervision, the plumbing subcontractors installed the solar
mechanical systems. With the array in place, the system was successfully
operationalized in late fall 1978 prior to the occupancy of the structure.
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Project Analysis
In analyzing the project "approach" to solar thermal, we will examine
the means by which solar thermal was made sufficiently comprehensible to
be accepted by the Cathedral Square Corporation, despite the negative
intrinsic characteristics described in Chapter 3. We will also consider
the means by which project participants were able to execute the
requisite planning and design activities involved.
First, it is important to remember that as a non-profit developer the
Cathedral Square Corporation is an institutional entity with meanings and
routines that differ somewhat from the average developer. The Cathedral
Square Corporation could therefore be expected to have a priori a
somewhat different disposition toward solar thermal's intrinsic
characteristics. In other words, it is likely to be disposed in a manner
that it consistent with its practices and routines. Most significant is
the fact that the Corporation is undertaking the project not for profit,
but rather, on the basis of less tangible, philosophic reasons, as noted
in the introduction, as an expression of their ideals and beliefs. Thus
one might expect the Cathedral Square Corporation to be less concerned
with such matters as the negative economic attributes of solar thermal,
e.g., the higher first cost, than the average industry member.
Alternatively, it is likely to be more attracted to the pos.itive values
or normative dimensions of the innovation, for example, the notion of
solar thermal as the environmentally sound technology.
Also distinguishing Cathedral Square is the fact that the project is
financed entirely with federal subsidies and will provide housing for the
elderly and the handicapped, a group that has traditionally had
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substantial difficulty locating "decent" housing at rates. commensurate
with their incomes. Thus one might expect the aesthetic and design
attributes of solar thermal, i.e., the deviation from current industry
design standards, to be of little or less consequence to the Corporation;
the demand for housing of this type is such that the physical appearance
of th structure would likely be less of a consideration than for other
tenant classes (at least as far as the roof design is concerned). For
similar reasons, the issue of resaleability is not applicable to this
case.
Thus on the whole, as a consequence of their normative motivation and
the captive market quality of the project, the developers of Cathedral
Square would seem to have been more favorably disposed to using solar
thermal than the average builder/developer. Nevertheless, it is
important to realize that there was still enough "wrong" with the
technology for them not to have been entirely favorably disposed to solar
thermal; in other words, they would not (and did not), readily take
action to incorporate solar thermal into their project on their own. For
one thing, though they were less concerned with the financial aspects of
development, they still had obvious resource limitations at the project's
start. They did not then know of the availability of federal subsidies
through the HUD SHAC Program. More important though, seems their highly
vulnerable position at the time. Even without a new technology such as
solar thermal, housing development is, undoubtedly, an activity of high
complication and risk. This is true whether one is motivated by profit
or ideals. And, it will be recalled, this was the Cathedral Square
Corporation's first experience in housing development, as noted earlier,
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something about which they did not feel entirely sure. In sum, the
Cathedral Square Corporation would appear to have had enough of the "new
and different" to deal with on the basis of the housing development alone.
How then did the Cathedral Square Corporation come to be a
participant in the HUD SHAC Program? Why did they agree to take on the
additional risks of experimenting with a new technology, and by what
means were they able to deal with those aspects of the technology at odds
with their particular routines?
First, in regard to gaining the consensus of the Corporation's Board
of Directors, the role of Adams appears to have been critical. As noted,
it was Adams who first learned of the HUD SHAC Program and notified the
Board of the availability of public funds for use of the technology.
Thus Adams is important for his role as a linker, passing on knowledge
from one source to potential users. Clearly though, Adams did not
perform in so limited a capacity as a simple conveyor of information.
The information was not passed on exactly in the manner in which it was
received, and the Corporation's Board of Directors did not determine to
participate in the HUD SHAC Program and use solar thermal simply because
they were then aware of it. Instead, this development seems the result
of the effects and influences of Adams, influences resulting from Adams'
overall status, i.e., the roles legitmated and assumed by him, and
further, because of the manner in which Adams presented the idea to the
Board.
The first and major factor having bearing on the Board, i.e., Adams'
status, is based in two distinct areas, that is, personal and
professional attributes. First, Adams is a member of the local
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community, known and respected by the Corporation's Board of Directors.
Moreover, and likely of greater importance, Adams is a longtime member of
the Cathedral Square Church, known and respected on this level as well.
Insofar as Adams shares a common background with the Board, he is linked
to his client in the sense of being "one of them"; he is a member of
their group.
On the basis of these personal attributes alone, one might expect
Board members to have been sensitive to Adams' suggestions, open to his
opinions and ideas. In other words, Adams could serve mediating
functions, that is, making solar thermal seem less risky and less new.
He could serve legitimating functions as well, endowing the technology
with a positive status or authority similar to his own. In short, by
introducing the technology through someone of Adams' status, solar
thermal might not have appeared as something strange or risky, but
instead, as a highly plausible if not altogether reasonable technology to
use.
Adams' potential for mediating and legitimating the use of solar
thermal was undoubtedly augmented by his professional status as well.
For not only is Adams trusted on a personal level as a member of the
local community and the Cathedral Square parish, but as an architect, he
is particularly trusted and respected in matters relating to building and
design. He has a proven competence and experise in these areas. As
noted, Adams had been involved in the siting and design of the new church
facility in 1972. Further, that the Board sees Adams in this way is
evidenced by their selection of him as project architect.
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Thus, on the basis of his personal and professional attributes, it
seems that suggestions from Adams on matters concerning the physical
structure would likely have been seriously considered. In a sense,
because of such statuses, Adams was able to translate or interpret the
information received from the ERDA publication and deliver it to the
potential user in a form more in keeping with their routines; from the
perspective of the Board, Adams was both a credible and reliable source
of information with motiviations that could not have been too different
from their own, suggesting the use of a new building material, as any
architect might do. For these reasons, it would appear to have been safe
for the Board to follow Adams' advice, safe, that is, to try solar
thermal.
Another interesting aspect concerning Adams' professional status is
his role as innovator or risk taker. This was, in fact, the predominant
view Adams, generally, and more specifically, in the context of his role
as an architect. As one board member explained, "Perhaps we can't always
get him to a meeting, or to deliver plans on time, but ideas, we can
always count on him for that; he's one of those innovative types, always
in the vanguard, on top of new ideas . . ." This too likely had a
mediating influence on the Board as it was altogether in keeping with
tradition for Adams to be the one to suggest trying something new. For
Adams to have suggested that they use solar thermal instead of a
conventional hot water heating system was not only in keeping with his
customary ("institutionalized") role as architect, but also, in keeping
with his role as innovator, the initiator of new things and ideas.
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Likely, these factors would have been sufficient to gain the Board's
approval to use solar, but what also seems to have been important was the
manner in which Adams presented the possibility to the Board, in other
words, the meaning he attached to solar in introducing it. Importantly,
Adams did not just inform the Board of the technical aspects of the
technology or the operations of the HUD SHAC Program, but instead,
whether or not intentional, he presented the idea in a manner entirely in
keeping with the Board's overall disposition as well as their newly
institutionalized roles and routines. That is, Adams emphasized the
normative aspects of the innovation; given solar thermal's present status
and current energy circumstances, use of the technology was presented as
the proper, civic-minded thing to do. As a non-profit developer, the
Cathedral Square Corporation was in general motivated more by ideals than
by profit and thus likely to have been attracted to the normative
dimensions of the technology. What seems of particular importance,
though, is the new image desired by the Church, as Viele pointed out, the
Church's desire to become "more civic-minded and outward-looking, . . .
to take on projects that would serve the public good"-- in short, tasks
precisely fitting the bill of solar as presented by Adams.
Considering both Adams' personal and professional statuses and the
manner in which he introduced solar thermal, it is now more
understandable why the Cathedral Square Corporation agreed to participate
in the HUD SHAC Program, why solar thermal was, all of a sudden, "worth a
try." Indeed, with all such factors, it would seem, in retrospect, more
than a little suprising had the Board rejected Adams' idea. Of course
there were still negative aspects to be reckoned with. For example,
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participation in the program would require the planning and preparation
of another lengthy application. Yet here the Board could rely on Adams;
he would take charge of all planning-related matters having to deal with
solar as with other aspects of the physical design. As for possible
organizational problems in using the new technology, likely, the Board
was not aware, having had so little experience with housing development.
To the extent that such difficulties were anticipated, however, they
could again assume that they would be handled by Adams; he was, after
all, the project architect, with full responsibility for project design
and supervision during the housing production process.
Interestingly, in spite of Adams' abilities to convince the Board and
generally serve mediating and legitimating functions, Adams was himself
not altogether sold on solar. He was certain of the overall worthiness
of the effort; he feels a serious commitment to furthering the
development of solar, as he said, "someone has to try it . . ." However,
as noted, he was not entirely convinced on the technological and economic
aspects nor entirely certain of what a project of this scale would
entail. And unlike the Board, Adams likely had a focused view of the
uncertainties and potential problem areas; in other words, where the
Board might not have fully known of uncertainties regarding technical or
organizational aspects, one might expect an architect like Adams to have
been well aware of the possibility of such problems.
Thus far we have described Adams as the innovator, the one willing to
take risks for worthy causes, as a way of explaining his willingness to
use solar in this case. But what seems important to recognize, and adds
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another dimension to the issue, is the fact that the risk Adams is so
willing to take in this instance is not entirely his own. True, Adams'
reputation is at stake, and his competence and expertise as an architect
might be questioned should anything go wrong. But clearly, it is the
Cathedral Square Corporation that will suffer should any major
difficulties develop, whether resulting from the solar aspects of the
project or simply on account of the complications in dealing with another
branch in the federal bureaucracy and thus an additional set of
regulations and operating procedures.
Insofar as Adams likely felt a responsibility to protect his
client--it is one thing to gamble with ones own funds but clearly, he did
not want to put them too far out on a limb--it seems reasonable to
suspect that there were other factors convincing Adams that this was not
the case, and that solar was, after all, "do-able." In again going back
to the project chronology, the reasons why Adams was willing to assume
such risks on behalf of his client seem more clear.
As noted, when Adams read about the HUD SHAC Program, one of his
first steps was to contact someone he knew from the local building
community having expertise in this area, Bob Wheeler of Yankee Solar
Systems, Inc. In the discussions between the two that followed, Wheeler
performed an important function, acting as a sort of sounding board for
Adams, a fellow collaborator in the case. He also served as a conveyor,
providing information on solar, generally, and the particular solar
components which he distributed. Insofar as Wheeler was respected in the
local building community and seen as a credible and reliable information
source, he likely had a general mediating influence as well.
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Perhaps of even greater significance, though, was Wheeler's role as a
connector or linking agent; on the basis of personal and professional
associations he was able to connect their efforts to two additional
resources, both of which appear, in retrospect, to have been altogether
critical to the case. The first resource, the Daystar Corporation,
played a central role in helping to determine the overall feasibility of
the idea, in providing detailed information on different solar
components, and in providing general technical assistance on matters
relating to systems design and integration with the site. In these
capacities, Daystar served as the all-around expert, the ultimate
technical advisor, providing technical information just at the times when
it was needed. The importance of the Daystar connection was a point
underscored by Adams himself, "Quite simply, we did not have complete
information on other solar products; Daystar products seemed perfectly
reasonable to us on the basis of the available data. One thing was for
certain; if we hadn't gone with Daystar, we would not have gone with
anyone.
While Daystar was thus critical to the project, simply by virtue of
its accessibility, it is important to recognize why Daystar was so
readily seen as a reliable and credible information source (in contrast
to the vendor with a bias toward his/her particular product), why, in
other words, the offer of assistance was immediately so appealing. First
was the introduction through Wheeler, then a trusted colleague. A second
and perhaps even more important reason, was Daystar's previous experience
with the HUD SHAC Program; as noted, Daystar had been involved in both
Cycles 1 and 2, the obvious implication being that they had the
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competence and expertise to plan and participate in the HUD SHAC
Program. In short, Daystar knew just what would be required in terms of
a system and the application, and they were there to assist, on both
counts.
The second resource brought in by Wheeler was engineer James Brown.
Also locally based, known and respected by both Adams and Wheeler, he too
was a trustrworthy information source, another generally mediating force
to join the team. Importantly, Brown approached the technology strictly
from the perspective of mechanics, in other words, his area of
expertise. As one colleague summed up ". . . he (Brown) seemed not the
least bit ruffled by the fact that this was 'solar' . With this
approach to the technology, Brown not only served a general mediating
influence, but in a very real sense, was able to translate the innovation
from the state of something novel and uncertain to something more routine.
It is this cast of supporting individuals that took away some of the
riskiness from solar thermal, and in doing so, convinced Adams of the
feasibility of the idea. While Adams was obviously hoping to proceed
with solar, in other words, predisposed to favoring the idea, certainly
solar could not have been viewed as so risky or potentially uncertain
with commitments for assistance and confirmation of its feasibility by
two trusted and respected colleagues and access to the resources of an
organization like the Daystar Corporation.
Together then, on the basis of a sense of mutual trust and
compatability, both personal and professional, this group formed a sort
of self-reinforcing network, in general, performing the critical
mediating and legitimating functions and helping the individual
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participants to maintain a "forward-looking" attitude throughout. Of
course there were uncertain moments, and complications did arise, e.g.,
the need to redesign the roof area, the incidents with the roofers. Yet
by means of this "forward-looking," supportive network, it was possible
for the group to work its way through such problems, "to piece things
out, step by step." As one participant summed up: "Solar was something
new to us, something of a challenge. At times we could certainly have
benefitted from even further assistance; however, we knew we could make
sense of it collectively; we were determined to make this thing work."
Thus we see how a network of interpersonal affiliations and generally
supportive institutional contexts helped to make solar thermal a more
acceptable technology. As a non-profit developer the Cathedral Square
Corporation was likely more favorably disposed to solar thermal than the
average industry participant. But this was not sufficient to induce the
Corporation to participate in the HUD SHAC Program on its own. The
critical force in bringing this about was Adams, who, on the basis of
personal and professional attributes, his role as an architect in the
local community, membership in the Cathedral Square parish, and the
manner in which he presented the innovation to the Corporation, was able
to mediate the newness and uncertainty inherent in the new technology and
generally, legitimate its use. Coming from Adams, in the form presented,
the suggestion to use solar thermal in the Cathedral Square Project
seemed like an altogether reasonable thing to do.
Though Adams was himself regarded as an innovator, one predisposed to
taking risks of this type, because of the risks that this entailed for
his client, it is not clear that he would have done so altogether on his
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own in this case. What prompted his decision was the encouragement and
support provided by two trusted and respected colleagues and access to
the all-around technical expert and consultant, the Daystar Corporation.
Brought together by Wheeler, the linker, this self-reinforcing network
performed the critical mediating and legitimating functions for and among
themselves, and in this way, helped to move the technology from the stage
of novelty to something more routine. In sum, solar was neither too
unusual nor too risky when it entailed a close collaborative effort among
colleagues performing in their usual roles, and access to the resources
of an outside (but also trusted) expert.
1970
February
1972
Fall
1973
1976
September
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Chronology
Cathedral Square
Original building of the Cathedral Church of St. Paul,
of Burlington, burns.
New church building completed at Cathedral Square.
National Episcopal Church applies to HUD for funding of
$50 million to sponsor the development of housing.
Funds denied due to federal moratorium on housing
subsidies.
National Episcopal Church notified of availability of
$10 million in HUD Section 202 funds; asks Church of
Cathedral Square if they are still interested in
sponsoring a housing development; Church accepts the
offer.
Cathedral Square Corporation established under the
direction of James Viele; Anthony Adams AIA, of
Burlington, contracted as project architect.
Cathedral Square design stage begins.
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1977
January
February
- February/March
March
Spring
Fall
1978
Summer
Fall
Winter
1979
February
Adams learns of the HUD SHAC Program; contacts Robert
Wheeler of Yankee Solar Systems, Inc.; approaches the
Corporation's Board of Directors with the idea of using
solar.
Board and Adams agree to investigate the HUD SHAC
Program. Wheeler begins development of proposal with
technical assistance from the Daystar Corporation;
Wheeler contacts James Brown; Brown agrees to join Adams
and Wheeler on the project team.
Components selected; preliminary system design developed;
system design completed. Grant application drafted;
submitted to HUD.
HUD awards Cathedral Square Corporation grant of $91,000.
Project redesigned by Adams in order to comply with
local zoning ordinance; solar system also redesigned.
Cathedral Square design stage completed; construction
begins.
Installation of solar system begins.
Installation of solar system completed; solar system
operational ized.
Construction of building completed.
Cathedral Square occupied.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This chapter reviews the propositions under investigation in this
study and summarizes the study's major findings and implications
regarding solar thermal acceptance and program design. The chapter is
divided into two main sections. The first reviews the case studies and
identifies institutional forces common to the solar thermal acceptance
process. The second section presents the implications of the study for
the design of future programs and measures aiming to facilitate
acceptance of solar thermal technologies in the homebuilding industry.
The Major Institutional Forces
This study began by describing institutions and the institutional
context in which innovation acceptance takes place. We then utilized
this framework to assess the likely response of the homebuilding industry
to a new energy technology like solar thermal. Finally, we considered
three cases in which solar thermal was used in housing, attempting to
assess the factors that contributed to the acceptance of the innovation.
Though at times this approach likely appeared somewhat abstract,
perhaps overly theoretical, it is important to once again point out that
the primary purpose of the study is to illustrate something that is, in
essence, very simple. That is, we try to understand new things in
relation to things that we already know, things we already understand.
Thus, innovations are more likely to be accepted if they are connected or
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associated with things already accepted. In short, we connect the new to
the old, use the old, the familiar, to give meaning to the new.
As explained in Chapter 1, such manipulation was possible first,
because as new things innovations cannot be objectively seen and
understood; it is almost definitionally impossible to fully comprehend an
innovation in an objective manner. Moreover, the attributes of an
innovation are not altogether fixed, intrinsic to the innovation, but
instead, are developed by association and interchange with entities in
the existing institutional environment. Innovations are always
introduced into an existing institutional environment, a world of
regularized relationships and common assumptions about behavior in
different contexts. Thus, at least to some extent, an innovation can be
expected to take on a meaning consistent with the context in which it is
encountered. A builder, for example, seeing a technology like solar
thermal always installed and associated with the HVAC trades might, upon
cursory inspection, assume that it was a product having to do with
plumbing or heating, perhaps, another heating system. By contrast, the
technology might be taken to be something else if it was always installed
by and associated with the roofing trades. In a similar vein, one might
respond differently to a product or process that came highly recommended
by ones most trusted colleague as opposed to one used by an individual
considered "not too bright."
In short, an innovation is not evaluated on the basis of its
intrinsic characteristics alone; there is almost always some middle
ground, an area for malleability of its meaning. An innovation must, of
course, have some minimal degree of compatability with existing
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institutional routines if it is even to be considered initially.
However, after such initial consideration, acceptance of an innovation
depends largely on the process through which it is encountered and the
extent to which it acquires meaning compatible with existing
institutional meanings and routines.
Understanding the existing institutional environment is of further
importance in that it enables the definition of a means of mediating the
uncertainties and risks involved in innovation acceptance. By connecting
the innovation to existing institutional entities, and/or presenting it
in institutionally supportive contexts, the innovation is given a
framework within which it can be understood. In short, it become less
novel, less strange.
In reviewing the major activities and events in the three case
studies, it appears that this perspective on innovation acceptance has
been confirmed. Though the cases differ, each involving a distinct
developer type and therefore, different a priori dispositions toward the
innovation, there are many common themes throughout. In spite of their
varied operational modes and constraints, each developer had good reason
to oppose the use of solar thermal. In each case there appears to have
been limited prospects for the builder/developers to have chosen to use
solar thermal on their own, that is, without the facilitating effects of
institutional forces.
For example, one obvious constraint, shared by all three
builder/developers was cost, in particular, the high front end cost of
solar thermal equipment. In each case, this constraint was mitigated by
the same factor, this being the subsidy provided by the HUD SHAC
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Program. In each case, the subsidy was critical; the builder/developer
would not have utilized the technology without the grant. However, for a
variety of reasons, some particular to each case, but in general, owing
to the uncertain status of the technology at the present time, the
subsidy itself could not alter the innovation to make it adequately
compatible with existing routines of the builder/developers. In other
words, though the subsidy was necessary in each case, it was not
sufficient to induce the builders to use the technology.
Rather, as revealed in the project analyses for each case, the
decision to participate in the HUD SHAC Program, to use solar thermal,
and the ability to undertake the many activities that this entailed,
resulted from a variety of supporting institutional factors. As shown in
each of the three cases, this was due to the workings of a wide range of
individuals and organizations, who, because of their personal and
professional statuses and capabilities (that is, their institutionalized
roles and functions) were able to perform in a variety of supporting
roles, mediating the uncertainties of the technology and generally
legitimating its use. These institutional entities made solar thermal
seem less risky and less new, and endowed it with a more positive
status. Similarly, acceptance of the technology was facilitated by the
institutional contexts in which it was encountered, that is, contexts in
keeping with existing institutional meanings and.routines. In short, the
institutional forces made use of solar thermal seem both a worthwhile and
realistic thing to do.
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FacilitatingInstitutional Entities
The first factor common to each case is the importance of one or more
facilitating institutional entities. In each instance, solar thermal was
accepted because its entry was mediated by one or more significant
institutional entities. For example, in the 924 West End Avenue Case the
public interest organization CAN served as a linking institution, using
its established organizational base together with its wide range of
personal and professional affiliations to prompt solar thermal acceptance
by the 924 Co-op Board. CAN's ties to prominent researchers and
practicioners in the solar field coupled with its general organizational
skills and work procedures, enabled the organization to identify and
coordinate neded resources in an effective and timely manner throughout
the case. CAN enlisted the support and assistance of two individuals,
Richard Napoli and Arthur Weinstein, who, because of their personal and
professional capabilities were able to serve in centrally supporting
roles, the former on administrative and technical issues, the latter on
housing and finance issues. As shown, Arthur Weinstein performed an
altogether critical function in presenting the idea of the project to the
924 Co-op Board and in making solar thermal appear less uncertain and
less risky, by contrast, a reasonably positive thing to do.
Interestingly, it was through a similar process, (i.e., the mediating and
legitimating effects of the experts linked by CAN, e.g., Napoli,
Ehrenkrantz, Daystar and Crane) that Weinstein himself became convinced
of the value of the project; though as we concluded at the end of the
case, Weinstein played the part of the risk-taker i.e., the innovator, as
well.
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Though the names and circumstances are different in the other two
cases, the importance of facilitating institutional entities is
undeniable. In Burlington, there was Anthony Adams. In a manner similar
to Weinstein, Adams was able, to mediate and legitimate the technology for
the Cathedral Square Corporation's Board of Directors. This ability
derived from his personal and professional roles, for example, his
expertise as an architect, his position in the local community and his
membership in the Cathedral Square parish. As a consequence, solar
thermal seemed like something worth investigating from the start. Like
Weinstein, Adams was himself characterized as an innovator. He too was
aware of the uncertainties, the personal and professional risks
involved. Similarly, his final support of the project was the result of
the influences and support of other individuals and organizations,
notably, two trusted colleagues in the local building community, Robert
Wheeler and James Brown. These three, were, in turn, supported by the
Daystar Corporation who limited uncertainty regarding not only the
technology but also, the HUD SHAC Program.
Project Solar for Indiana provides another variation on the theme.
Here the HBAI assumed the critical legitimating, mediating and linking
roles. The HBAI is the organizational focus of the state's building
community and a credible and legitimate source of information for the
builders. As such, it has access to experts in every aspect of the
housing field and operates routinely to make links among its many
resources. Thus, it is easy to understand why, at the HBAI's suggestion,
solar thermal went from the category of something altogether unthinkable
to something at least plausible. And in ways similar to CAN in the 924
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West End case, the HBAI effectively marshalled the forces necessary to
carry out the project, assembling the group of seven builders and the
network of individuals and organizations (e.g., Puller, Moulder, Kennedy,
Vandermeer) who were able to serve further mediating, legitimating and
generally facilitating functions.
Facilitating Institutional Contexts
While we thus see how in each case a cast of individuals and
organizations in institutionally facilitative roles helped to reduce the
uncertainty and risk of solar thermal, in general, making it appear an
attractive and worthwhile technology, it is also necessary to recognize
the importance of facilitating institutional contexts. In each case, the
builder/developers encountered the innovation not only through
institutional entities themselves known and understandable, but also, in
contexts that were known and understandable, thus engendering further
mediating and legitimating effects.
For example, in the Cathedral Square Development case, Adams' ability
to influence the Board resulted not only from the fact that he was highly
respected, both professionally and personally, or simply from the fact
that he was a member of the Cathedral Square parish. The ability was
enhanced because Adams was perceived as fulfilling a routine role for the
developer--conveying information about new products and techniques. The
Burlington homebuilding industry routinely accepted and relied on
information from such sources. Moreover, Adams was known as an innovator
long before his involvement in the Cathedral Square Project. It was thus
altogether in keeping with accepted routine in this institutional context
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for Adams to suggest the use of new product. Further, Adams was known to
be concerned and committed to the development of alternative energy
resources, solar energy, in particular. Thus it was in keeping with the
institutional context that the new product suggested by Adams be a solar
one.
Similarly, the 924 West End Avenue case is an example of routinized
response to innovation and innovation prompters. Like Adams, Weinstein
was known to be something of an innovator. It had been his idea to
convert the building from rental to co-op, and it had been under his
direction that the conversion was carried out. Thus it was altogether in
keeping with the institutional context for Weinstein to initiate the idea
and then serve in a supervisory role. Further, like Adams, Weinstein was
known to have an interest. and strong commitment to furthering the use of
alternative energy resources, as well as an expertise in these areas.
Thus it was altogether understandable in terms of the existing
institutional context for Weinstein to be suggesting the use of new
energy technology like solar thermal.
Such contextual mediation is even more apparent in the Project Solar
for Indiana case. As the case analysis suggests, though the technology
was different, for the seven builders involved in the project, it was,
more or less, "business as usual." Most important in this regard was the
introduction of the technology through the HBAI. As the focus for the
state's builders and building related professionals, it is the place
industry members customarily turn to hear of new developments in the
field. Information about new products and practices of potential
relevance to the Indiana homebuilding industry routinely flows to and
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through the HBAI. Builders expect to be informed of new developments in
this way. Moreover, it is customary for the HBAI to sponsor group
projects of this type; this is, in fact, the primary purpose of the many
standing committees within the HBAI. Similarly, it is typically under
the direction of individuals like Puller that such group projects,
committee work, and other joint efforts are carried out. As a member of
many HBAI committees, active in the organization's affairs, Puller is an
individual of the type expected to lead the organization's projects.
Further, the actual planning and implementation of the project was
carried out in a manner consistent with the builders routines, matching
the stages of the housing production process. In essence, these were not
"solar houses" they were planning, but rather, "houses with solar." The
only difference from totally routine development was that the HVAC
product was solar thermal instead of conventional heating systems.
The Creation of Meaning for Innovation
In addition to the facilitating function of both supporting
institutional entities and supportive institutional contexts, the
particular meaning given to an innovation, when first presented to
potential users, is also an important factor. Here too, it is apparent
that existing institutional meanings were maintained in an effort to make
the technology more comprehensible. In the 924 West End Avenue case, for
example, Weinstein's presentation of the idea of the project to the
Co-op's Board of Directors emphasized the financial aspects of the
technology. Given the purpose behind the cooperative form of tenure, and
the particular function of a Co-op Board of Directors, these were the
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aspects of the technology most compatible with the co-op's routines.
Though appealing on political, environmental and philosophic grounds, the
distinguishing characteristic of the technology in Weinstein's
presentation was its financial appeal. In essence, solar thermal
provided a means for the co-op to achieve cost savings in operation, a
reduction in the co-op's annual operating budget. As explained in the
project analysis, it was on this aspect that the 924 Co-op Board was
finally convinced of the projects desirability, including a willingness
to invest co-op resources.
In Indiana, the novelty aspects of the technology were emphasized in
the initial presentation. Though a new product with environmental
bonuses and potential future utility, in Indiana, solar is something so
out of the ordinary that it could serve as a calling card, a means of
attracting attention to subdivisions as Moulder's solar house had done.
Obviously, considering the competitive conditions of local housing
markets, this was a matter of importance to the builders.
In Burlington, the normative aspects of the technology were
emphasized in the initial presentation. Considering the current energy
situation, use of a technology like solar thermal, even in its
underdeveloped state, was nothing less than the civic-minded thing to do,
an effort consistent with the Corporation's normative motivations. Solar
thermal was a technology that not only promised significant environmental
benefits but symbolic bonuses as well. As Adams put it, "A solar array
makes a public spirited type feel warm, . . . that the government is
actually doing something about our energy circumstances." While is it
clear that such normative aspects would have appealed to most non-profit
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developer types, this was particularly attractive to the Cathedral Square.
Corporation. After all, the motivation behind the entire project was to
"better serve the community," the public good. It was in this spirit
that, as Viele recalled, the Board had decided "solar was worth a try."
Caveats
While the three case studies thus clearly illustrate the less
objective, "softer" dimension in the innovation acceptance process and
underscore the importance of institutional forces hertofore ignored (or
at least, vastly understated) it is necessary to offer certain
qualifications. While it is evident that such institutional forces can
and do help in the acceptance of innovation, it is important to
realistically assess the potentials of such forces. One cannot conclude
that innovations will invariably be accepted if they are encountered in
supportive institutional contexts, conveyed by favored institutional
entities or connected with existing institutional meanings. Innovation Q
will not be acceptable just because trusted source M says it is a good
thing and it is encountered in familiar institutional context Y.
Obviously, this would be a rather simplistic interpretation. For in some
cases it is clear that all the institutional support possible will not be
able to make an innovation acceptable to potential users. For example,
solar thermal may be technically uncertain and risky at the present time,
its claims for efficiency, durability, reliability, and so on, unproven.
However, one can be sure that if solar thermal proves in time, to be, in
fact, inefficient, or unreliable, it will not stand a chance at gaining
acceptance in the homebuilding industry. Such technical attributes are
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objective facts which cannot be mediated. (It is also likely, however,
that if such inefficiency or unreliability are true, it would not be
possible to assemble such sweeping institutional support).
Similarly, supportive institutional forces cannot overcome a lack of
economic feasibility. The builder/developers in the three cases would
not have utilized solar thermal had it not been for the grants from the
HUD SHAC Program. In the 924 West End Avenue case, solar thermal was
entirely out of the question without the grant; as Weinstein put it, it
amounted to "selling the building out." Similarly, both small to
medium-sized speculative builders and non-profit developers have obvious
resource constraints. Neither the seven Indiana builders nor the
Cathedral Square Corporation would have made the financial commitment to
solar thermal without the grant from the HUD SHAC Program.
But while the HUD SHAC grant was critical in each case--in essence,
it brought the technology to the middle ground, the area where the
meaning of the innovation can be manipulated--it was not, as noted
earlier, sufficient to induce the builder/developers to use solar
thermal. As explained, the decision to participate in the HUD SHAC
Program, to use solar thermal technology was the result of a range of
institutional forces, the introduction of the innovation by facilitating
institutional entities, in supportive institutional contexts, the
connection with favored institutional meanings and routines, together
with the HUD grant. The facilitating institutional factors made possible
the initial consideration of solar thermal. Then, the HUD grant (itself
having routine attributes in terms of entity, context and meaning) made
the financial considerations possibile, in essence, making possible the
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means for compensating for the most blatant incompatability of the
technology, i.e., product cost. Finally, the supporting networks
(including the HUD financial support) made possible a continuing
commitment to installation and ongoing use. In short, acceptance and
adoption is a continuing process, requiring explicit positive response at
each decision point. It is the result of a long chain of causes and
conditioning factors, dependent on both the intrinsic characteristics of
the innovation and the process through which it is encountered in the
existing institutional environment.
Implications for Future Pr amDesign
It is clearly beyond the scope of the present study to make elaborate
recommendations on how solar thermal might be made a more acceptable
technology to homebuilding industry members. Nor is it possible to fully
address the broader dynamics relating to institutionalization of the
technology in the industry overall. However, the major events in the
three case studies and the experiences of the many individuals involved
in these projects do present a number of common themes which have
important implications for future program design efforts.
Issues with a Problematic Technology
This study confirms the view of solar thermal as a highly problematic
technology, problematic in its inherent engineering and other "technical"
attributes as well as in its match with major homebuilding industry
routines. Both engineering and industry routine mismatch problems must
be resolved before the technology is accepted in the homebuilding
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industry. In its present form, solar thermal is incompatible with a
number of critical routines of the builder/developer; thus, there is good
reason for resistance if not lack of serious interest on the
builder/developer's part. Cost is likely the most serious obstacle at
the present time. Quite simply, the payback period is too long, the
front end cost too large. While this appears the most pressing issue, it
is clearly not the only factor currently deterring the use of
technology. Solar thermal is directly incompatible with industry design
and aesthetic standards. It is at odds with major industry norms, most
importantly, the homebuyer's traditional view of what a house should be.
Moreover, as a new technology just making its introduction into the
industry, solar thermal entails major uncertainties in nearly every
activity in every stage in the housing production process, from
preparation through distribution and service. Finally, and equally
important, are the uncertainties inherent in the technology itself; basic
questions about product reliability, efficiency and durability, in both
design and performance, have yet to be resolved.
Based on this review, it is clear that solar thermal must resolve
many substantive issues before it will be widely used in the industry.
And it is clear that program efforts designed to facilitate such ends
must account for both the uncertainties inherent in the technology, that
is, questions of technical adequacy, as well as the instances of
incompatibility with industry routines; obviously, a product that matches
routines, but does not work (or entails many uncertainties and high risks
in these regards) wil not be accepted. Similarly, a product that works,
technically, but does not match industry routines e.g., cost, design and
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aesthetic considerations, among others, can be expected to meet stiff
resistance.
The Innovation Introduction Process
Beyond reaffirming such substantive problems and grounds for
resistance, and the general problematic nature of the technology, this
review of solar thermal has, at the same time, identified several forces
which facilitate the acceptance of innovation in the homebuilding
industry. Central to the analysis is the view that an innovation is not
likely to be accepted simply on the basis of an objective evaluation of
its intrinsic characteristics. Rather, innovation acceptance is partly a
function of the process in which it is introduced and encountered in the
institutional environment, its connections with existing institutional
entities and routines. An institutionally sensitive innovation
introduction process will not compensate for blatantly incompatible
intrinsic characteristics of an innovation. However, such a process can
significantly enhance the acceptance of any plausible innovation. As
shown in the three case studies, an institutionally sensitive process was
both necessary and effective in inducing the builder/developers to use
solar thermal and participate in the HUD SHAC Program. In short,
presentation of an innovation though an institutionally sensitive
process, can have a significant effect on the rate and extent of
innovation acceptance.
Given such potentials, there appear obvious implications for
enhancing the acceptability of solar thermal technologies and
facilitating more widespread use in the homebuilding industry. That is,
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to utilize an institutionally sensitive approach(s) in conjunction with
measures aimed at making the solar thermal a more plausible technology,
measures, that is, that will correct or compensate for the blatant
incompatibilities of the technology and bring it within the range of
malleability noted earlier. In essence, the existing institutional
structure would be used to its fullest advantage in order to heighten the
potentialities of programs and measures addressing substantive problem
areas.
Utilization of the institutional structure to its fullest advantage
is, of course, a rather broad directive which may take any number of
forms. However, the essential thrust of the approach is very simple; it
entails an examination of the existing institutional structure, that is,
an identification of the existing institutional entities, their
functions, activities and roles, the relationships between and among
them, the channels or mechanisms, through which they interact, the medium
typically used, and so on. Who, for example, typically performs what
functions, under what circumstances, to what advantage? Which entities
are likely to be taken as credible information sources, in which
contexts? Further, which entities are likely capable of providing
support and assistance of the type needed? An examination of this sort
will enable program development efforts which take the appropriate
institutional forces into account--in short, forces that may be used to
facilitate the acceptance of the innovation. (By the same token, forces
detrimental to the acceptance of the innovation, e.g., institutional
entities -likely to oppose the innovation, contexts which might, for
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whatever reason, give the innovation a negative image, can also be
identified and taken into account in program development efforts.)
For example, a more institutionally sensitive approach to the HUD
SHAC Program might have tried to identify potentially facilitating
organizations beforehand, and deliberately utilzed them in the program
implementation strategy, if not in the design of the program itself. For
example, in Indiana, even a cursory examination of the state's
homebuilding community would have revealed the centrality of the HBAI,
the organization's role as a reliable and credible information source, as
well as its access to a wide range of resources and expertise. HUD might
have targeted its approach at the HBAI more directly, rather than having
the HBAI become involved in the haphazard way it did. Similarly, a
review of the New York City housing market would suggest that co-ops were
ideal initial accepters, and that environmental groups like CAN could be
effective in project initiation and implementation. Whether or not
environmental groups like CAN would be used directly in program
implementation strategies, given their institutionalized roles as
organizational facilitators and/or linking institutions, it would, in any
event, appear advantageous for such organizations to be kept well
informed of program efforts, such that they might pass on the information
and perform their usual linking and facilitating functions. In a similar
vein, given the role of the architect in the housing production process,
the architect's institutionalized role as a conveyor of information about
new products and building techniques, an institutionally sensitive
program design approach would take explicit measures to ensure that
architects are informed of program efforts, if not involved in a more
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direct way, such that they might suggest the use of solar thermal to
potential users, and generally, facilitate the use of the technology.l
It is important to recognize that utilization of an institutionally
sensitive approach can. also help to prompt appropriate resolution of
intrinsic characteristics that presently deter the use of the
technology. For example, as the preceding examples suggest, and as shown
in the three case studies, existing institutional forces can compensate
for some of the uncertainties presently confronting the technology,
importantly, uncertainties both real (i.e., concerning "technical
matters") and symbolic (i.e., definitional uncertainties of an
innovation). For example, in connecting solar thermal with an
organization like the HBAI, it was possible to assemble the resources and
expertise needed to actually plan and implement a solar project, while at
the same time, because of the familiarity of the organization and its
procedures to the builders (i.e., the HBAI's attributes of routine and
stability), some of the more symbolic uncertainties were lessened.
1Why, for example, an individual like Anthony Adams, an architect
with an unusually strong commitment to alternative energy resources,
solar in particular, and moreover, an individual noted for awareness of
new developments in the energy field, should have had to wait until he
was more than three months into the design of a housing project before
learning about the availability of subsidies from the HUD SHAC Program
seems a bit suspicious. This one incident is not necessarily
representative of the HUD SHAC program strategy as a whole. But it is
clear, in any event, that had HUD been more sensitive to the
institutional context of the industry, to the roles and functions of the
architect in particular, HUD program efforts might have been publicized
through channels of the type that Adams (and other architects)
customarily rely on to learn about new developments in their field, e.g.,
architectural journals, periodicals, publications of the American
Institute of Architects, and the like. In so bypassing the institutional
structure, it is possible that HUD missed out on important program
opportunities.
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Further, by virtue of the organization's credibility and high standing in
the homebuilding community, the technology was given a more positive
image, as well as a more specific meaning compatible with the builders'
institutional routines. Similarly, in the Cathedral Square case, Adams
was able to serve mediating and legitimating functions by virtue of
personal and professional attributes, while at the same time, by virtue
of his connections to individuals like Wheeler and Brown and in turn,
Wheeler's connections to the Daystar Corporation, it was possible to
amass the technical skills and expertise needed to carry out the project,
thus lessening the actual uncertainties and risks that use of the
technology entailed.
It is important to point out that while an institutionally sensitive
innovation process can thus reduce some of the uncertainties currently
confronting the technology, a continued sensitivity to such institutional
processes, how, for example, the innovation is being used, to what
effect, by which entities, and so on, will yield useful information on
emerging meaning(s) attributed to the innovation. To the extent that
such meaning reveals problems with the intrinsic characteristics, either
technical limitations such as engineering problems, or instances of
incompatability with homebuilding industry routines, the innovation
disseminators can then make possible appropriate modifications of the
innovation or modifications in program strategies. If, for example,
program monitoring reveals technical problems with a given solar system,
a particular manufacturer, or any flaws affecting product performance,
reliability or cost effectiveness, appropriate action might be taken such
that these limitations do not engender negative meanings for solar
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thermal and further deter its use. In the 924 West End Avenue case, for
example, the Daystar Corporation responded to evidence of technical
complications, thus retaining a positive view of both its activities and
products and solar thermal in general. By comparison, HUD, as shown, did
not systematically monitor the institutional context, thus likely missing
opportunities to build off its program successes in each of the three
cases.2
Summary of Implications
Thus there are many reasons to use an institutional approach to
innovation acceptance, rather than relying exclusively on measures and
incentives relating to substantive issues, as exemplified in the HUD SHAC
program strategy of technical development and financial subsidy. Quite
simply, the traditional market approach to inducing change in the
homebuilding industry does not seem to be sufficient in the case of a
replacement technology of the intrinsic characteristics of solar
thermal. Though an institutional approach will not overcome an
2Though the case studies are highly suggestive in these regards, the
objective at this point is not to critique or even analyze the HUD SHAC
Program in terms of its "institutional sensitivity" or its approach to
substantive issues. For further discussion and analysis of program
objectives, strategies and accomplishments, see "National Solar Heating
and Cooling Demonstration Program, A Roundtable Discussion with the Solar
People at HUD and ERDA," Solar Age, December 1977, pp. 9-16; Oversight
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy, Research, Development and
Demonstration, the House Committee on Science and Technology on
Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974, 94th Congress, 1st
Session,~~Ray 13, 14, 15, T976; and&Tfh&5as-HI.Sianton et al., "Clouded
Progress: An Evaluation of the HUD Residential Solar Energy Program,"
Washington, D.C.: Housing Research Group of the Center for Study of
Responsive Law, 1976.
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inadequate technology, we have seen evidence that such an approach can
significantly facilitate innovation acceptance, even in the face of very
real engineering problems and examples of incompatability with major
industry routines. Use of existing institutional forces can help to
compensate for such negative intrinsic attributes of the innovation, in
addition to providing leveraging potential needed to overcome the more
symbolic, i.e., definitional uncertainties and resistance to innovation.
Needless to say, given the structure of the homebuilding industry,
the general disposition of industry actors, and the many examples of
solar thermal's mismatch with homebuilding industry routines, solar
thermal technologies will not be institutionalized in the homebuilding
industry overnight. Further, given the complexity of the issues involved
and the number of different interests at stake, it is clear that no
single piece of legislation, no single program or activity can possibly
be expected to resolve the many problematic aspects of the technology.
However, given the evidence provided in these three case studies, it is
clear that soundly conceived strategies with institutional dimensions,
that is, programmatic strategies that utilize the existing institutional
structure in a sensitive and imaginative way, can do much to enhance the
probability of successful introduction of solar thermal technologies.
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APPENDIX
Exhibit A: Interview Schedule
[Note: Use actual name of organization instead of "your organization."]
We are first interested in understanding the role of your organization
in this housing market.
1. In general, what role does your organization assume in this housing
market?
2. What activities does your organization pursue in carrying out its
role in the housing market?
[Note: Here pursue information on the organization viewed internally,
and in relation to the overall market.]
3. What are your duties and responsibilities in the organization?
(a) How long have you been in this position?
(b) How long have you worked in the organization? in housing?
4. (a) How large is the organization?
(b) How long has the organization been in existence?
(c) What is the make-up of the staff?
We are interested in how innovations are accepted in the housing sector,
and how your organization relates to that process. In particular, we
would like to discuss your organization's experience with solar thermal
forms of heating and cooling.
5. Can you recall when and how your organization first learned about
solar thermal?
6. In what way was your organization involved with solar thermal?
[Note: Questions 7 and 8 are prompting questions. Respondent should be
answering 5 and 6 in the time and sources/information-orientation mode.
Use 7 and 8 to be certain ground is covered.]
7. Time-orientation
(a) What did your organization do first?
(b) What did you do then? and then? . . .
8. Sources/information-orientation
(a) What sources of information did you rely on?
(b) How did that information get to you?
(c) What kinds of information did you get from these sources?
d) How important was (name each source) in making your decision?
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[Note: expands on data from 8.]
9. (a) How did the actions of other organizations influence your
organization's actions?
(b) What aspects of solar thermal did your organization examine?
We have focused on the specific aspects of your organization's use of
solar thermal in residential settings. Before we move on, can we
briefly summarize in a somewhat broader context.
10. As you think back, then, what were the key factors in determining
your organization's adoption of solar thermal?
11. Have you now made solar thermal a part of your routine activities
in the housing market? (Pursue reasons for answer.)
12. Thinking about the housing market more generally, which
organizations have favored solar thermal? Which opposed it? Which
participated? Which did not?
13. In carrying out your organization's present role in the housing
market, what other organizations do you deal with?
14. Which of those organizations would it be useful for us to see in
studying acceptance of solar thermal?
(a) Why do you think these people and/or organizations are
important?
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Exhibit B: Thesis Interviewees
Project Solar for Indiana:
Chaille, John. Director of Information and Education, Conservation
Department, Indiana Department of Commerce, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Kennedy, Lee. Director of Sales and Marketing, The Hedback Corporation,
Indianapolis, Indiana.
Kibler, Thomas. Director, Indianapolis Energy Office, Indianapolis,
Indiana (formerly Director of the Indiana Energy Office).
Laycock, Thomas. President, A.H.M Graves, Inc., Builders & Developers,
Indianapolis, Indiana (formerly President of the HBAI).
Moulder, Stephen. President, The Moulder Corporation, Greenwood,
Indiana.
Puller, Kenneth. President, Puller Mortgage Associates, Inc.,
Indianapolis, Indiana.
Reilly, John. President, R&R Builders, Cumberland, Indiana.
Shure, Patricia. Designer, Hutchcraft Associates, Architects,
Indianapolis, Indiana (formerly Energy Director of Puller Mortgage
Associates, Inc.)
Steinkeamp., Harold. President, Steinkamp Builders, Batesville, Indiana.
Vandermeer, Albert. Director of Sales and Marketing, Davidson
Industries, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Weiss, Robert. Associate Director, The Home Builders Association of
Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana.
924 West End Avenue
Hunt, Irmgard. Director, Consumer Action Now, New York, New York.
Napoli, Richard. Deputy Director of the Center for Regional Technology
and the Solar Energy Application Center, Polytechnic Institute of
New York, Brooklyn, New York.
Weinstein, Arthur. Attorney, New York, New York (formerly Deputy
General Counsel for the New York State Energy Research and
Development Administration).
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Cathedral Square
Adams, Anthony. Anthony Adams AIA Architect, Burlington, Vermont.
Brown, James. President, Jennison Engineering, Inc., Consulting
Engineers, Burlington, Vermont.
Viele, James. President, Cathedral Square Corporation, Burlington,
Vermont.
Wheeler, Robert. President, Yankee Solar Systems, Inc., Burlington,
Vermont.
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